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Global environmental conventions are created to address and resolve global 
environmental problems. Assessments of the achievement of specific environmental 
goals, however, indicate that there is room for progress and that stronger collective action 
is required. Given that there are no empirical instruments to measure implementation and 
to determine the factors behind individual countries’ results, challenges emerge that 
require the expansion of existing analytical frameworks around environmental 
conventions and their role as global governance instruments. This study develops an 
empirical instrument – the Environmental Conventions Index – to assess the 
implementation of global environmental conventions, determining the main trends for 
both countries and conventions. Using a mixed methods approach, it analyzes the 
 implementation of four conventions in two clusters – pollution and conservation – by all 
member states and illustrates trends over time (15 years). The study also examines the 
underlying reasons for countries’ performance and explains the governance mechanisms 
of international environmental agreements. As the international community is at 
crossroads in the solution of global environmental challenges and the implementation of 
new agendas for sustainable development, countries’ commitment to international 
environmental goals should occupy center stage in the political debate. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 
 
 
 
Environment is the foundation for human life. The natural environment—land, 
water, air, and living species—has been humanity’s source of sustenance, shelter, 
services, and spirituality. However, population growth and the quest for economic growth 
have drastically transformed the environment, affecting the functioning of planetary 
systems in ways that threaten Earth’s resilience and adaptation capacity. Recent 
scholarship has pointed to the urgency of the environmental crisis. We have crossed four 
of a total of nine planetary boundaries that have been defined as the “safe operating 
space” within which humans can function (Steffen et al., 2015). Human pressure on 
climate change, biodiversity, chemicals, and land has exceeded the levels required for the 
stability of earth systems. In addition, the inequality behind economic growth has brought 
dynamism and advancement in human welfare for some, while others face economic, 
social, and environmental challenges. Ultimately, we clearly need to integrate the three 
dimensions of sustainable development—people, planet, and prosperity—in the context 
of peaceful societies and global partnerships.1
                                                
1 This logical construction of people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership was defined by the 2030 
UN Sustainable Development Agenda, as critical areas for action for humanity and the planet towards the 
promotion of sustainable development (UN General Assembly, 2015). 
 2 
Traditionally, environmental issues were local concerns, since their sources and 
consequences seemed confined to a certain physical space. Solutions to environmental 
concerns were thought to lie within the actors and functions of national governments. 
Problems like pollution, biodiversity loss, deforestation, climate change, ozone layer 
depletion, and desertification, however, have brought attention to the planetary dimension 
of the environmental challenge. Even problems such as deforestation and desertification, 
which are connected to specific territories, are now considered to have regional and 
global consequences. The traditional understanding of these issues as local or national is 
no longer accurate; they need to be mapped from an international perspective, as 
concerns for global governance and human security. Moreover, most contemporary 
environmental problems are multidimensional, complex, and defy clear delimitations. In 
fact, environmental issues are clear examples of the interconnectedness of the 
contemporary world and the need for international cooperation.  
Almost five decades ago states began to recognize their inability to address 
critical environmental problems on a national basis. At the same time, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) started calling for new international initiatives to facilitate 
cooperative responses on environmental protection and conservation. Under the auspices 
of the United Nations (UN), the architecture for global environmental governance took 
shape around the establishment, in 1972, of the UN Environment Programme, known 
previously as UNEP and today as UN Environment. Created from the international 
community’s conviction of “the urgent need for intensified action, at the national and 
international level, in order to limit and, where possible, to eliminate the impairment of 
 3 
the human environment” (United Nations, 1968) UN Environment started numerous 
initiatives involving international environmental cooperation. 
Since 1972, the international community has undertaken multiple efforts to create 
institutions and mechanisms that bring governments and other actors together on specific 
environmental agendas for action, especially global environmental conventions. 
However, in the specific case of these agreements, there is no systematic assessment that 
evaluates the progress in their implementation, and how countries are translating these 
global commitments into national policies. This dissertation aims to bring empirical data 
and analysis to the question of the implementation of global environmental conventions, 
in order to improve these processes and to expand the analytical framework on the 
concepts of implementation and effectiveness in global governance.  
Also known as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), environmental 
conventions are agreements between multiple governments “intended as legally binding 
with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural 
resources” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 431; 2016).2 These international legal instruments address 
global environmental problems, raise awareness, gather information, and promote 
coordinated action towards effective solutions (Brunée, 2006; Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 
1993; Mitchell, 2010; Steiner, Kimball, & Scanlon, 2003) (see Table 1). However, 
environmental challenges persist. In 2016, the Second Meeting the UN Environment 
Assembly (UNEA) called attention to the effects of air pollution on health, estimating 
                                                
2 This study uses the term global environmental conventions instead of multilateral environmental 
agreements to reflect that the agreements included in this study are considered truly global because of their 
membership and scope. As a concept, multilateral environmental agreements can also refer to treaties with 
a smaller list of countries.  
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that “7 million people across the world die each year due to everyday exposure to poor air 
quality”, 7 percent of which are caused directly by chemical pollution (UNEP & WHO, 
2016, p. 3). In a similar pattern, the 2016 Red List published by the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) called attention to the global extinction crisis (IUCN, 
2016). Ecosystems and biota across the world remain threatened by the adverse effects of 
economic activities and climate change. For example, the total global area of wetlands 
declined an estimated 64-71 percent in the twentieth century (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e). 
These issues raise questions about the extent to which international cooperation 
functions, about the success of implementation of specific mechanisms such as the global 
environmental conventions, and about whether, and to what extent, international 
agreements contribute to solving environmental problems. 
As environmental conventions increased over the years in both number and 
membership, they transformed into decisive global frameworks to guide policy responses 
to protect the environment (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; DeSombre, 2004; Mitchell, 
2003). The academic literature about these global governance instruments has addressed 
various issues, from the process of negotiation and treaty formation (Bodansky, 2010; 
Chasek, 1997; Dimitrov, 2003; Gehring, 2007; Susskind, 1994; Susskind, Dolin, & 
Breslin, 1992) to their operationalization for the achievement of global environmental 
goals (Breitmeier, Underdal, & Young, 2011; Breitmeier, Young, & Zürn, 2006; Brown-
Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Cameron, Werksman, & Roderick, 1996; Choucri, 1995; Hanf 
& Underdal, 2000; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Miles et al., 2002; Victor, Raustiala, 
& Skolnikoff, 1998; Oran R. Young, 1979; Oran R. Young & Levy, 1999), and to the 
interactions between the governing bodies of agreements and their state parties (Andresen 
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& Skjærseth, 1999; Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhüner, 2009; Biermann & Bauer, 2003; 
Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Desai, 2010; Sandford, 1994; Wiersema, 2009). 
Additionally, the policy world reinforced the importance of environmental conventions 
both globally and nationally. In 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20) recognized the importance of MEAs and highlighted their contributions to 
sustainable development (United Nations, 2012a). The concern at the core of the analysis 
of global environmental conventions, however, has been their effectiveness in the solution 
of global environmental problems.  
Frequently, international legal scholars tend to view the implementation of 
international commitments as the norm. As first suggested by in his 1979 book How 
Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time” 
(p. 661). In the case of international environmental conventions, different studies have 
approached the question of their implementation through different methodologies. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, qualitative and quantitative analyses assessed whether states 
had taken the steps required to achieve international environmental agreements and their 
outcomes (Breitmeier et al., 2006; Miles et al., 2002; Victor et al., 1998; Oran R. Young, 
1999). Almost all these studies, however, agree that measuring the effects of global 
environmental conventions on national policies and the environment is difficult. Factors 
such as the structure and clarity of obligations defined by the conventions, as well as lack 
of agreement about what constitutes compliance and implementation, impede the 
establishment of concrete methodologies to provide empirical systematic data across 
countries and conventions, to help us understand the extent to which countries have 
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translated their global environmental commitments into national policies that improve the 
state of the environment. To overcome these obstacles, we must first understand how 
environmental conventions are being implemented at the national level. In other words, 
assessing national implementation of conventions and explaining why countries perform 
differently is essential to understanding the dynamics and effectiveness of global 
conventions in addressing environmental challenges.  
Many stakeholders have recognized the positive effects of conventions on global 
environmental problems. In 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20) acknowledged the “significant contributions to sustainable development made 
by the multilateral environmental agreements” (United Nations, 2012a para. 89). 
International cooperation is needed to address increasingly complex environmental 
problems, and multilateral agreements have contributed to the definition of policies, aims, 
and actions of countries to achieve environmental conservation and sustainability (UNEP, 
2012b; UNEP, University of Joensuu, & Government of Canada, 2007). Regarding 
specific conventions, for example, an 2016 evaluation of the Stockholm Convention 
stated that it provides a dynamic framework to regulate persistent organic pollutants 
(POPs)—a group of chemicals with common features including persistence, 
bioaccumulation, and long-range transport—throughout their lifecycle (Stockholm 
Convention, 2016b). CITES as well has listed more than 35,000 species that are now 
protected by tools such as trade measures, species management plans, and enforcement 
actions (CITES, 2013a).  
However, assessments of specific environmental goals indicate that there is still 
room for progress and that stronger collective action is required. In 2012, the fifth edition 
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of Global Environmental Outlook (GEO-5) evaluated the progress of ninety global 
environmental goals from existing MEAs and non-legally binding instruments.3 A 
summary of those results, published as Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals & 
Gaps, found that only three out of thirty-five goals summarized there have achieved 
significant progress, and that “there has been little or no progress or further deterioration 
on about half of the goals and objectives assessed by the GEO-5” (UNEP, 2012a, 2012b). 
Furthermore, several research and data gaps were identified. The main conclusion was 
that the “international community (had) made very uneven progress in achieving these 
goals and improving the state of the environment” (UNEP, 2012b, p. 31). Given the 
urgency of environmental threats, new analytical frameworks are required to study the 
policy and legal instruments that address them. Analyzing environmental conventions 
requires then, empirical data collection and coordination, and the definition of 
measurable indicators that establish international standards, make data available for all 
countries, and improve knowledge about global environmental conventions, their 
implementation, and effectiveness.  
This dissertation addresses that challenge. As part of my work at the Center for 
Governance and Sustainability at the University of Massachusetts Boston, I worked as 
one of the principal investigators in the design of an empirical instrument—the 
Environmental Conventions Index (ECI)—to assess the implementation of global 
environmental conventions. This instrument thus establishes a foundation for the 
                                                
3 These goals were defined as part of an initiative started by the Government of Switzerland to identify 
specific indicators that served for the establishment of a reliable baseline against which to measure progress 
and to establish monitoring systems for the collection of data on critical environmental issues at regular 
intervals (UNEP, 2012d). 
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assessment of countries’ progress on their international environmental obligations and 
contributes new insights to the literature on global environmental governance and 
international environmental law. The ECI is part of a broader research and outreach 
initiative—the Environmental Conventions Project—that not only aims to assess 
implementation, but to generate a policy space to support countries in the fulfillment of 
their global environmental commitments. Ultimately, this work could help countries 
better achieve their obligations under the global environmental conventions, thus 
providing opportunities for learning and contributing to the solution of global 
environmental problems.  
Using quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze the information from 
governments and conventions, my analysis offers insights into the actual role of 
multilateral environmental agreements in the broader system of global governance and 
their contribution to sustainable development. Previous efforts in international 
environmental politics scholarship lack the broad scope of this assessment and the 
standardized empirical approach, and therefore offer limited evidence on which to build 
theory and provide practical advice to policy-makers. As the international community 
moves forward with the implementation of a new agenda for sustainable development, 
empirical data and evidence-based understanding are imperative, and countries’ 
commitment to international environmental goals should occupy center stage in the 
political debate. 
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International cooperation for the environment 
 Global governance—the definition, implementation, and monitoring of global 
policies—describes the extent to which collective choices will benefit humanity and 
protect the environment. Laws, institutions, international organizations, international 
agreements, government agencies, local initiatives, and decision-making processes 
belong to the systems of governance established by the international community to act 
together on specific agendas for action. In the case of the environmental challenge, the 
extent to which global governance instruments are being implemented is a particularly 
difficult and important question, whose answer will determine the future of the 
environment and our progress towards sustainable development.  
In 1972, the international community held its first-ever global summit on the 
environment. Three years earlier, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
recommended to the UN General Assembly the definition of specific mechanisms to 
discuss member states’ views on problems of the human environment; to evaluate the 
progress already being made by governments, international organizations, and NGOs; 
and to identify areas requiring international cooperation (United Nations, 1968). The 
international community recognized that “a growing class of environmental problems, 
because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the common 
international realm, will require extensive cooperation among nations and action by 
international organizations in the common interest” (United Nations, 1972), and that 
managing these problems requires “a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on 
an equal footing” (United Nations, 1972, Principle 24). 
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These efforts flourished during the next two decades, and as UN Environment 
evolved into the anchor institution for the global environment (Ivanova, 2009), other 
governance mechanisms—including several global environmental conventions—were 
negotiated. To achieve sustainable development, it was clear that effective international 
cooperation structures were required (WCED, 1987). In 1992, the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED)—also known as the Earth Summit—
reaffirmed governments’ intention  to establish “new levels of cooperation among states, 
key sectors of societies and people” (United Nations, 1992a). Its implementation plan, 
known as Agenda 21, defined international legal instruments and mechanisms as crucial 
to achieving sustainable development. UNCED also acknowledged the essential 
importance of countries' participation in these mechanisms, the need for implementation 
strategies, and the importance of assessing the implementation of these instruments to 
ensure the efficacy and effectiveness of international cooperation (UNCED, 1992). 
Twenty years later, Rio+20 reinforced this message as countries agreed “to promote 
policy coherence at all relevant levels, improve efficiency, […] and enhance coordination 
and cooperation among (the) multilateral environmental agreements” (United Nations, 
2012a para. 89). 
Within this framework, multiple international environmental law mechanisms 
have been established to promote environmental conservation, including bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to bring governments and other actors together on specific 
environmental agendas (United Nations, 1972), particularly global environmental 
conventions. These agreements were initially created in the nineteenth century to manage 
shared environmental resources (DeSombre, 2004). Starting in the 1970s, however, they 
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experienced two fundamental changes. First, the creation of UN Environment constituted 
a new framework for global environmental governance. Second, the number of 
conventions began to increase (see Figure 1). Thus, environmental conventions became 
key to the system of global environmental governance, with the goal of centralizing 
commitments and innovations around environmental problems (Steiner et al., 2003).  
The number of environmental agreements has now reached more than 1,250 
(Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; DeSombre, 2004; Mitchell, 2016) (see Figure 1), 
addressing transboundary environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity 
loss, and chemical pollution. However, only perhaps fifteen of them could be considered 
truly global in both membership (universal) and scope (global) (see Table 1). Over the 
same period, these conventions have also experienced a significant increase in 
membership (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1 Historical evolution in number of international environmental agreements 
 
Source of data: (Mitchell, 2016) 
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Table 1 Global Environmental Conventions 
  Start 
Year 
Parties 
(No.) 
Atmosphere • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  1992 197 
Biodiversity 
• Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
• Convention on International Wetlands (Ramsar Convention) 
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) 
• Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS) 
1992 
1971 
1973 
 
1979 
196 
169 
183 
 
124 
Chemicals 
and Waste 
• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  
• Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes 
• Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure  
• Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer 
2001 
1989 
 
1998 
1987 
181 
185 
 
157 
197 
Land • UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 1994 196 
Data to December 31, 2016. Sources: (Basel Convention, 2016b; CBD, 2015; CITES, 2016c; CMS, 2016; 
Ozone Secretariat, 2014; Ramsar Convention, 2015b; Rotterdam Convention, 2017; Stockholm 
Convention, 2017; UNCCD, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015) 
 
Environmental conventions thus serve as institutional frameworks that deliver 
various functions: they set agendas, proscribe behaviors, prescribe actions, contribute to 
the raise awareness about environmental issues, reduce uncertainty around regulation, 
and generate policy responses (Brunée, 2006; Haas et al., 1993; Mitchell, 2010; Steiner et 
al., 2003). Environmental conventions also contribute to policy specialization, opening 
spaces for the participation of civil society and for the use of innovative instruments to 
solve environmental challenges. As DeSombre explains, “in the area of international 
environmental politics, the agreements that get adopted are rarely the end product, but 
instead create the framework and the process that guide responses to the environmental 
problem in question” (2004, p. 84). 
The academic literature on global environmental conventions addresses multiple 
issues. Some researchers study the negotiation and treaty-making processes and how  
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Figure 2 Membership in global environmental conventions 
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attention to the interactions between member states and the conventions, how do they 
operate in principal-agent dynamic, and how this influences implementation.  
The analysis of institutional performance is particularly relevant to this study. The 
conventions established specific mechanisms to evaluate and monitor countries’ 
compliance and implementation. For example, during the sixth meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Basel Convention in 2002, state parties 
established the Committee for Administering the Mechanism for Promoting 
Implementation and Compliance to help countries comply with their obligations and to 
facilitate, promote, monitor, and aim to secure the implementation of, and compliance 
with, obligations under the agreement (Basel Convention, 2002). In the case of the 
Ramsar Convention, those functions were assigned directly to the COP (UNESCO, 1971 
Art. 6). Other conventions, as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs), are still discussing the definition of a specific compliance mechanism 
(Stockholm Convention, 2015). The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are the main 
executive body in environmental conventions, that brings together all parties to take stock 
of implementation and adopt decisions for the future of the agreement.  
Despite these efforts, the global environment continues to degrade at an alarming 
pace, and planetary boundaries are being pushed to new limits. This raises key questions 
about the institutional performance of the environmental conventions, including how 
national policies based on international environmental commitments contribute to solving 
global environmental problems. In other words, are the conventions, as they are being 
implemented by states, improving the global environment? Answering this question 
would make possible to determine the role of conventions as instruments of global 
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governance, while offering an analytical and empirical framework on their process of 
implementation. Understanding how the conventions function will also provide insights 
about states’ capacity requirements to accomplish behavioral changes and outcomes at 
the national level.  
 
Governance and global environmental challenges4  
 Changes in global environmental patterns indelibly transform the future of 
humanity. Natural disasters and abrupt changes in environmental conditions have altered 
the parameters supporting the existence of life forms and the subsistence of ecosystems. 
The erosion of environmental quality has undermined prosperity by damaging human 
health and the stability of Earth’s systems. In the second part of the twentieth century, 
concerns about the impact and acceleration of industrialization fueled a growing 
realization that humanity is now a principal driver of the scale and magnitude of 
environmental change. Deforestation, rising global temperatures and sea levels, increased 
emissions of greenhouse gases, extinction of species, and destruction of natural habitats 
are some outcomes affecting Earth’s natural stability. Understanding the connections 
among drivers of environmental change is essential for identifying possible solutions, 
thereby preserving environmental benefits for human societies and economies. 
                                                
4 This section relies heavily on the findings of the 2012 Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) and its main 
summary, Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals and Gaps (UNEP, 2012b). The GEO, issued 
periodically by UN Environment, responds to the reporting requirements of the sustainable development 
agenda, offering a comprehensive assessment of the state of the environment and the main policies 
associated with it. A newer version published in 2016 does not offer a global perspective, since the analysis 
was only presented at the regional level. The section also includes data collected in key documents 
published by some of the conventions and NGOs. 
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Only about 40 percent of Earth’s surface is covered by land, and much of that is 
uninhabitable. Pressure from population growth, economic development, and global 
markets has caused more than 30 percent of the usable land to be devoted to agriculture. 
As a result, the extent of natural habitats has declined 20 percent or more since 1980, and 
valuable ecosystem services have consequently been lost. Wetlands, for example, 
continue to decline globally to a startling extent. Social and economic factors, together 
with infrastructure development, land conversion, deforestation, changes in water 
temperatures, and invasion by alien species, decreased the extent of world wetlands 64-71 
percent in the twentieth century (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e), costing more than US$ 20 
trillion annually in ecosystem services.  
At the same time, the effective and equitable management of protected areas, and 
their connectivity with ecosystem services, still need improvement. In 2014, 15.2 percent 
of the world’s terrestrial and freshwater environments were covered by protected area 
agreements, which is below the goals established at the international level. In addition, 
according to IUCN, 26 percent of 5,500 mammals, 13 percent of 11,100 birds, 42 percent 
of 6,500 amphibians, 33 percent of 860 reef-forming corals, and 62 percent of 300 cycads 
are considered at risk of extinction (IUCN, 2016). In 2016, for the first time ever, giraffes 
were listed as a vulnerable species on the IUCN Red List. The global giraffe population 
has plummeted by up to 40 percent over the last thirty years, driven by habitat loss, civil 
unrest, and illegal hunting. Ultimately, all forms of biodiversity loss result in new risks 
for the multiple benefits that humans receive from biodiversity. As overexploitation has 
resulted in net economic growth, it has also been accompanied by reduction in other 
ecosystem services.  
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Global chemical pollution and wastes are two other acute problems for human 
health, livelihoods, and the environment. While chemicals play an important role in 
human life, economic development and prosperity, they can also have adverse impacts. 
The number of chemicals continues to grow rapidly, and sales of new chemicals to the 
developing world have more than doubled. Efforts to eliminate the production and use of 
POPs have achieved important successes, but the pollution they generate is still 
widespread. In addition, many developing countries lack policies governing the 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, resulting in unregulated dumping and 
human exposure. The diversity and potential consequences of such impacts, combined 
with limited capacity of developing countries and economies in transition to handle them, 
make the management of chemicals and waste a cross-cutting issue. Nonetheless, 
developing these policies depends greatly on scientific knowledge and data, the absence 
of which definitively constitutes a barrier to the effective management and minimization 
of chemicals and wastes.  
Water supply and quality, atmospheric depletion, and climate change are among 
other challenges that environmental policies face. Increasing efficiency in the use of 
water resources is vital to cover human water demands, which are increasing due to 
growing population and economic activities. In 2011, forty-one countries experienced 
water stress, and even though the proportion of people without access to clean water 
declined from 23 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2015, there are still important gaps in 
rural areas and across regions, and access to drinking water of adequate quality and 
quantity remains one of the largest human health problems globally. Although the extent 
of the Antarctic ozone hole slightly reduced in the 2010s, some ozone-depleting 
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substances are still present in the environment and need to be destroyed or recycled 
(UNEP, 2012a). In 2016, parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed on new strategies to 
phase out hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a category of replacement chemicals for ozone-
depleting substances with high global warming potential (UNEP, 2016d). Furthermore, 
climate change continues to threaten food security and biodiversity, and it is likely to 
increase sea levels, droughts, and other extreme weather events worldwide. While these 
concerns are particularly prevalent, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
continue to increase to levels that are likely to push global temperatures to more than 2°C 
above the pre-industrial average. Controlling emissions and temperatures requires 
movement toward low-carbon economies and solutions. Governments need to view 
climate change, air quality, and stratospheric ozone depletion in an integrated way that 
supports economic development and saves human lives, enhancing the quality of life and 
protecting the environment.  
  
From agreements to behavioral change: The implementation puzzle 
 As the GEO asserts, “harmful environmental changes are taking place in an 
increasingly globalized, industrialized and interconnected world” heightening the risks 
and reducing the opportunities for the advancement of human well-being (UNEP, 2012a, 
p. 458). The complexity of environmental processes and our limited understanding make 
it hard to predict thresholds and effects. In this context, the international system requires 
“a polycentric governance approach (…) to attain effective, efficient and equitable 
outcomes.” The successful implementation of global environmental conventions through 
goal setting, metric development, data collection, and resource mobilization is therefore 
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fundamental to coordinating, integrating, and systematizing efforts to protect the 
environment and promote sustainability. Therefore, evaluating their implementation and 
effectiveness is particularly important. Existing assessments of international law 
instruments in general, and global environmental conventions in particular, focus on 
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. The analysis of the literature on both 
perspectives includes the three concepts.  Compliance refers to conformance to 
expectations, the adherence of state parties to the agreement’s obligations (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1997; 
Simmons, 2000; Oran R. Young, 1979). Implementation refers to the adoption of 
domestic regulations to fulfill international commitments (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 
1995; Mitchell, 2001; Simmons, 1998; Victor et al., 1998; Oran R. Young, 1979). 
Effectiveness means fulfilling the goals of the agreement and resolving the environmental 
problem in question (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Miles et al., 2002; Mitchell, 2001; 
Simmons, 1998).  
 This study analyzes implementation to assess whether state parties to a particular 
convention have put in place the necessary conditions to achieve the goals of the 
agreement, and therefore be effective in addressing the global problems central to each 
convention. To this end, my analysis will be grounded in the compliance and 
implementation literature. However, analyzing implementation is a difficult task. Each 
convention’s definition of implementation differs, which increases the difficulty of 
defining a standard measurement for evaluation. In addition, most academic studies view 
implementation from a limited perspective that connects specific agreements to the 
solution of environmental global problems but omits the process of adopting the national 
 20 
policies required for complying with those obligations. Thus, implementation and 
effectiveness of global environmental conventions have been seen by analysts as 
pivotally determined by the capacity and resources of member countries. In addition, 
countries in which certain environmental issues are more urgent, are expected to have 
higher implementation and effectiveness on the agreements that address those pressing 
problems. 
Overall, states with higher levels of economic capacity and more stable political 
situations achieve better implementation in terms of their objectives as parties to 
environmental conventions. Systemic factors also influence the process of translating 
global environmental obligations into national policies. However, discussions of the 
determinants of implementation cover multiple issues, which makes it difficult to 
establish solid overarching causality relationships. 
Three gaps--conceptual, empirical, and methodological--characterize the literature 
on global environmental conventions. Most conceptual analyses concentrate on 
effectiveness, without understanding first how the conventions are being translated into 
national environmental policies. The causal connections between conventions as 
instruments of governance and the solution of environmental challenges need to follow a 
systematic approach that incorporates the measures—informational, institutional, 
regulatory, technical, and financial—that countries enact to fulfill their global 
commitments. In other words, assessing individual countries’ implementation of 
environmental conventions and explaining why countries perform differently is essential 
to understanding the dynamics and effectiveness of international environmental 
organizations and their contributions to addressing global challenges. Secondly, studies 
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need to offer empirical standard metrics that allow for comparisons across conventions 
and countries. Specific targets need to be identified and adequate data collected to 
measure progress under the same parameters for all countries and conventions. And 
finally, there is a fundamental gap regarding scale. Most analyses only offer information 
for a limited number of countries, whereas other studies focus on a specific agreement 
without offering national data that allows comparison among cases. Third, the absence of 
an accurate, up-to-date empirical indicator that estimates the implementation of global 
environmental conventions leads to the lack of a systematic explanation for the 
determinants of the process, and fails to connect the implementation of the conventions to 
the policy actions that countries and international organizations can develop to address 
weaknesses and improve performance in meeting global environmental goals.  
Therefore, studies need to be recalibrated to determine how conventions are being 
implemented across all member states over a period of time, in order to understand why 
countries perform differently. In addition, the same methodology should be applied to 
different agreements to evaluate how the nature of different environmental issues, and the 
institutional arrangements of different conventions, impact the process of 
implementation.  In this context, I will examine the implementation of global 
environmental conventions in four agreements and two issue areas—biodiversity and 
chemicals and waste (see Table 2), as a way to offer a better understanding of the process 
of implementation and effectiveness, and to provide input for policy-making processes. 
By analyzing and raising attention to the implementation of global environmental 
conventions, policy-makers and academic researchers can help solve global planetary 
challenges and proscribe human activities that are harmful to the environment.  
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Table 2 Global environmental conventions included in this study 
• Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
• Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
(Basel Convention) 
• Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention) 
 
Measuring implementation: The Environmental Conventions Index 
 To address the need for an empirical indicator that measures the implementation 
of global environmental conventions, the research team at the Center for Governance and 
Sustainability designed an empirical instrument—the Environmental Conventions Index 
(ECI), which assesses the actions that signatory countries have taken to fulfill their 
commitments. The index derives a composite score from the answers to the questions that 
state parties submit in national reports to each convention’s secretariat; thus, the index 
illustrates trends between countries, within countries (across issues and over time), and 
across conventions. Aligning the data from these agreements is a particularly complex 
and time-consuming effort, as each convention has its own reporting platform, 
requirements, and timeline.  
The methodological approach I used includes description, assessment, and 
explanation, as is appropriate for a social sciences analysis (King, Keohane, & Verba, 
1994). Through a multi-stage protocol (see Chapter 3), the research team I was part of 
collected the reports submitted by state parties to the four conventions over a 15-year 
period (2001-2015) 5; identified implementation indicators for each convention, including 
the creation of necessary institutions and evidence of the technical capacity to comply 
                                                
5 For each convention, this study includes data for every country that has submitted at least one report in 
the years 2001-2015. For more information on the selection of case studies, the reporting requirements, and 
the characterization of the dataset, see Chapter 3. 
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with obligations; and created and applied scoring scales for each indicator. More than 
100,000 data points were coded to build a reliable dataset that includes the data reported 
by each country. Countries were ranked on their progress toward each convention’s goals 
using an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the highest level of implementation. As a 
quantitative metric, the index is then comparable by country and by convention.  
The index has some important distinguishing characteristics. First, it examines 
data related to the national implementation of the hard legal obligations defined by the 
conventions. Second, it assesses whether signatory countries provided the required 
information, created the necessary institutions, and possess the technical capacity to 
comply with their obligations. This feedback is important to the convention secretariats, 
as it will help them to determine how to allocate institutional and financial resources, and 
how to improve national capacities for implementation. And third, by using a 
standardized metric, the index makes it possible to establish connections between 
environmental conventions and to understand changes in policy behaviors and 
environmental quality, providing an accurate description that enhances explanatory 
power. In addition, by using a large-n analysis, this study evaluates implementation 
results for every country party to the four conventions analyzed here (see Table 2) for 
which information was available for 2001 through 2015.  
Data from the ECI also sets a performance baseline and promotes learning. The 
index expands the scale of existing studies about the implementation and effectiveness of 
global environmental conventions, to include more countries and to compare different 
conventions across the same parameters. This allows for the identification of patterns that 
reflect on traditional assumptions about the extent of implementation and the factors that 
 24 
determine it, and call for alternative explanations of the observed facts. The empirical 
model developed by this study can be integrated with current theoretical assumptions to 
offer an alternative explanation to the role of the environmental conventions as global 
governance mechanisms. The index could also be used as the dependent variable in 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of multiple factors to test theoretical assumptions 
about the determinants of the process of implementation. This will provide insights for 
policy recommendations, addressing conventional beliefs about countries’ capacities, the 
nature of environmental issues, the characteristics of the agreements, and roles of the 
international system, as well as broadening our understanding of interactions between 
state parties and conventions in defining national policies to achieve global objectives. 
Identifying the factors that determine implementation in each country is central to 
understanding national results, to establish best practices, and to identify challenges that 
must be addressed to improve countries’ implementation of global environmental 
commitments. 
In addition, my methodological approach can be applied not only to other 
environmental conventions but also to international law instruments in other policy areas 
that require assessments of their translation into domestic policies. Moreover, the use of 
national reports as sources of information for the construction of the ECI provides 
valuable insights about the nature of these information mechanisms, about the 
information requirements of global environmental conventions in particular and 
international law agreements in general, and about how these requirements contribute to 
compliance, implementation, and enforcement.  
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	 Fulfilling global environmental goals requires information, assessment, and 
monitoring. This dissertation covers all three elements, contributing to the system of 
global environmental governance by developing an analytical and political data baseline 
of national performance in global environmental conventions, based on the ECI. At the 
intellectual level, this research bridges a gap in the existing literature about the 
implementation of global environmental conventions. The ECI brings empirical evidence 
to the analysis of implementation, and informs countries and conventions about the extent 
of their progress in fulfilling their international environmental obligations, allowing them 
to compare results across countries and conventions for the years analyzed. Measuring 
and understanding implementation is needed to articulate and analyze best practices that 
could be used by scholars and policy-makers to help improve outcomes. If the challenge 
of implementation is not addressed through evidence-based global responses, 
environmental problems will persist, eroding the legitimacy of the governance system 
and preventing it from providing solutions to issues central to human well-being and 
sustainable development. The international community stands at a crossroads in the path 
to solving global environmental challenges, as it attempts to begin implementing the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific targets related to 
different environmental conventions. Thus, it is critical to define new strategies for 
globally agreed environmental goals to occupy center stage in the political debate. 
 
Organization of this study  
 In this analysis, I seek to accomplish three goals: first, to assess the level of 
implementation of global environmental conventions in the select case studies; second, to 
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evaluate the main trends regarding the level of implementation across types of countries 
and regions to offer a preliminary evaluation of the reasons why countries perform 
differently; and third, to provide information on national policies and measures that 
inform the relevance of the index, identifying best practices and challenges for each 
convention’s implementation at the national level. Implementing the conventions requires 
behavioral changes at the institutional, informational, regulatory, and technical levels 
intended to eventually improve the environment or at least prevent its further 
deterioration. Offering evidence on how each country is implementing these changes 
opens a window to better examine the dynamics of implementation, thus improving the 
literature and informing policy-makers. The ECI also answers many questions about how 
the obligations and actions defined by the conventions move parties towards the ultimate 
goal of solving the problems addressed by the conventions. Each chapter provides a piece 
of this analysis, revealing different aspects of the process of implementation and 
revealing its main successes and challenges. 
 In Chapter 2, I set the conceptual foundation for the analysis by laying out a 
detailed characterization of global environmental conventions and the main debates that 
exist—both in academia and in the policy world—about their nature, formation, 
functioning, and implementation. I describe the previous efforts to assess implementation 
to typify gaps in the literature. The chapter discusses the importance of the conventions 
as instruments of governance, and the need to evaluate progress in their implementation, 
as a way to improve their results. This also responds to new debates about the ideas of 
treaty congestion, the interactions among the existing conventions, the emergence and 
implementation of new conventions, the connection between environmental agreements 
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and other policy areas—such as trade and human rights—and their contribution to the 
implementation of the sustainable development agenda. 
  Chapter 3 presents the methodology and technical notes for this study. Departing 
from a general description of the methodologies used in such analyses, I discuss the 
characteristics of the dataset, the structure and construction of the ECI, and the 
methodological protocol used in each step. Chapter 3 also introduces the qualitative 
methodology used to build the country profiles presented in Chapter 6. Finally, this 
chapter demonstrates the value of the index’s methodology and its replicability in other 
policy areas.  
 Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the implementation of the conventions in (1) chemicals 
and waste and (2) biodiversity. They are presented separately to emphasize the patterns of 
results in each cluster. Each chapter has a similar structure: After introducing each 
convention, I discuss its membership, national reporting of results, and level of 
implementation. Each section highlights average results, historical trends, comparisons 
across developed and developing countries and across regions, as well as top and bottom 
performers. Chapter 4 explains how countries with greater technical capacities, access to 
technology, and possibilities for data collection and monitoring achieve better results in 
implementing their obligations under the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes and the 
Stockholm Convention on POPs. Furthermore, existing disparities in implementation 
across types of countries and regions call for targeted policy instruments in capacity 
building and technical assistance, particularly regarding information collection 
mechanisms. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of the Ramsar and CITES 
biodiversity conventions. I show that the nature of the problems of wetlands conservation 
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and illegal wildlife trade result in different levels of implementation, highlighting the 
positive results that some developing countries are obtaining. The biodiversity 
conventions also present specific arguments about the role that their governance bodies 
have in the process of implementation. I also devote special attention to the connection 
between the conventions’ organizational structures and procedures, and their level of 
implementation. 
Chapter 6 connects the results of the ECI with qualitative analyses at the national 
level. Given the innovative nature of the index, it is important to evaluate whether its 
results reflect policy actions that countries are taking to fulfill their international 
environmental obligations. Using ten countries—Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, the Republic of Korea (South Korea 
from now on), and Thailand—I show that the positive results of the index correspond to 
the existence of governance instruments such as regulation and policy frameworks, as 
well as to specific initiatives countries have established to address their obligations. 
Consequently, countries with lower scores face challenges with these same issues. The 
countries register different national results across clusters (and within clusters in some 
cases), confirming that the process of implementation results from a series of changes 
that can be evaluated empirically and quantitatively. Such analysis offers standard 
metrics that provide insights to policy and contribute to the literature about global 
environmental conventions and their implementation and effectiveness. Understanding 
how countries are translating their global environmental obligations at the national level 
will serve as the foundation for creating a policy space for discussion about 
implementation that could potentially improve the performance of countries and of 
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conventions. These profiles were part of a collaborative project developed between the 
Center for Governance and Sustainability and the Law Division of UN Environment. 
Building on these empirical findings and the interpretative analysis, in Chapter 7, 
I offer conclusions on the dynamics of the implementation process, its results, and the 
insights that inform improvement. These conclusions contribute to current policy debates 
on the role of global environmental conventions within the system of environmental 
governance and the implementation of the sustainable development agenda. This 
discussion shows a path for future research and explains how the framework established 
for the ECI forms a foundation to measure the extent of the conventions’ effectiveness in 
the solution of problems such as pollution and biodiversity loss, and in the promotion of 
the environmentally sustainable management of chemicals and wetlands conservation. 
While multiple studies have previously tried to evaluate the implementation of 
environmental conventions, a systematic approach that identifies the steps towards 
implementation, and measures their progress, provides a new repository of data across 
countries and conventions. This can then be the departure point for analyses and policy 
recommendations that improve performance. Furthermore, from this systematic analysis, 
new steps in this research agenda could focus on the results of individual countries, 
increasing the salience of environmental issues in national foreign policies that have 
traditionally been dominated by security, conflict, and development challenges. 
Ultimately, better understanding of implementation offers the space for policy action and 
cooperation. Within this space, it would be possible to create a new generation of 
leadership, at the national level and in the global institutions, as well as in the higher 
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education system, that motivates organizations to produce this type of analysis and to 
support policy-making processes with academic rigor and engagement. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS: DEFINITION, FUNCTIONS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
 This chapter presents an overview of the key issues in the academic literature 
regarding the global environmental agreements. As discussed in Chapter 1, the research 
agenda regarding environmental conventions addresses multiple dimensions, from the 
process of regime formation to their operationalization, functioning, effectiveness, 
evolution, and consequences (Breitmeier et al., 2006). This chapter creates a conceptual 
framework for this study, discussing first the scope and functions of these agreements, 
the factors considered in the process of treaty negotiation and formation, and the 
institutional arrangements established and their role in the agreements’ operation. This 
chapter provides the foundation for discussions on the institutional performance of 
environmental conventions’—including the theoretical perspective on the concepts of 
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness—and on how implementation can be 
measured, promoted, and ensured. This chapter also investigates selected studies 
assessing the implementation and effectiveness of global environmental conventions. In 
sum, in this chapter I contextualize the gap in the academic literature that this study 
attempts to bridge, and I frame the concept of implementation of the environmental 
conventions within the system of global environmental governance. 
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 Global environmental conventions are the main law-making fora to protect the 
environment (Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990). They are “intergovernmental document(s) 
intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing 
human impacts on natural resources” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 431). Subject to the regulations 
of the Law of the Treaties (Vienna Convention), environmental conventions are the result 
of a voluntary agreement in which states have committed to bind themselves to 
international obligations and multilateral rules at multiple levels (Birnie, Boyle, & 
Redgwell, 2009; Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990). These conventions also establish 
institutional frameworks and mechanisms for participating states to receive support for 
achieving the specific objectives defined for each environmental issue, as well as to 
provide important principles guiding the interactions among states and other actors 
(Gehring, 2007). Even though global environmental conventions have been part of the 
system of international environmental law since the nineteenth century, the past five 
decades have seen an expansion of the system of international environmental 
cooperation—creating more agreements, supporting developing countries in defining 
their environmental policies, expanding the membership of existing agreements, opening 
them to the participation of non-state actors, and promoting sustainable development 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992; UNEP et al., 2007).  
 Conventions such as the 1971 Ramsar Convention and the 1973 CITES were 
negotiated and concluded in the context of the same environmental concerns that led to 
the creation of UN Environment. Soon thereafter, and under the auspices of UN 
Environment, negotiations concluded for the Convention on Migratory Species (1979), 
whose purpose is the global conservation of wildlife and habitat by protecting terrestrial, 
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marine, and avian migratory species throughout their ranges. UN Environment was also 
the main force behind efforts related to the management of chemicals and wastes. 
Concerns about environmental damage and the effects of harmful phenomena such as 
pollution and the degradation of the ozone layer on human health and the environment 
(Tolba & Rummel-Bulska, 1998) led to the establishment of the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1987) and the Basel Convention on the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (1989). 
 Around the time that preparations were underway for the 1992 Earth Summit, 
countries agreed on the need to move forward with the commitments established by 
previous MEAs by developing and applying domestic policies conducive to progress 
toward sustainable development (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992; UNEP et al., 
2007). At the same time the so-called Rio Conventions were also adopted: The 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (1992), and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1994). With these 
treaties, conventions moved from specific sectoral approaches into more holistic 
perspectives that—instead of focusing on specific environmental resources or threats—
presented overall approaches that recognized the interconnectedness between 
environmental issues, their effects on broader ecosystems, and their positive and negative 
effects on sustainable development (Redgwell, 2014). Two other conventions were 
negotiated towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century to expand 
the scope of global regulations of the management of chemicals and wastes: the 
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (1998), and the Stockholm Convention 
on POPs (2001).  
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 Recently, environmental conventions have not only increased in complexity but 
have also established multiple connections with other areas of international law such as 
trade, human rights, intellectual property, and maritime law. Agreements have also 
established stronger and more open mechanisms to promote the participation of civil 
society and non-governmental stakeholders in the processes of treaty-making, 
implementation, review, and monitoring (UNEP et al., 2007), and UN Environment and 
their executive bodies are developing new mechanisms to link their mandates with other 
global agendas and strategies, particularly those to do with sustainable development 
(UNEP, 2016b).  
 Conceptually, environmental conventions can be classified according to multiple 
characteristics. The type and number of parties, level of legality, and instruments used to 
achieve goals result in different categories of agreements (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; 
Bodansky, 2010). However, the most common classifications are based on the 
geographical range of the environmental problems they address: global, regional, 
subregional, or bilateral (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011); the nature of the obligations they 
enact, including regulations, procedures, or programs (Mitchell, 2008a); and the 
environmental issues they address (UNEP, 2012d). This last category refers to the 
process of clustering that was part of the discussions around the strengthening of the 
system of international environmental governance that UN Environment started in 2001 
(Oberthür, 2002). Agreements can be clustered around atmosphere, biodiversity, 
chemicals and waste, land, or water (see Table 1). This is a useful policy and 
methodological instrument to understand the agreements’ objectives and their possible 
linkages. I use this classification to separate the agreements into the chemicals and waste 
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cluster (Basel and Stockholm) and the biodiversity cluster (Ramsar and CITES) and to 
present comparative analysis among and within clusters.  
 
Scope and functions of global environmental conventions 
 Global environment conventions serve multiple functions depending on the issues 
they address and the characteristics of the countries involved (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 
1998; DeSombre, 2004; Simmons, 2009). As institutional frameworks to address 
transboundary environmental problems, they set agendas, raise awareness, gather 
information, regulate actions, improve knowledge about the state of the environment and 
the extent of environmental deterioration, reduce uncertainty, and promote consolidated 
actions and policy responses toward effective solutions by centralizing commitments and 
innovations (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Brunée, 2006; DeSombre, 2004; Haas et 
al., 1993; Mitchell, 2003, 2010; Steiner et al., 2003). Ultimately, these functions point 
toward “the control and prevention of environmental harm and the conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystems” (Birnie et al., 2009, p. 212). They 
also contribute to policy specialization, opening spaces for the participation of civil 
society and the use of innovative instruments to solve environmental challenges.  
 As part of their functioning, the conventions develop mechanisms for 
governments to use in addressing environmental challenges (Mäler, 1990). Policy 
coordination requires complex design in order to develop policy options that work better 
for a group than those that countries would have implemented individually (Hoel, 1997; 
Simmons, 2009). These mechanisms are based partly on the institutional arrangements 
that each convention establishes. Conventions create executive and subsidiary bodies that 
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work on issues such as decision-making, the provision of scientific recommendations, the 
review and verification of the agreement’s application, and its implementation and 
compliance at the national level (Birnie et al., 2009). Therefore, the conventions’ very 
purpose is to facilitate a response to common concerns, to build mechanisms for norm 
creation and adaptation, and to promote compliance “in the context of polycentric 
problems where states are likely to be both perpetrator and victim” (Brunée, 2006, p. 14). 
 Agreements “are rarely the end product, but instead create the framework and the 
process that guide responses to the environmental problem in question” (DeSombre, 
2004, p. 84). Beyond their policy roles, they also have additional functions. First and 
foremost, environmental treaties express collective intentionality (Simmons, 2009), 
bringing governments and actors together under a series of principles and obligations that 
enhance their capacity to respond to environmental problems (Bodansky, 2010; 
Simmons, 2009). They transform “intergovernmental bargaining into deliberative 
transnational problem-solving” (Gehring, 2007, p. 496). From the perspective of 
international organizations, conventions support, manage operations, jointly elaborate 
and produce norms, and coordinate the efforts of countries that agree to work together to 
address a common issue (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Choucri, 1995). By opening spaces for 
interactions among countries, agreements also promote reciprocity, define specific norms, 
and require countries to establish the national policies necessary to address environmental 
problems. All these functions, outcomes, and substantive measures would ultimately 
improve the state of the environment. 
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The process of treaty formation 
 The study of environmental diplomacy and of the negotiation of an environmental 
treaty covers numerous aspects, from the actual motivations for joining an agreement, to 
the process of reaching it, the relevance of different issues in the negotiation process, and 
the treaty’s design. In addition, the study of environmental conventions also includes 
aspects such as the role of science in the definition of international policies and 
commitments, the establishment of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and the 
influence of power and interests behind these decisions.  
 A core debate within international relations theory regards ways in which states 
can work together on common problems. States are motivated by the classical concept of 
maximization of their own results (Krasner, 1982; Stein, 1982). In an anarchic world, 
states operate as unitary, single actors depending on self-help to achieve their objectives 
(Morgenthau, 1960; Waltz, 1979). Specific interests determine different forms of 
interaction between countries (Frieden, 1999; Stein, 1982; Waltz, 1979). However, the 
evolution of international affairs opened the door for states to build mechanisms to join 
efforts in solving common problems under other expectations. Different perspectives of 
liberal institutionalism recognize the relevance of non-state actors, the existence of 
multiple channels of access, the reduced salience of power, and the increasing relevance 
of international institutions in the provision of common goods (Hasenclever et al., 1997; 
Keohane & Nye, 1972; Krasner, 1983; Mitrany, 1975). Neoliberal institutionalism tries to 
bridge the gap using realist arguments that share the underlying principle that states are 
rational actors. It also recognizes motivations for cooperation that emerge from the 
anarchic nature of the international system (Grieco, 1993; Stein, 1982). Under this 
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framework, institutions serve as catalyzers of states’ efforts to define conformity to 
specific values and mechanisms for policy coordination in which actors adjust their 
behaviors to the preferences of others (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 
1983; Mitrany, 1975). States cooperate with institutions according to specific conditions, 
countries’ mutual choice and the possibility for permanent interactions that highlight the 
need for cooperation (Grieco, 1993; K. Raustiala, 1997).  
 Even though both the above-stated theoretical strands recognize the role of 
international cooperation, their perspectives on states’ motivations and interests differ 
significantly. While rational choice is exclusively limited to the maximization of specific 
interest in each situation, neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states follow strategies 
that will offer them the best possible results according to their interests and long-term 
evolution. Cooperation maintains its relevance, since agreements and institutions support 
joint efforts to achieve policy benefits. However, neoliberal institutionalism fails to 
address major constraints on states’ decision to cooperation, including the ones defined 
by realism, based on anarchy and the primacy of security (Grieco, 1993). 
 Overall, developing an international environmental agreement is not an easy 
endeavor. It involves achieving a voluntary commitment among many nations with 
various levels of development, technical capabilities, resources, and concern about the 
specific environmental problems (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992). Therefore, a 
finalized agreement results from a multilateral process that connects elements of 
environmental policy, international law, and governance (UNEP, 2016b). Its formation 
covers multiple stages, from the recognition of a specific need to the adoption and 
ratification of the treaty and its entering into force (Gehring, 2007; UNEP et al., 2007; 
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Oran R. Young, 1989). Negotiations take place within international organizations or 
through independent or new diplomatic conferences, and are always influenced by the 
institutional cultures of the organizations conducting the negotiations (Gehring, 2007). 
Before moving forward with the negotiation of the agreements, however, governments 
need to establish a series of decision-making procedures, and to declare the values that 
are to be part of the foundation of the treaty-formation process (Bodansky, 2010). In 
some cases, states also to work to reduce informational, political, and institutional 
constraints that would prevent them from obtaining optimal benefits once they start 
participating in a given agreement (Brandt, 2002). Table 3 lists the steps in the process of 
treaty formation. 
 
Table 3 Steps in the treaty-making process 
Pre-negotiation • Framing of the issue 
• Formulation of national positions 
Initiation of 
negotiation 
• Choice of negotiating forum 
• Adoption of negotiating mandate 
Negotiation • Structural issues: committees, coalitions 
• Procedures: decision-making rules, transparency, access  
• Formulation of initial draft 
Adoption and entry 
into force 
• Adoption 
• National consent: signature and ratification, or accession 
• Entry into force 
Source: (Bodansky, 2010) 
 
 For the formulation of the initial draft of an agreement, no specific template 
exists, but common components of treaties have been identified (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1992). In defining components, parties operate under consensus 
principles that require negotiations before making decisions. Departing from a statement 
of common interests, environmental conventions establish specific definitions for the 
specialized terms that are used through their legal texts, as a way to clarify contents and 
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obligations. Furthermore, agreements define a series of requirements for parties to 
institute regulatory mechanisms, report information, establish legislation, and define 
national institutional mechanisms to work on issues related to the convention. But 
conventions do not only set rules. They also put in place mechanisms to monitor and 
verify compliance, collect information about national policies established by state parties, 
and settle disputes regarding environmental resources (Palmer, 1992).  
 Treaties also include definitions on the institutional framework for 
implementation at the national and at the global levels, defining the foundation for state 
parties to fulfill the obligations they acquire when joining an agreement (Gehring, 2007; 
Redgwell, 2014). These instruments make the conventions forums for further negotiation 
and discussion, which will lead to administrative decision-making and additional law-
making. In this sense, treaties should be seen not as discrete events but as a process, as 
flexible components of the system of international environmental law (Brandt, 2002; 
Choucri, 1995; Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990; Miles et al., 2002). Table 4 lists the sections 
commonly included in the legal text of global environmental conventions.  
 
Table 4 Key elements of global environmental conventions 
• Preamble 
• Definition and use of terms 
• Objective and principles 
• General provisions and scope 
• Substantive commitments 
• Financial and technical assistance 
• Education, training, and awareness / Research and monitoring 
• Conference of the Parties (COP) / Meeting of the Parties (MOP) 
• Subsidiary bodies / Secretariat, focal points, and authorities 
• Compliance, communication, and reporting 
• Review of effectiveness 
• Dispute settlement 
• Treaty mechanisms 
Source: (UNEP et al., 2007) 
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 A critical issue in the negotiation and drafting process is the clarity of obligations, 
which determine the level of engagement that countries will have with the agreement 
(Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Simmons, 2009). Countries are subject to all the 
obligations in the treaties they join, unless they express a reservation (UNEP et al., 2007). 
Therefore, it is critical that obligations—especially those substantive ones—are as 
detailed as possible to reduce the room for additional regulations, and the possibility of 
misinterpretation. However, in some cases parties use vague obligations to hide the lack 
of political consensus or to evade concrete commitments (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). 
Since the agreements materialize cooperation to solve specific environmental problems, it 
is clear that “environmental protection is an appropriate ream of international law” (Tolba 
& Rummel-Bulska, 1998, p. 20).  
 
Institutional arrangements 
 International treaties include a series of institutional arrangements put into place 
to support state parties in the fulfillment of their obligations (Gehring, 2007). The 
complexity of environmental problems demands different structures at the institutional 
level (Choucri, 1995). Normally, a convention establishes two executive bodies—a 
secretariat and a conference or meeting of the parties—which are the main decision-
making and mandated executive bodies for the administration and operation of the 
agreement. The study of these organizational structures addresses two different topics: 
the role of these executive bodies in the implementation of the associated treaty, 
discussing their levels of influence and the conditions they need to advance the 
implementation of their mandate (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009, 2013); 
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and their actual structures, using the perspective of organizational behavior theories, and 
evaluating the role of the members of the secretariats’ staff as individual and multilateral 
diplomats, considering variables such as their professional backgrounds and personality 
traits (Egeberg, 2003; Häfliger & Hug, 2012; Reinalda, 2011; Spies, 2013; Trondal, 
2013). Both strands of the literature are important for understanding the structure of 
executive bodies and how they affect the outcomes and impact of the conventions. 
The executive bodies and the international bureaucracies that represent them are 
generally considered independent actors in world politics (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 
2013; Churchill & Ulfstein, 2000), fulfilling both political and technical functions 
(Urquhart, 1995). They serve as agents of the decisions reached by state parties to the 
different organizations and treaties. The mandates assigned by countries shape the 
activities and performance of the secretariats and the behavior of their staff (Trondal, 
2013). Mandates include multiple functions not limited to the implementation of a 
convention (Ege & Bauer, 2013). Functions range from the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge to the shaping of the discourse associated to the treaty, the influence on the 
negotiation, the coordination and monitoring of the process of implementation, the 
institutionalization of the convention, and the definition of standards (Biermann & 
Siebenhüner, 2013). 
COPs and secretariats are important for different reasons. At the global level they 
act as agents in the international system, dealing with specific international issues and 
proposing and coordinating problem-solving strategies (Bauer, 2006). At the national 
level, their relevance lies in how they influence policy outputs, generating change, 
affecting the distribution of power and transforming the structure and processes of 
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domestic governance (Trondal, 2013). Discussions about how COPs outcomes expand 
the obligations and legal scope of treaties evidence the importance of these meetings 
(Wiersema, 2009). In executing these mandates, executive leadership appears to be a 
central determinant of authority, capacity, autonomy, visibility, and legitimacy of 
secretariats (Bauer, 2006; Cox, 1969; Grigorescu, 2013).  
A more detailed approach to international bureaucracies incorporates their 
dimension as international civil servants. In this role, secretariats also perform functions 
of representation, protection of state interests, negotiation, information gathering and 
reporting, and promotion of friendly interstate relations (Spies, 2013), making the 
individual and personal characteristics of the employees of the secretariat particularly 
relevant, since they bring their positions, values, and political views with them to their 
jobs (Reinalda, 2011). These characteristics, at the structural and individual levels, result 
in different typologies of organization, specialization, and leadership that determine the 
level of engagement of specific secretariats and their capacities to execute the mandate 
they receive from member states (Bauer, 2006; Trondal, 2013). 
Different studies have addressed the role of environmental secretariats in global 
environmental governance and politics. Issues such as their institutional status and 
structure are important to establish the capacity of action of international bureaucracies 
(Bauer, 2006). Biermann and Siebenhüner (2013) and Andresen and Skjærseth (1999) 
offer different typologies of the determinants of the ability of international bureaucracies 
to exercise influence. Their characterizations include the nature of the problem; its 
international salience and level of autonomy; institutional and capacity frameworks at 
legal, institutional and financial levels; and expertise, culture, and leadership. At the same 
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time, some challenges that secretariats face—political problems, resource availability, 
lack of autonomy, and socio-cultural considerations—negatively affect their capacity to 
exercise influence and execute their mandates (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Bauer, 2004; 
Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009; Sandford, 1994). Analyses have also focused on the 
specific influence that secretariats have on the implementation of global environmental 
obligations. Brown-Weiss and Jacobson (1998) identify the structure of the secretariat as 
“a crucial factor” of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness of an agreement. 
They highlight a series of functions and institutional arrangements that will facilitate 
countries’ engagement to advance implementation and the solution of environmental 
problems, including convening meetings, monitoring, scientific assessment, assistance 
and capacity-building, connection to stakeholders, standardized data collection, and 
providing information to parties and the public. 
Another key aspect of conventions’ institutional arrangements is the secretariats’ 
legal status. Each convention establishes specific regulations about the functions of its 
secretariat, operations, and administration. While some agreements have a more 
independent structure, in most cases the convention establishes a hosting agreement, 
locating the secretariat within an already existing international institution (Desai, 2010). 
In the case of CITES and the Basel and Stockholm conventions, the secretariat is housed 
at UN Environment. The Ramsar Convention’s secretariat is hosted by IUCN. Different 
analyses have addressed these administrative arrangements, and programmatic 
cooperation between the hosting organizations and the environmental conventions they 
administer (Ramsar Convention, 2005b; UNEP, 2016c). How and where the secretariat is 
established is fundamental to the convention’s organizational structure and will therefore 
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influence its role in the implementation process. Furthermore, secretariats’ institutional 
structure will raise questions about the nature and quality of their services, their 
autonomy and the organizational linkages they establish with other conventions and 
international organizations. 
 
Institutional performance 
 Environmental conventions operate in a system with no hierarchical authority to 
coordinate or enforce them. That is why questions about their institutional performance 
and their contribution to the solution of environmental problems are particularly relevant. 
While some analyses consider international agreements as useful instruments, others 
recognize that their benefits are limited by the circumstances in which they operate 
(Krasner, 1983). These debates revolve around three core concepts: compliance, 
implementation, and effectiveness. Compliance refers to conformance to expectations, 
the adherence of state parties to the obligations the agreement represents (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993; Faure & Lefevere, 2015; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1996; 
Hasenclever et al., 1997; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1997; Simmons, 2000; Oran R. 
Young, 1979). Implementation refers to the adoption of domestic regulations to facilitate 
compliance (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Mitchell, 2001; Simmons, 1998; Oran R. 
Young, 1979). Effectiveness is the fulfillment of the goals of the agreement and the 
resolution of the environmental problem in question (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; 
Simmons, 1998). A review of the literature shows that the three concepts have received 
different levels of attention as to their theoretical treatment and conceptualization, 
measurement, and analysis of the factors that motivate and ensure implementation. This 
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dissertation uses the concept of implementation to address the existing gap in the 
literature and to evaluate, under standardized parameters, the extent to which state parties 
put in place the necessary conditions and measures to fulfill the goals established by the 
conventions.  
 As part of the implementation process, international agreements influence states’ 
behavior (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Mitchell, 2001; Oran R. Young, 1979, 1994). 
Initially, states’ compliance is based on the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda—
treaties are to be obeyed—as recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; United Nations, 1969). Implementation and 
compliance are, however, more complex. While some scholars limit these aspects to the 
adherence of state parties to the obligations of an agreement (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; 
Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Simmons, 2000), it is necessary to consider the 
adoption and implementation of measures that change states’ behavior. While Downs et 
al. (1996) argue that compliance is not evidenced in state behavior, other authors such as 
Young (1979, 1994), Chayes and Chayes (1993), and Mitchell (2001) analyze the effects 
of compliance in states’ behavior in terms of both their foreign and domestic policies and 
their role in solving global problems. Jacobson and Weiss (1995) define compliance not 
only around adherence to specific provisions, but also in terms of implementing those 
measures that treaties institute. Implementation, according to them, refers to the measures 
that states take to make international accords effective in their domestic law. Victor, 
Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998) are even more specific, referring to national 
implementation as the creation of new programs and the promulgation and enforcement 
of laws and standards. What all these approaches have in common is a strong behavioral 
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component that goes beyond actual conformance with specific legal obligations (Haas et 
al., 1993; Oran R. Young, 1979). In some cases, however, states do not carry out these 
changes and behave contrary to expectations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995; Downs et 
al., 1996; Simmons, 1998). Additionally, as most agreements offer no standard to 
measure implementation, studies conducted on global environmental goals established by 
these conventions evidence a persistent failure to achieve many of their goals.  
 In the case of environmental law, conventions are often used as examples of 
positive results in compliance and implementation. However, even though some authors 
have evaluated these processes (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 
1995), their results do not share a common definition for measurement standards and do 
not offer a systematic empirical assessment demonstrating results. Even within the same 
environmental issues, treaties have different conceptions of what is acceptable behavior 
by state parties (Beyerlin, Stoll, & Wolfrum, 2006; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). 
Difficulties with the vagueness of legal obligations and with countries’ reporting reduce 
the ability to determine the extent to which countries are fulfilling their obligations and 
translating them into national policies. Common understanding of terminology simply 
does not exist, and key concepts for assessing the state of the environment and the 
effectiveness of measures taken are missing (Helm & Sprinz, 2000; M.A. Levy, 1995; 
Marc A Levy, Young, & Zürn, 1995). In addition, different reports, including the flagship 
international environmental assessment—the Global Environment Outlook (GEO-5)—
show a high level of failure in attaining global environmental goals (UNEP, 2012a, 
2012b; UNEP et al., 2007). This raises questions about the extent to which countries 
comply with international environmental treaties and implement their provisions, as well 
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as about the effectiveness of international treaties in general, and the factors that 
determine countries’ and conventions achievement of their goals. There is also an 
important gap in the literature around empirical assessment of the implementation of 
international environmental conventions.  
 
Theoretical treatment 
 Compliance and implementation are major topics in the international relations and 
international law literature (Abbott & Snidal, 2013; K. Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002; 
Simmons, 2000; Slaughter, 1993). Some analyses of these issues explain how each 
discipline perceives them. Guzman (2002), for example, combines approaches from 
international relations and international law, to construct what he calls a ‘compliance-
based’ theory of international law. Other authors assume a more interrelated approach, 
seeing compliance in the intersection between international relations and international 
law. Beth A. Simmons (1998) analyzes three perspectives: realism, rational 
functionalism, and the normative approach, while Anne-Marie Slaughter (1993) 
compares liberalism and institutionalism, and Jeffrey T. Checkel (2001) adds 
constructivism. These approaches explain how different international relations theories 
perceive compliance and the role of legal instruments in international politics: 
• Realism: International law is perceived as an ‘epiphenomenon of interests’ 
(Simmons, 1998) which maintains the polarity between law and power (Slaughter, 
1993). States operate according to their national interests, which motivate their 
willingness to comply (Downs et al., 1996; Steinberg, 2013; Von Stein, 2005). 
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• Liberalism/Institutionalism: Regimes are constructed to affect states’ behavior 
and designed to maximize their effectiveness (Slaughter, 1993). International 
institutions serve as fora to solve contentious issues and exercise pressure to solve 
disagreements peacefully (McLaughlin Mitchell & Hensel, 2007; Moravcsik, 
2013). 
• Rational Functionalism: States participate in international regimes because of 
their need to solve common problems, and this works as an incentive to 
compliance (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 1998; Slaughter, 1993). 
International law thus has intrinsic value for national-level politics and objectives. 
• Normative Approaches: States base their interests in compliance on the role of 
ideas, beliefs, and standards in promoting appropriate behavior, thus constituting 
a major influence in governments’ willingness to implement international 
agreements (Brunée & Toope, 2013). This approach is connected to both 
constructivism (Checkel, 2001) and to Hedley Bull’s International Society (Bull, 
1977). At this level, the legitimacy of the law also plays a key role in defining 
compliance and how to achieve it (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 2000; 
Slaughter, 1993). 
 Of these multiple approaches, most of the literature has focused on the realist 
perspective (Downs et al., 1996). Theoretical and practical difficulties persist in 
establishing connections with other theories of international relations. However, the 
growing role of international law in international politics has raised the relevance of other 
theoretical approaches and opened debate about the motivations of states to comply and 
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develop specific behaviors and policies that reflect their international commitments. This 
approach will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Measuring and motivating implementation 
 Even though most of the scholarship about implementation stems from the 
perspective that there is a general propensity of states to comply with international 
obligations (Choucri, 1995), and although international legal scholars see compliance and 
implementation as the norm, in practice measuring implementation is a difficult task. 
There is no specific standard for “good implementation.” In environmental governance, 
as in other issue areas in which research has assed compliance, studies do not share a 
common definition of measurement standards (Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Jacobson & 
Brown-Weiss, 1995). Treaties have different conceptions of what is an acceptable 
behavior from state parties (Beyerlin et al., 2006; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). 
Furthermore, implementation is perceived as the result of a subjective evaluation, in 
which measurement will depend on expectations. Levels are determined according to 
what parties count as acceptable performance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). However, some 
variables have been established by the literature as useful metrics of compliance. 
According to Raustiala and Slaughter (2002), legitimacy is not only a way to guarantee 
compliance but also a mechanism to measure it. Legitimacy constitutes a central ‘pulling’ 
factor that allows for the assessment of implementation as well as incorporating other 
dimensions such as ideas and beliefs (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 1998; 
Slaughter, 1993). Proxies such as perception, membership, and the speed of entering into 
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force have also been considered as indicators of implementation and effectiveness 
(Choucri, 1995) 
 Based on these concepts, studies have presented various analyses and measures of 
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness (see  
 
Table 5). As Young explained in his 1999 book on the effectiveness of environmental 
regimes, during the 1990s, scholarship focused on the question of why some regimes 
were more successful than others. Under different definitions and methodological 
approaches, scholars agreed on the need for specific assessments of the level of 
compliance with and implementation of international environmental agreements. 
However, the question of what to measure and how seemed to be an issue in some of the 
analyses. Some studies used proxies to implementation, limiting their analysis to specific 
agreements within single environmental clusters (Choucri, 1995) or presented 
multidimensional approaches to measure progress, including factors such as change in 
policy outputs, scientific understanding of environmental problems, and overall 
improvement in economic growth, social justice, and national governance performance 
(Mitchell, 2008b). Other research focused on the sources of non-compliance, as well as 
the role of international organizations and NGOs in enforcing the obligations of different 
accords (Cameron et al., 1996).  
 Other analyses focus on positive and negative drivers of implementation (Fearon, 
1998). Beyond the legally binding nature of the obligations and the design of treaties—
including the clarity of the obligations and incentives they establish—states are also 
motivated by their desire to improve standards or reputation in terms of agenda-setting or 
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problem-solving (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001; Downs & Jones, 2002; 
Simmons, 1998; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Underdal, 1998; Von Stein, 2013; Oran R. 
Young, 1994). Furthermore, foreign policy considerations and concerns about their 
sovereignty also motivate countries to develop the necessary conditions defined by 
environmental conventions (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Downs & Jones, 2002; Hoel, 1997; 
McLaughlin Mitchell & Hensel, 2007; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005). 
 However, states’ interactions and the practical role of international law bring other 
variables into consideration. Implementation should not be considered a unidimensional 
variable (Simmons, 1998). In their 1995 study, Jacobson and Weiss offer four categories 
of determinant factors: (a) the nature of the activity associated with each treaty, (b) the 
structure of the agreement, (c) the characteristics of the country, and (d) the 
characteristics of the international environment. A similar categorization is presented by 
Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998), who include the nature of the problem and the 
commitments, the power configurations, the linkage with other issues and objectives, the 
level of public concern, and other exogenous factors as determinants of implementation 
and effectiveness. 
 In terms of the nature of the activity in each agreement, clearly some issues are 
less contentious than others and promote cooperation. Some global problems also 
facilitate nations’ objectives of deploying political power and contribute to the process of 
regime preservation (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). The 
structural design of agreements also plays a key role. “If the agreement is well 
designed—sensible, comprehensible, and with a practical eye to probable patterns of 
conduct and interaction—compliance problems and enforcement issues are likely to be 
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manageable” (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 183). Characteristics of the international 
system also influence the behavior of states and their adherence to international 
agreements. Among these, the political space for international organizations and NGOs to 
exercise pressure facilitates and promotes compliance. In particular, civil society 
influence and pressure on states to commit to international agreements also shape 
implementation and accountability. 
 The category in Jacobson and Brown-Weiss’s conceptualization that probably 
receives more attention in the literature is country characteristics. Here different variables 
are at play. First, compliance is motivated by the conditions that lead to an agreement 
(Von Stein, 2005). Under the framework of rational functionalism, states are more 
motivated to comply when they have a clear understanding of the reasons that support 
their participation in the regime and the benefits they receive (Simmons, 1998; Underdal, 
1998). States may also be interested in improving standards (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) or 
their reputation (Fearon, 1998) in terms of agenda-setting or actual effectiveness in 
problem-solving (Downs & Jones, 2002; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Oran R. Young, 
1994). This raises awareness about how agreements are constructed. In some cases states 
only commit to the obligations they can actually fulfill, so that their reputation is not 
negatively affected by non-compliance allegations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 
2001). Second, authors see compliance as dependent on the capacity of states. Technical, 
political, and financial resources shape capacity, as do information availability and 
leadership (Haas et al., 1993). A state’s policy history—commitment to international law 
and the priority given to it in foreign policy traditions—is also relevant to capacity. Third, 
domestic regimes also a determining factor. Simmons (1998) argues, for example, that a 
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state’s domestic regime influences its perception of the role of law in its foreign policy. 
Democracies, she contends, are more likely to comply with international legal 
obligations, since they have standardized processes to adopt domestic legislation and 
since they depend on honoring commitments to maintain the support of the electorate.  
 In another theoretical strand, the literature discusses how compliance depends on 
the mechanisms that each agreement or regime establishes to encourage or discourage it. 
Agreements should be designed to ensure clarity about the operations, performance, and 
responses required from state parties (Mitchell, 2001). This design includes mechanisms 
that work both ways: as strong incentives to comply and as weak incentives to go against 
agreements (Oran R. Young, 1979). Regimes should establish a persuasive discourse, 
through monitoring, verification, and enforcement mechanisms, that motivate compliance 
and promote national implementation (Simmons, 1998). Compliance and implementation 
therefore comprise a multilevel, multi-actor process that extends beyond governments’ 
preferences, and thus analysis of compliance and implementation requires extensive and 
systematic empirical evidence. 
 What is clear from the multiple analyses that try to measure and explain 
implementation is that questions about this process continue to be as relevant as they are 
complex. When determining the role of conventions and their effectiveness in solving 
global environmental problems, clearly there is a long list of determinant variables. 
However, implementation is definitively “the central process to turn commitments into 
actions” (Victor et al., 1998) and deserves special attention. International law, 
international relations, and political science have strongly focused on the legal concept of 
compliance without taking into consideration its effects on states’ policies (L. L. Martin, 
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2013). Previous scholarship has conceptualized the conflict of implementation and 
assessed its levels, but “very little empirical research (had tried) to answer these questions 
in a systematic way” (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). Furthermore, some analyses 
assumed that developing countries did not need to make substantial behavioral changes 
for the environmental agreements they joined either because their limited resources or 
because they were not responsible of environmental damage. This lack of empirical 
evidence constitutes a key gap in both the literature and the practical evolution of the 
concept. As the research agenda about environmental governance moves forward, 
agreements should be seen as scenarios for learning. For implementation to lead to more 
effective international environmental agreements, a better understanding of the extent to 
which countries implement conventions is fundamental, not only to measure progress but 
also to adjust the mechanisms to are being established to ensure implementation and to 
achieve the goals of the conventions in the protection of the environment and sustainable 
development.  
 
Ensuring implementation  
 Other strand of the literature on international environmental law and conventions 
addresses the mechanisms required to facilitate and enforce implementation and 
compliance. In the system of global environmental governance, a core challenge is to 
ensure compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. Countries and agencies have 
acknowledged the importance of implementation and discussed strategies to promote the 
domestication of international environmental obligations. In 1992, the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development asked that parties to international agreements develop 
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“procedures and mechanisms to promote and review their effective, full and prompt 
implementation” (UNCED, 1992 para. 39.8), including capacity building, information, 
science, technology, institutional arrangements, and finances, among others. This 
approach was reinforced by the 2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, referring not only to the implementation of environmental 
conventions but also to the development agenda (WSSD, 2002). More recently, the 2012 
UN Conference on Sustainable Development Rio+20 reaffirmed the previous discussion, 
and invited countries to improve the implementation of their policy commitments, to 
advance in providing means of implementation, and recognized finance, technology, 
capacity building, trade and information as decisive factors to achieve the proposed 
agenda (United Nations, 2012a). 
Environmental conventions have also addressed the ensuring of implementation 
(Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Sands, 2003). “Once an agreement has come into force, 
compliance by the Parties with their commitments may be controlled by a variety of 
techniques developed under different environmental regimes” (Sand, 1992, p. 13). 
However, the process faces multiple challenges, including inadequate means, the 
existence of multiple environmental commitments at the country level, the collision of 
those commitments with countries' political and economic interests, and the 
multidimensional nature of some environmental threats. These factors raise concerns 
about non-compliance, implementation gaps, and ineffectiveness in the solution of global 
environmental problems (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 
2006). That is why countries, as part of the development of international environmental 
law, put into place mechanisms and techniques to guarantee compliance and 
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implementation, guaranteeing that countries adhere to the provisions of each convention 
through the definition of domestic policies and measures (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; 
Sands, 2003).  
 In the literature, the debate has centered on ways to induce change in behavior by 
states to address their international obligations. In addition to the realist perspective on 
enforcement and sanctions (Guzman, 2002), authors have developed a range of models to 
ensure compliance and implementation. Downs et al. (1996) argue that there is no 
problem with compliance, since it does not expect any behavioral changes. Other 
academics recognize a problem but argue that it is mostly managerial (Chayes & Chayes, 
1993). Enforcement is also seen as a way to promote compliance and implementation 
(Avdeyeva, 2007; Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001). Finally, some writers 
highlight yet other mechanisms, such as coercion, persuasion, acculturation, and social 
learning (Avdeyeva, 2007; Underdal, 1998). 
 These models span two schools of thought about ensuring compliance and 
implementation (Fearon, 1998). According to the managerial perspective of Chayes and 
Chayes (1993), compliance should be motivated by strategies of persuasion and 
assistance that are “less costly and intrusive and certainly less dramatic than coercive 
sanctions” (p. 205). They argue that non-compliance emerges from problems with 
agreements that affect parties’ capacity to comply. Issues such as ambiguity and 
indeterminacy in the treaties’ language, obligations and objectives, and structure prevent 
countries from complying with the legal obligations they establish. Nonetheless, some 
agreements tolerate a certain extent of non-compliance, being highly permissive with 
violations and extenuating circumstances for domestic policies, as long as their 
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implementation does not threaten the survival of the regime. Mitchell (2001) presents a 
similar argument about the importance of clarity for compliance. Managerial limitations 
are also associated with the capacity of states to carry out their commitments (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). Additionally, each treaty incorporates a 
vision of the international system and a specific temporal dimension of the social and 
economic changes envisioned in treaties that affect compliance and implementation; that 
is, adherence to obligations and making behavioral change takes time, especially when 
not all parties start from the same point. As Chayes and Chayes (1993) put it, “drive to 
universality requires accommodation.”  
 More recently, the managerial approach has evolved into strategic treaty 
management (McInerney, 2015)., which  suggests that to ensure implementation, treaties 
should follow a strategy formulation process and develop other managerial tools such as 
performance evaluations, strategic assessments, and initiatives for stakeholder 
engagement. Then it would be possible to identify strategic priorities in areas such as 
national implementation, finance, synergies and collaboration with other treaties, data 
collection and scientific assessment, performance management, and the expansion of 
membership. 
 The enforcement school of thought addresses the use of incentives, sanctions, and 
persuasion to promote compliance (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Positive incentives 
establish standards of behavior for states to facilitate and monitor the process of national 
implementation. Negative incentives reduce the benefits of cheating and promote the 
value of a good reputation (Avdeyeva, 2007; Guzman, 2002; Underdal, 1998). 
Additionally, decentralized mechanisms of compliance are created on the principle of  
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Table 5 Selected studies to assess compliance, implementation, and effectiveness 
Study 
author(s) 
Core 
variable 
Empirical 
approach 
Determining 
factors 
Key findings 
and 
relevance 
Key issues 
Oran R. 
Young 
(1979, 
1994) 
• Effectiveness 
understood as 
problem-
solving  
• No specific 
metric is 
developed 
• Study 
recognizes 
challenges in 
measuring 
effectiveness 
• Highlights 
the 
importance 
of 
generalizabil-
ity 
• Treaty design 
• State 
capacity 
• National 
circum-
stances 
• Regimes 
serve 
multiple 
purposes in 
terms of 
cooperation, 
authority, 
learning, and 
internal 
realignments 
• Analysis is 
required to 
move 
forward in 
designing 
effective 
institutions 
 
Edith 
Brown-
Weiss and 
Harold K. 
Jacobson 
(1998; 
1995) 
• Implementa-
tion referrers 
to measures 
states take to 
make 
international 
accords 
effective in 
domestic law. 
• Compliance 
is the 
observance to 
both 
obligations 
and 
implementing 
measures 
• Effectiveness 
is the result 
of both in 
relation to the 
objectives of 
each 
agreement 
and the 
solution of 
the problem 
• Study 
conducted 
for five 
agreements 
in nine 
countries 
• Departs from 
the 
assumption 
that “national 
implementa-
tion of and 
compliance 
with 
international 
accords is not 
only 
imperfect but 
often 
inadequate” 
(1998, p. 2) 
• Multifaceted 
view of 
performance 
• Characteris-
tics of the 
activity 
• Characteris-
tics of the 
accord 
• International 
environment 
• Factors 
involving the 
country 
• Development 
of a model of 
determinants 
of 
implementa-
tion, to make 
agreements 
effective 
• Improving 
countries’ 
engagement 
will improve 
the environ-
ment, lives, 
institutions, 
and add to 
the academic 
literature. 
• Acknowl-
edges the 
difficulty in 
collecting 
data 
• Definition of 
implementa-
tion is not 
standardized 
across 
treaties 
• Not all 
treaties are 
evaluated in 
all countries 
• Need to 
identify 
cross 
national 
differences 
in policy 
implementa-
tion 
• Comparisons 
do not 
consider 
timeline 
• Compliance 
and 
implementa-
tion should 
not be 
classified 
equally 
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Study 
author(s) 
Core 
variable 
Empirical 
approach 
Determining 
factors 
Key findings 
and 
relevance 
Key issues 
David G. 
Victor, Kal 
Raustiala, 
and Eugene 
B. 
Skolnikoff 
(1998) 
• Implementa-
tion is 
understood as 
the 
translation of 
intent into 
action 
• Case studies 
to assess sys-
tems of 
implementa-
tion review 
• Case studies 
in selected 
countries to 
assess 
national 
implementa-
tion 
• Nature of the 
problem 
• Power 
configuration 
• Nature of the 
commitments 
• Linkages 
with other 
issues and 
objectives 
• Exogenous 
factors 
• Public 
concern 
• There is no 
single way 
for a country 
to put its 
international 
commit-
ments into 
practice 
• Monitoring 
and systems 
of 
implementa-
tion review 
are critical 
for 
implementa-
tion 
• Failure to 
implement is 
in some 
cases 
intentional 
• Commit-
ments have 
“induced 
substantial 
implementa-
tion 
activities 
within na-
tions” but 
there is still 
progress to 
be made 
• Historical 
case studies 
• Descriptive 
and 
theoretical 
approach 
• Focus on 
formulation 
and content 
of the 
agreements 
and their 
systems of 
implementa-
tion review 
• Limited 
scale of the 
study 
Edward L. 
Miles, Arild 
Underdal, 
Steinar 
Andresen, 
Jørgen 
Wettestad, 
Jon Birger 
Skjærseth, 
and 
Elaine M. 
Carlin 
(2002) 
• Effectiveness 
compared 
against a spe-
cific standard 
of success 
• Implementa-
tion is an 
outcome that 
ultimately 
will have an 
impact on 
nature  
• Two 
measures: 
distance to a 
collective 
optimum and 
relative 
improvement 
• Character of 
the problem 
• Problem 
solving 
capacity  
• Institutional 
capacity  
• Entrepreneur-
ial leadership 
• Environmen-
tal regimes 
succeed in 
changing ac-
tors’ 
behavior  
• There are 
different pat-
terns on 
regime 
effectiveness 
• Regimes fall 
short in 
providing 
functionally 
• The study 
has a 
methodologi-
cal challenge 
in the defini-
tion of a 
point of 
reference 
• Analysis is  
different in 
periods of 
time 
• Exclusive 
factors list 
effectiveness 
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Study 
author(s) 
Core 
variable 
Empirical 
approach 
Determining 
factors 
Key findings 
and 
relevance 
Key issues 
optimal solu-
tions 
as a determi-
nant 
Helmut 
Breitmeier, 
Oran R. 
Young, and 
Michael 
Zürn (2006) 
• Regime 
attributes and 
their design  
• Inclusion of 
quantitative 
methods 
• Focus on 
regime attrib-
utes to deter-
mine the 
extent to 
which regime 
designs 
matters 
• Sources of 
compliance 
• Compliance 
mechanisms 
and goal 
attainment 
• Construction 
of a database 
system to 
move away 
from case 
study 
approaches 
• Assessments 
are of an 
interpretative 
nature 
• Limited 
number of 
case studies 
and no clear 
record 
• Definition of 
measurement 
units 
• No specific 
reference to 
countries 
Kate 
O’Neill 
(2009, 
2017) 
• Regime 
effectiveness 
• Conceptual 
approach to 
effectiveness, 
its definition, 
measures, 
and methods 
• Specific case 
study to 
exemplify 
arguments 
about 
compliance 
and 
effectiveness 
• Treaty 
characteris-
tics 
• Enforcement 
mechanisms 
• Transparency 
and 
reputation  
• Capacity-
building 
mechanisms 
• Importance 
of drafting, 
enforcing, 
eliciting, and 
creating 
compliance. 
• Regime im-
pacts as 
measures of 
effectiveness 
• No 
systematic / 
empirical 
analysis for a 
single 
regime 
 
bilateral or multilateral reciprocity. Even though all mechanisms share the goal of 
fulfilling the obligations of an agreement, conditions such as existing relationships among 
the parties and the level of pressure to be exercised towards the observance of the treaty 
are some factors to consider when deciding which approach to use. 
 Implementation mechanisms deserve special attention. Environmental 
conventions use them as instruments for promotion and prevention. Control is not 
enough, and countries face multiple challenges that require support not only to fulfill 
their environmental obligations but also for general economic, developmental, and 
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geopolitical conditions (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Birnie et al., 2009). This situation 
was acknowledged by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
which, in its Rio Declaration, stated that “in view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities” 
(United Nations, 1992a', Principle 7) considering the consequences that environmental 
problems have in developing countries, and the accountability of developed countries 
(Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). The establishment of implementation mechanisms points 
out the “growing internationalization of the domestic implementation and legal process, 
and an awareness that international law will not achieve its objectives if it does not also 
take account of the need, and techniques available for improving domestic 
implementation of international environmental obligations” (Sands, 2003, p. 227)  
 Various authors have developed typologies of implementation mechanisms, that 
are also used to categorize these instruments in the policy world. The categorization 
presented below groups these mechanisms based on the kind of support they provide to 
countries in the implementation of international environmental law. 
• National reports: Reporting is the most basic mechanism used by conventions to 
support implementation. National reports provide critical information on a 
country’s progress in achieving its global environmental commitments (Kiss, 
2006). However, national reporting faces multiple challenges. First, in some cases 
reporting systems are not comprehensive enough to address the multidimensional 
nature of conventions. Second, reports are not analyzed or included in the scope 
of compliance and implementation systems (Kiss, 2006), so state parties rarely 
obtain feedback on the information they provide. And third, questions persist 
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about the extent to which countries are actually fulfilling their reporting 
requirements (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). 
• Institutional arrangements: As indicated in UN Environment’s Training Manual 
on International Environmental Law, "for the purpose of facilitating 
implementation, most MEAs establish institutions such as Secretariats, COPs, and 
other technical bodies to oversee the implementation of the Convention, and to 
provide policy guidance" (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006, p. 41). These 
institutional bodies are crucial to the process of implementation, fulfilling both 
political and technical functions (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Sands, 2003; 
Urquhart, 1995). As international bodies advance toward the fulfillment of their 
mandates, they facilitate implementation and coordinate other mechanisms with 
the same purpose (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Ege & Bauer, 
2013), strongly influencing institutional performance and policy outputs (Ivanova, 
2010; Trondal, 2013). Institutional bodies serve as agents to state parties, by 
convening meetings, monitoring, providing scientific 
assessments/assistance/capacity building, connecting with stakeholders, and 
collecting information and data (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Ege & Bauer, 
2013). Institutional capacity, autonomy, visibility, organizational structure, 
legitimacy, people, and procedures are central to their capacity to facilitate 
implementation (Andresen & Skjærseth, 1999; Bauer, 2006; Biermann & 
Siebenhüner, 2013; Cox, 1969; Grigorescu, 2013). 
• Capacity building and technology transfer: Discussions about means of 
implementation in the system of global environmental governance have usually 
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focused on capacity building and access to technology for developing countries 
and economies in transition. Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration mentioned the 
need to “strengthen endogenous capacity-building” including “the development, 
adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies” (United Nations, 1992a 
Principle 9). Outcomes from key conferences reinforced this need and established 
additional mechanisms to provide such support (United Nations, 2012a; WSSD, 
2002). Furthermore, in 2002, UN Environment’s Governing Council recognized 
the urgent need to develop a strategic plan to provide instruments, which led to 
the development of the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity. 
Capacity-building aims to enhance the human, scientific, technological, 
organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities of state parties to address 
obligations of conventions, including the development of legal and institutional 
frameworks. (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Technology transfer strategies support 
the development and enhancement of state-level technical capacities to conduct 
scientific assessment, monitoring, data processing, and analysis (Beyerlin & 
Marauhn, 2011). 
• Finance: Financial resources are central to multilateral diplomacy, not only to 
support countries in developing national policies, but also to provide resources for 
conventions to execute broader projects (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). 
Conventions establish financial mechanisms, funded by contributions—
mandatory and voluntary—of state parties and other channels, to transfer the cost 
of implementation in developing countries to other state parties or international 
actors (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Such mechanisms take multiple forms, 
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including loans, credits, grants, and funds, and they may operate not only as 
means to induce and restore compliance and implementation but also to deal with 
emergencies (Boisson de Chazournes, 2006). In some cases, financial 
mechanisms are administered by third parties. In 1992 the Earth Summit 
established the Global Environment Facility to bring together the resources of 
various international organizations working on environmental issues and to serve 
as the funding mechanism for environmental conventions providing grants to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, for projects that 
generate global environmental benefits within the context of sustainable 
development (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). Some conventions also 
establish positive or negative economic incentives to promote implementation 
(Matz, 2006).  
 Countries are expected to make use of the mechanisms offered by the conventions 
to facilitate implementation (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). However, it is not clear 
how effective these mechanisms are. Despite some analyses (Sand, 1992, pp. 14-15), 
establishing a causal connection between the use of these mechanisms and the successful 
national  implementation of a convention is a complex task, especially when no standards 
exist to measure progress. Additionally, implementation mechanisms face fundamental 
challenges to exercise positive influence on countries compliance and domestic policies, 
including: 
• Lack of information for determining the best policy approaches and the kinds of 
assistance each country requires, and for establishing priorities (Stahl, 2011).  
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•  Interlinkages and synergies are required to improve efficiency in facilitating 
implementation, and to reduce the overlapping in these mechanisms across the 
different conventions (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011).   
• Lack of participation from civil society, as the public is excluded from most 
compliance and implementation mechanisms, which reduces possibilities to raise 
awareness and identify non-compliance situations and assistance needs (Paddock 
et al., 2011). 
• Often-subjective decisions about the application of specific facilitation 
implementation mechanisms (Paddock et al., 2011) are conditioned to other 
policy processes. 
 In general, facilitation implementation mechanisms of environmental conventions 
“have been innovative and have posed a variety of challenges” (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 
2011, p. 357). Member countries, however, still need to determine the roles and 
responsibilities of their actors to guarantee effective coordination and action 
(Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). Furthermore, policy decisions need to use evidence 
that connects mechanisms to the conventions and that determines effectiveness over time. 
Connecting mechanisms to specific types of obligations that countries are expected to 
adhere to, and reflecting on the main challenges that these mechanisms confront, is 
essential to supporting conventions’ “effective, full and prompt implementation” (Sand, 
1992). 
 Agreements are of little significance if not translated into national politics. The 
study of implementation also offers substantial insights about the connection between 
international law and international relations, and how these fields influence international 
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politics. The literature on compliance sets out definitions, discusses the implications for 
state behavior, and explains the factors that affect compliance and implementation at 
different levels. However, measurement implementation calls for deeper empirical 
analysis to improve results in the adoption of measures and their effectiveness. Such 
analysis will offer countries and conventions additional information to balance their 
national policies with the fulfillment of their international obligations, to obtain the 
health, economic resources, and ecosystem services benefits promised by implementation 
of international conventions.  
 
Moving forward in the study of global environmental conventions 
 As global international conventions have evolved, different issues have emerged 
as concerns and trends, highlighting the critical role of conventions both conceptually and 
in practice. One aspect has to do with the increasing number and scope of agreements and 
international organizations, which brings complexity to the international system (Alter & 
Meunier, 2009). Because each agreement represents a set of countries, interests, and 
goals, the creation of multiple agreements raises many questions. On one hand, the 
literature discusses the problems of duplication, fragmentation, and overlap, and their 
effects on governance architectures and performance (Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & 
Zelli, 2009). The possibility exists for “regulatory congestion” at national and 
international levels caused by the co-existence of international environmental agreements 
(UNEP et al., 2007). On the other hand, some scholars focus on how institutions and 
agreements interact with each other, the possibilities of synergies and collaboration 
among the conventions, and the effects of these connections on states’ behavior and the 
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effectiveness of the conventions (McInerney, 2015; Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013; K. 
Raustiala, 2013; Kal Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Oran R Young, 1996). Furthermore, there 
are cross-cutting issues that have to do with governance mechanisms. The coexistence of 
multilateral agreements is opening the space for regime complexity that can be both an 
advantage and an opportunity (Gehring & Faude, 2013). The extent to which the 
mechanisms established by the conventions can generate spaces for capacity 
development, technology transfer, and financing is critical to ensuring that state parties 
support each other in achieving the conventions’ goals, contributing to the solution of 
environmental problems and advancement in sustainable development.  
 In addition, UN Environment identified various factors affecting the substance 
and functioning of global environmental conventions (Kanie, 2007; UNEP et al., 2007). 
Multiple national institutions manage this process, which raises the challenge of further 
fragmentation and demands stronger coordination skills to present a unified position on 
each agreement. At the international level, overlap in the issues addressed by conventions 
is both a challenge and an opportunity. Overlap transforms how agreements are 
negotiated and how their institutional arrangements operate, and calls for conventions to 
rethink their focus, strategic visions, and interaction with other global governance 
mechanisms. At the procedural level, countries are required to participate in numerous 
post-agreement negotiations. These negotiations also take place at a very fast pace, 
supported by communications technologies, under the premise of more available 
information, and more spaces for countries to provide input and present their concerns. 
How the focal points—the institutions that implement the agreements at the national 
level—balance their multiple commitments and timelines is a critical challenge, 
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especially for countries with limited institutional and financial resources. Negotiations 
themselves are also being transformed, as new formats and coalitions—based not on 
countries’ capacities or location but on like-mindedness—are emerging. There is also 
increasing rapport among individual negotiators, as well as increasing influence and 
engagement from stakeholders and civil society representatives (UNEP et al., 2007).  
 At the substantive level, several trends are critical. One overall trend is the 
evolution of the common concern of humankind for the environment and the increasing 
challenges that it presents. Numerous  approaches refer to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, which acknowledges disparities in economic development 
among countries and therefore on responsibility for solving environmental problems 
(Cullet, 2010; United Nations, 1992a). In some cases, conventions—such as the 
UNFCCC—ended up establishing different types of obligations for different countries 
(Redgwell, 2014). While all countries need to contribute to the solution of planetary 
environmental problems, each convention should differentiate the kinds of support that 
developing countries require (financing, capacity development, technology, and 
expertise) to put in place institutions and policies needed to achieve the objectives.  
 Conventions also need to make progress in the recognition of community 
environmental interests and the integration of non-state actors. Engagement with NGOs, 
work on education, awareness and communication, research initiatives, and action plans 
through local actors are just some examples of how environmental agreements can 
engage stakeholders. Conventions also need to define time-bound targets, flexible 
regulations, and stronger compliance regimes to guarantee that they fulfill the monitoring 
and review function that, by definition, they have. Through the specification of 
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performance review and strategic assessment approaches, conventions need to identify 
specific indicators to assess their progress (McInerney, 2015). Under the premise that you 
cannot control what you do not measure, agreements need to design and execute 
initiatives for data collection, measurement, assessment, and feedback to evaluate 
progress in policy objectives, both nationally and globally (UNEP, 2012d).  
 Lastly, as the world moves forward on the implementation of the SDGs, the role 
of global environmental conventions is indisputable. Different targets refer directly and 
indirectly to the conventions and their implementation, including SDG12 Responsible 
Consumption and Production, SDG13 Climate Action, SDG14 Life below Water, and 
SDG15 Life on Land (UN General Assembly, 2015). Furthermore, the goals address the 
importance of partnerships, access to technology, resource mobilization, and assistance, 
factors that apply not only to environmental agreements but to international cooperation 
in general. In this context, the conventions need to understand their role in the sustainable 
development agenda, in order to put in place mechanisms to implement the goals (UNEP, 
2016b). Conventions also have to integrate within their own institutional structures and 
plans of action the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development. Furthermore, in the process of achieving the SDGs, countries need to draw 
lessons from the conventions that have worked on implementing, monitoring, and 
assessing similar global commitments. Global environmental goals are reflected in the 
sustainable development agenda, and existing information from the conventions and their 
implementation can certainly contribute to the monitoring and fulfillment of the SDGs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS INDEX: DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
A key recent trend in the systems of global governance is the use of 
quantification, assessment, the measurement of results, and governance indicators to 
promote performance evaluation, accountability, and public regulation (Davis, Fisher, 
Kingsbury, & Merry, 2012; de Siqueira, Leite, & Beerli, 2017). Using indicators to 
inform decision-making processes changes the nature of that process and, if designed 
correctly, can offer consistent, efficient, transparent, and impartial metrics to gather 
information, summarize complex realities, exercise judgment, and support actors in 
designing and executing policies and in justifying choices. Furthermore, scholarly 
attempts to apply strategic management to international treaties highlight the need to 
monitor compliance and evaluate treaty performance through the use of different 
instruments, including reviews and assessment, evaluations, and the use of performance 
metrics and indicators (McInerney, 2015). The central purpose behind these metrics is to 
establish linkages between treaty objectives and outcomes (Alesani, 2014).  
In the case of global environmental governance, different measures exist to study 
the effectiveness and implementation of environmental agreements and regimes (O'Neill, 
2009, 2017). Even though qualitative methods seem to dominate the field, there is a clear 
need for a quantitative mechanism that provides description, assessment, and explanation
 72 
(King et al., 1994). This type of social science approach will make possible to evaluate, 
from a positivist perspective, the existing linkages between environmental conventions 
and changes in policy behaviors, and the extent to which it contributes to improve 
environmental quality. Empirical assessment can provide an accurate description of these 
linkages and enhance explanatory power. An empirical approach to global environmental 
governance would definitively improve the understanding of different international 
instruments used to protect the environment. Indices such as the Environmental 
Performance Index developed by Yale University (YCELP, Data-Drive Yale, & CIESIN, 
2016), and the Environmental Democracy Index developed by the World Resources 
Institute (Worker & De Silva, 2015), have addressed ecosystem health and environmental 
vitality, and environmental rights, respectively. In the case of global environmental 
conventions, although these international law instruments are broadly acknowledged to 
be central to the environmental protection, sustainable development, and effective global 
environmental governance, the extent to which countries have established the laws and 
regulations to fulfill their obligations has yet to be systematically measured.  
In seeking to assess the level of implementation of global environmental 
conventions, I have used a mixed-methods approach based on both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, and that is part of the work I developed in the Environmental 
Conventions Project, as member of the Center for Governance and Sustainability’s 
research team.  
After identifying the main units of analysis, I will describe the data sources, 
methodology, and technical approach for the quantitative and the qualitative analyses. In 
the case of the quantitative analysis, describing the steps taken to develop the ECI not 
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only clarifies its structure but also presents the important information that the index 
contains and how it can be useful for understanding specific aspects of implementation. 
This chapter describes the qualitative methodology used in the elaboration of the country 
profiles presented in Chapter 6. I describe the technical nature of the index’s 
methodology and demonstrate its replicability and usefulness for assessing the 
implementation of other international law instruments in different policy areas. In 
addition, the use of specific sources of information such as national reports submitted to 
the convention secretariats reflects on the nature of these information mechanisms. Using 
these reports as part of the methodology for this study certainly informs analyses on 
information requirements in global environmental conventions and international 
agreements, and on how these requirements contribute to processes of compliance, 
implementation and enforcement.  
Measuring the extent to which the conventions have been implemented 
determines the breadth of countries’ progress in putting in place regulations, institutions, 
and strategies needed to achieve global environmental goals, and in addressing challenges 
to fulfilling their obligations. This allows us to identify systematic patterns that reflect on 
the current assumptions of theories and to call for alternative explanations of the 
observed facts. This type of description serves as a foundation for solid social science 
research on the implementation of international agreements and offers the necessary 
elements to propose improvements to the policy process. Using an index constructed with 
clear goals, audiences, and indicators is essential for measuring progress and change, and 
can be an effective tool to mobilize action and resources from governments, academia, 
civil society, and stakeholders. It provides a report card to countries and conventions to 
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track progress and ensure accountability. Ultimately, it could improve strategic 
governance processes to increase environmental protection and achieve sustainable 
development. 
 
Units of analysis 
 Two core units of analysis form the basis of this study: countries and conventions. 
This section explains their characteristics and the criteria for their selection.  
 
Countries 
 The master list of countries included in this study includes the 193 member states 
of the UN (United Nations, 2015c), four other states with a different UN status (the Cook 
Islands, Niue, Palestine, and the Holy See), and one regional organization: the European 
Union. The Holy See, Palestine, and the EU have received a standing invitation to 
participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the UN General Assembly, to 
which they maintain permanent observer missions. The Cook Islands and Niue are states 
in free association to New Zealand, but they behave as sovereign states in international 
law.6 The total 198 units of analysis are distributed in different categories based on 
regions and levels of development (see Table 6). Both classifications are based on those 
established by the UN Statistical Division (UN DESA, 2016) (see Appendix H).7  
                                                
6  Some countries have recognized the Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign states, and they maintain 
diplomatic relations in their own name, including participation in international agreements.  
7 Additional classifications can be made based on regional groupings established by the conventions, or by 
other characteristics based on income, geography, development (i.e., Small Island Developing States / 
SIDS or Least Developed Countries / LDCs), or membership in international groups such as the 
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Table 6 Countries included in this study, by type of country and region 
 Number. of countries Percentage 
UN Membership   
UN permanent Members 193 97% 
Observers 4 2% 
Regional Organization 1 1% 
Total 198 100% 
Level of development   
Developed 50 25% 
Developing 148 75% 
Total 198 100% 
Regions   
Africa 54 27% 
Americas 35 18% 
Asia 48 24% 
Europe 44 22% 
Oceania 16 8% 
Regional Organization 1 1% 
Total 198 100% 
 
Agreements 
 Of the ten agreements considered by that research initiative (see Table 1), four are 
considered in this study. They fall within two thematic clusters—chemicals and waste 
and biodiversity—and include the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste, the Stockholm 
Convention on POPs, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (see Table 7). In developing the Index, the 
Center for Governance and Sustainability collaborated with top leadership in the 
secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Ramsar, and CITES conventions, as well 
as with officials from UN Environment. Collaboration included making site visits to 
several convention secretariats and attending some COPs.  
                                                
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP). 
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Table 7 Global environmental conventions included in this study 
  Start 
Year 
No of 
parties 
Biodiversity • Convention on International Wetlands (Ramsar Convention) • Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
1971 
1973 
169 
183 
 Chemicals 
and Waste 
• Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes 
• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  
1989 
2001 
185 
181 
 
Quantitative analysis 
 
Sources of data 
 The quantitative analysis of the ECI is grounded in the national reports submitted 
by state parties to each convention. Environmental conventions introduce obligations for 
parties to report on the implementation of and compliance with the provisions established 
by each agreement (Kiss, 2006). Each treaty determines the type of information it wants 
to collect through national reports, including the measures that the state parties have 
taken, and establishes the office or executive body to which the reports are to be 
submitted (see Table 8). Normally national reports contain two sorts of information. On 
one side, they focus on the legal, administrative, and policy measures that state parties 
adopt or intend to adopt to implement each agreement. They also collect scientific data 
on the state of the environmental problem addressed by each convention at the national 
level. For the four agreements included in this study, reporting requirements differ in 
frequency and content as well as in the mechanisms for submission and the use of 
information included in the reports.  
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Table 8 Reporting requirements for the conventions included in this study 
Convention Reporting requirements 
Basel 
Convention 
According to Article 13 of the convention, reports should include: 
• Information on focal points 
• Information on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes 
• Measures adopted to implement the convention 
• Statistics on the effects of hazardous waste generation, transportation, and disposal  
• Information on accidents, disposal options, and technologies to manage hazardous 
wastes. 
• Information on other agreements for hazardous waste management 
Stockholm 
Convention 
According to Article 15 of the convention, reports should include: 
• Measures adopted to implement the convention, and their effectiveness 
• Statistical data on the production, import, and export of the chemicals included in the 
annexes to the convention. 
Ramsar 
Convention 
After the convention entered into force, the second meeting of the COP recommended 
the submission of national reports and requested the Bureau of the Convention (then 
equivalent to the secretariat) to establish the requirements for this process. Reports are 
submitted for each COP based on a format established by the standing committee. 
Questions are based on the convention’s strategic plan and are designed to measure 
progress on key indicators and considering continuity to permit time-series analyses.  
CITES 
Article VIII para (7) establishes two types of reports for the convention that should be 
transmitted to the Secretariat: 
• An annual report containing a summary of the records of trade in the specimens 
regulated by the convention, including detailed information as indicated in Art. VIII 
para (6). 
• A biennial report on legislative, regulatory, and administrative measures taken to 
enforce the provisions of the present convention. 
Source: (Basel Convention, 2016a; IUCN, 1973 Art. VIII; Ramsar Convention, 1984, 2013; Stockholm 
Convention, 2016a; UNEP, 1989 Art. 13; United Nations, 2001 Art. 15) 
 
Based on these reporting requirements, the conventions established specific 
questionnaires and the frequency with which reports—responding to these 
questionnaires—were to be submitted Cycles (see Appendix A for the questionnaires for 
each reporting cycle included in this study). For the purposes of this study, those have 
been designated Reporting Cycles (see Table 9). Reports are collected by the convention 
secretariats, except for the Ramsar Convention, for which reports are officially submitted 
to the COP. Only the Basel Convention (since 2012) and the Stockholm Convention have 
electronic reporting systems. Once the reports have been collected, they are intended to 
be publicly available. Convention secretariats have made reports submitted in 2001 or 
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later available online. This study, therefore, uses the online reports, the structure of which 
is comparable and standardized through the different reporting cycles between 2001 and 
2015. That information forms the basis for creating the dataset for the ECI. 
 
Table 9 Reporting cycles structure and availability 
 Structure of reporting cycles Reporting cycles available 
Basel Convention 
Reporting cycles are annual. An 
electronic reporting system was 
implemented in 2012. 
2001-2015 
Stockholm 
Convention 
Reporting cycles are defined by the 
COP. So far it has established three. 
Three reporting cycles: 2002-2006, 
2006-2010, and 2010-2014 
Ramsar Convention 
Reports are submitted for each 
COP, which takes place every three 
to four years.  
2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015 
CITES Reports are biennial 
Six reporting periods: 2003-2004, 
2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, 
2011-2012, and 2013-2014. 
 
Index design 
 In the empirical analysis part of this study I will discuss the design and 
implementation of a measurement instrument to obtain data about national 
implementation that, evaluating the process under the same parameters, allows for 
analysis and comparison across conventions, within conventions but across countries, and 
for the identification of trends along the different reporting cycles. As the main outcome 
of the Environmental Conventions Project, designing and defining the index involved a 
multi-stage process to obtain the required information to assess implementation and 
developing a methodology that includes all the aspects of this process in a way that 
assures replicability across environmental conventions, as well as for other mechanisms 
of international law. The steps in constructing the index are described in the next 
sections. 
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Analysis of the structure of global environmental conventions 
 This stage includes the analysis of the legal text of the conventions to 
identify the hard legal obligations defined by them. Obligations constitute binding 
rules that determine the actions and commitments to be undertaken by the 
conventions target subjects, in this case their member states (Bodansky, 2010). 
National Reports compilation 
 This step includes the collection of the national reports submitted by state 
parties to the conventions. As mentioned above, these reports are the main sources 
of information to evaluate implementation and construct the index. However, the 
delayed submission or lack of submission of some reports posed challenges to the 
data analysis. A review of the reporting cycles resulted in the availability of 2,754 
reports distributed among the four agreements, as indicated in Table 10.8 This 
introduces a bias, since results and analysis were only possible for those countries 
that submitted at least one report between 2001 and 2015. However, the number 
of reports for each convention does not affect the distribution of the data, since 
they maintain the same unit of analysis—reporting cycle—and eventual 
comparisons across conventions are only done using the latest available report for 
each country.  Historical trends are presented with the purpose of assessing the 
evolution of the index. However, references to individual countries are based on 
the last available report. Table 11 presents the number of countries for which data 
was available and distribution of type of country and region. For each convention, 
                                                
8 Chapters 4 and 5 present detailed information on the national reporting trends for each of the conventions 
included.  
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the analysis evaluates the information for all parties available through December 
31, 2016.9  
 
Table 10 Number of national reports analyzed by convention 
 Basel Convention 
Stockholm 
Convention 
Ramsar 
Convention CITES 
National reports 
available 1,355 226 768 405 
 
Table 11 Number of countries that have submitted at least one report 
 Basel Convention Stockholm Convention 
Ramsar 
Convention CITES 
 Countries % Countries % Countries % Countries % 
By type of country         
Developed 46 29% 39 33% 46 28% 44 40% 
Developing 115 71% 81 67% 120 72% 66 60% 
By region         
Africa 41 25% 30 25% 50 30% 17 15% 
Americas 31 19% 25 21% 30 18% 24 22% 
Asia 38 24% 28 23% 37 22% 27 25% 
Europe 42 26% 35 29% 41 25% 39 35% 
Oceania 9 6% 2 2% 8 5% 3 3% 
European Union 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
TOTAL 161 100% 120 100% 166 100% 110 100% 
Reporting 
compliance (1)         
Total 161 87% 120 66% 166 98% 110 60% 
Developed (2) 46 100% 39 89% 46 98% 44 94% 
Developing (2) 115 86% 81 60% 120 98% 66 50% 
(1) Percentage of countries, of those obliged to report, that have submitted at least one report during the 
period of analysis. 
(2) Percentage of countries, of those in each specific category obliged to report, that have submitted at 
least one report during the period of analysis.  
 
National Reports analysis 
 The analysis of national reports aims to determine the structure of the 
questionnaires—number and nature of the questions, the type of indicators they 
                                                
9 The ECI includes also the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, and the World Heritage Convention. These 
agreements, however are not part of this study.  
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measure, and how they are related to the process of implementation. The 
methodology chose indicators for the index that connect to the actual process of 
implementation and are suitable for coding. Indicators reflect countries’ 
commitments to provision of information, creation of the necessary institutions, 
and the technical capacity to comply with obligations. The indicators fall into five 
categories: information, regulation, management, technical, and financial 
obligations (see Box 1). These categories reflect the types of obligations and 
create the same structure of the components of the index for all conventions, 
independently of the number and type of indicators. Table 12 presents the number 
of questions in each reporting cycle for each convention, the total number of 
indicators, and their category classification. 
 
Box 1 Definition of categories of indicators 
• Information: Obligations to conduct scientific assessment, measurement, and evaluations associated 
with the activities connected to each convention; submission of reports to the conventions’ executive 
bodies; and the establishment and maintenance of databases and records required for the 
implementation and operation of each convention. 
• Management: Designation or creation of administrative bodies and focal points to manage the 
implementation and general functioning of each convention, the linkages with the conventions’ 
executive bodies, and the definition of strategic frameworks for the operation of each convention at the 
national level. 
• Regulation: Legislative and policy measures that each state party has to implement according to the 
framework of each convention. 
• Technical: Technical measures and procedures to address or manage the environmental problems 
associated with each environmental convention. 
• Financial: Payment of dues and assistance, and other financial responsibilities by state parties.  
 
Table 12 Number of questions and indicators by reporting cycle 
   Category (number and percentage) 
 Questions Indicators for ECI Information Management Regulation Technical Financial 
Basel Convention 
2001-
2011 
30 15 - 2 (13%) 
2 
(13%) 
11 
(74%) - 
2012-
2015 
30 15 - 2 (13%) 
2 
(13%) 
11 
(74%) - 
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   Category (number and percentage) 
 Questions Indicators for ECI Information Management Regulation Technical Financial 
Stockholm Convention 
2002-
2006 
67 48 4 
(8%) 
15 
(31%) 
14 
(29%) 
12 
(25%) 
3 
(6%) 
2006-
2010 
65 59 4 
(7%) 
26 
(44%) 
8 
(14%) 
18 
(31%) 
3 
(5%) 
2010-
2014 
72 56 4 
(7%) 
20 
(20%) 
9 
(16%) 
20 
(20%) 
3 
(5%) 
Ramsar Convention 
2005 581  
45 
 
8 
(18%) 
24 
(53%) 
1 
(2%) 
11 
(24%) 
1 
(2%) 
2008 
69 
 
36 
 
8 
(22%) 
16 
(44%) 
1 
(3%) 
10 
(28%) 
1 
(3%) 
        
2012 83  
48 
 
14 
(29%) 
20 
(42%) 
2 
(4%) 
11 
(23%) 
1 
(2%) 
2015 67  
45 13 
(29%) 
20 
(44%) 
2 
(4%) 
9 
(20%) 
1 
(2%) 
CITES 
2003-
2014 
120 46 11 
(24%) 
14 
(30%) 
10 
(22%) 
10 
(22%) 
1 
(2%) 
 
Examples of indicators from the various categories are presented in Table 
13. For each indicator, the analysis establishes the available data options that 
countries can use to report their progress (see Appendices B and C for a complete 
list of indicators by convention and reporting cycle and their scoring scales). 
 
Table 13 Sample indicators across conventions 
Category Indicator Convention 
Information10 
• Provision of information on CITES relevant legislation CITES 
• Maintenance of wetland inventory data and accessibility for 
stakeholders Ramsar Convention 
• Transmission of the National Implementation Plan to the COP Stockholm Convention 
Management 
• Existence of a national definition of waste and hazardous 
waste Basel Convention 
• Trade/taking /possession/transport conditions included by 
domestic measures adopted for CITES-listed species CITES 
• Existence of a national wetland policy Ramsar Convention 
• Existence of measures to manage stockpiles in a safe, 
efficient, and environmentally sound manner Stockholm Convention 
                                                
10 The Basel Convention does not include information obligations. 
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Category Indicator Convention 
Regulation 
• Existence of border control for transboundary movement of 
waste Basel Convention 
• Review of legislation regarding access to or ownership of 
natural resources/harvesting/transport of live specimens CITES 
• National arrangements established for the custodianship, 
storage, and maintenance of wetland inventory data  Ramsar Convention 
• Development of strategies to identify products and articles in 
uses and wastes consisting of, containing or contaminated 
with chemicals listed in Annex A, B or C 
Stockholm Convention 
Technical 
• Existence of measures for reduction and/or elimination of the 
generation of hazardous and other wastes Basel Convention 
• Development of written permit procedures for permit 
issuance/acceptance, registration of traders, and registration of 
producers 
CITES 
 
• Implementation of measures to protect wetlands of special 
importance Ramsar Convention 
• Inventory of 
PCDD/PCDF/PCB/pentachlorobenzene/hexachlorobenzene Stockholm Convention 
Financial11 
• Use of CITES fees for wildlife conservation CITES 
• Payment of Ramsar dues Ramsar Convention 
• Existence of measures to provide financial support and 
incentives to achieve the objectives of the convention Stockholm Convention 
 
Creation of scoring scales 
The scoring scales are based on the options for reported data available for 
each indicator. Each indicator is accompanied by a guidance note that includes the 
question to which it corresponds, and its correspondence in previous reporting 
cycles if available. Scoring scales are in place for each score to be logical and 
justifiable. The scales rank reported data options from 0 to 5, with 1 meaning 
activities not being implemented and 5 meaning fully implemented. Using scoring 
scales is essential for the empirical assessment behind the index and allows for 
comparability across indicators and conventions, which otherwise would not be 
possible, since indicators have different reporting options for data. Table 14 
provides a sample of response options and the coding scheme. A missing value 
                                                
11 Only some of the conventions include financial obligations.  
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(no response) is indicated by NR and scored with a zero. When the option for 
reported data is not applicable, indicators are not scored and are not considered in 
the index. When data is not provided, this are indicated by N/A and scored with 
the most negative possible score (normally one) and considered in the index. 
 
Table 14 Sample responses and coding scheme 
Convention Scoring for Index 5 3 2 1 0 Blank 
Basel 
Convention 
• Implemented  
• Exists  
• Used 
• In 
preparation 
 • Not 
implemented 
• Does not 
exist  
• Not used  
No 
information 
available 
No 
response 
Not 
applicable 
Stockholm 
Convention 
• Yes • In progress • Being 
planned 
• No 
Ramsar 
Convention 
 • Partly  
• In some 
cases  
• In progress  
• In some 
sites 
• Being 
planned 
• No 
CITES • Yes • Partly  • No 
 
Data coding 
The next step in the construction of the ECI is the coding of the national 
reports to build a database that includes the reported data submitted by each 
country to each convention through the different reporting cycles, for all selected 
indicators. The coding process was done by myself and one other research 
associate from the Center for Governance and Sustainability, in a rotation set up 
to ensure intercoder reliability (see Table 15). Both sets of coding results then 
were compared to ensure that differences did not exceed 5 percent. When 
required, the two independent coders reviewed one more time the national reports 
for which the first coding registered discrepancies, and adjusted the code. The 
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information resulting from the coding process shows to what extent countries 
have fulfilled the obligations defined by each convention, according to their own 
national policies and objectives. National reports also provide insight about which 
factors determine the overall success of the convention and help us to understand 
why countries perform differently.  
 
Table 15 Intercoder reliability by reporting cycle 
 Basel Convention Stockholm Convention 
Ramsar 
Convention CITES 
Intercoder reliability 98.0% 97.8% 99.7% 98.5% 
 
This coding process was done using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Based 
on the number of reports and the number of indicators used for the index, over 
100,000 data points were coded independently by two researchers to build a 
reliable dataset that includes the reported data submitted by each country to each 
convention for all selected indicators over the fifteen years of the reporting 
period. Each reporting cycle was coded in a separate table, including all the 
indicators and countries and their reported data. Additional spreadsheet 
summarized membership, national reporting rates, and compliance with national 
reporting.  
Data scoring 
This step includes scoring the reporting data, ranking individual countries’ 
responses according to the previously defined scales. This resulted in a score for 
each indicator as reported by each country. Scores were assigned automatically 
using specific logic functions in Microsoft Excel. Using the logical formula IF, 
the Excel spreadsheets are designed, based on the options for reported data and 
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the scoring scales presented in Table 14, for the coders to enter just the reported 
data. Once the data is entered, the spreadsheet automatically calculates the score 
corresponding to that response (see Box 2). When a country failed to report data 
for a particular indicator (but otherwise reported), it received a score of zero for 
that specific metric. Indicators that were not applicable to a country or for which 
countries reported that the information was not available are not included in the 
index. 
 
Box 2 Example of Microsoft Excel formulas for data scoring 
Basel Convention  
• Reporting cycle   2009 
• Question    2B  
• Indicator    No. 2 Existence of a national definition of hazardous waste 
• Options for reported data:  Exist 
      Does not exist 
          In preparation 
       No information available (N/A) 
        No response (NR) 
Excel formula: 
IF (CELL= “Exist”, 5, IF(CELL= “Does not exist”, 1, IF(CELL= “In preparation”, 3, IF(CELL= 
“NR”, 0, “”)))) 
 
Ramsar Convention  
Reporting cycle    2012 (COP11) 
Question    4.1.1 A  
Indicator    No. 33 Development of a National Action Plan for Wetland CEPA  
Options for reported data: A. Yes  
    B. No  
    C. In progress  
    D. Planned 
       No information available (N/A) 
       No response (NR) 
Excel formula: 
IF (CELL=“A”,5,IF(CELL=“B”,1,IF(CELL=“C”,3,IF(CELL=“D”,2,IF(CELL=“NR”, 0, “”))))) 
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Index computation 
The process of calculating the index uses the scores given to each 
indicator. The overall index score is the arithmetic average of the scores obtained 
by each country in each category of indicators. This protocol resulted in an 
empirical measurement that assesses implementation progress by country and by 
convention and ensures comparability of results by country and convention. Using 
this method implies that all the categories have the same weight. (Further progress 
in the construction of the index might, however, change this approach, depending 
on the process of validating the methodology that the Center for Governance and 
Sustainability will conduct with a group of experts in the field. If changed, 
weights for the different types of indicators will be determined based on expert 
consensus.) This core step of the research process ultimately results in an 
empirical measurement that assesses the progress of each country in the 
implementation of global environmental conventions. This database includes 
trends analysis for the index, overall ranking, and analyses by type of countries 
and regions. Countries’ rankings by index scores are provided both at the global 
and the regional level, but they could also be provided for specific indicators’ 
categories. These data constitute the main input to explain implementation and 
determine the causes for countries’ performance. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
 The quantitative methods are supplemented by a qualitative analysis of ten 
country profiles (presented in Chapter 6). The selected countries include Algeria,  
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Box 3 Summary of research protocol for the ECI 
A seven-step protocol for the construction of the index ensures analytical rigor. 
(1) Identify obligations and commitments by member states. 
(2) Collect reports submitted by member states to the conventions as the main formal source of 
information to evaluate implementation and construct the index.  
(3) Use national reports to identify implementation indicators for each convention (see Tables 1 and 
2). 
(4) Create and apply scoring scales for each indicator. To this end, each answer to each question 
under a specific convention is evaluated using an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the 
highest level of implementation. A score of 0 is given when no information is provided.  
(5) Code data from national reports to build a dataset that includes the reported data submitted by 
each country to each convention for all selected indicators. Two researchers conduct the coding 
process to ensure inter-coder reliability. 
(6) Score reported data and rank countries both on whether they have submitted reports according to 
their obligations and whether their reports demonstrate progress toward the aims of the 
conventions.  
(7) Construct the index using the scores for each indicator. The indicators are not weighted. A 
weighting could take place at a later stage or users could do it once the database is available 
online in an interactive format. 
 
 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, South 
Korea, and Thailand. Countries were chosen as part of an analysis conducted in 
partnership with the Law Division of UN Environment. The selection process was based 
on criteria of membership in the conventions, availability of information (see Table 16), 
equitable representation of developed and developing countries, and distribution among 
the five UN geographic regions (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3 Countries selected for qualitative analysis in Chapter 6 
 
 Selected countries for national implementation profiles 
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Table 16 National reporting rates for countries in selected implementation profiles, 
by convention12 
 DZA ARG AUS CAN COL CZE DEU MOZ KOR THA 
Basel           
Stockholm           
CITES           
Ramsar           
 
 No reports  1% - 50%  51% - 80%  81% - 100% 
 
These country profiles seek to illustrate the range of factors that shape 
implementation, and connect the actions that countries implement at the national level 
with the quantitative assessment resulting from the ECI. They include information from 
the national reports submitted by state parties to the conventions, and use the index 
results. They also use additional primary and secondary sources of data including COP 
decisions and other relevant documents of the conventions as well as country reports, 
legislation, and various action and implementation plans as well as various newspaper 
and scholarly articles and reports from NGOs.  
The analysis is based on rigorous research of national measures to implement the 
international agreements. It identifies best practices that facilitate implementation and 
challenges that hinder implementation for each convention in the two clusters—
chemicals and waste and biodiversity. To ensure consistency and comparability, a set of 
common concepts across the countries were identified and discussed in each case. As the 
                                                
12 The country codes listed here include: Algeria (DZA), Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Canada 
(CAN), Colombia (COL), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Mozambique (MOZ), South Korea 
(KOR), and Thailand (THA). See Appendix H for a complete list of country codes. 
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countries were selected from a pool of both developed and developing countries and from 
different geographic regions, the findings provide valuable insights on the overall 
implementation of the four conventions.  
This study’s methodology provides key empirical tools for both quantitative and 
qualitative assessment of the level of implementation of the four conventions included in 
this study. By evaluating implementation under the same parameters, using a set of 
indicators based on the national reports signatory countries submit to the convention 
secretariats, the index allows for multifaceted analysis and comparison. It also identifies 
trends over time for individual countries, groups of countries, and the conventions. 
Complementing this analysis with the qualitative national implementation profiles 
validates the index results and connects it with the regulation and policy instruments 
established at the national level as part of the obligations under each agreement. The ECI 
database, its methodology, and the national implementation profiles contribute to the 
understanding of how countries are translating their obligations into national 
environmental policies, offering policy inputs to improve the performance of countries 
and conventions.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH: IMPLEMENTING 
THE CHEMICALS AND WASTE CONVENTIONS 
 
 
 
Chemicals are critical to all aspects of modern life. They play an important role in 
agriculture, industry, energy, and medicine. Through the different stages of their life 
cycle, from extraction to disposal, chemicals might pose various threats to human health 
and the environment (Selin, 2010). As the Global Chemicals Outlook notes, “exposure to 
toxic chemicals can cause or contribute to a broad range of health outcomes. These 
include eye, skin, and respiratory irritation; damage to organs such as the brain, lungs, 
liver or kidneys; damage to the immune, respiratory, cardiovascular, nervous, 
reproductive or endocrine systems; and birth defects and chronic diseases, such as cancer, 
asthma, or diabetes” (UNEP, 2013a, p. 50). Every year the number of chemicals available 
on the market increases, and as consumption rises across countries, the international 
chemicals industry is growing dramatically. Just in the European Union it is expected that 
30,000 new chemicals will be registered by 2018. Furthermore, the global chemical 
industry output, which was valued at US$ 171 billion in 1970, had by 2010 increased 
more than twentyfold to US$ 4.12 trillion (UNEP, 2013a, p. 50). By 2020, chemicals are 
expected to represent a third of overall global consumption (UNEP, 2012a).  
Chemical pollution has become a transboundary issue as many hazardous 
substances are transported through air and water across the globe. The disposal of 
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hazardous wastes has also become an international concern. National regulatory systems 
are critical to the safe management of chemical substances but are often insufficient as 
trade volumes increase, opportunities for illegal dumping appear in places around the 
globe with weak regulatory systems, and the cost of chemical management in 
industrialized countries increases. As governments have noted, “the challenges posed by 
chemicals and wastes are global, enduring and constantly evolving and (...) are 
interrelated with crucial environmental issues such as environment-dependent human 
health, the health of ecosystems and better ecosystem management, the preservation of 
biodiversity, and the link between poverty and environment, environmental disasters, 
climate change and sustainable consumption” (UNEP, 2013a, 2013c). 
For decades, global environmental governance has been concerned with 
hazardous chemicals, pollutants, their management, and their effects on health and the 
environment. Through various international agreements, countries have consistently 
articulated a clear commitment to reduce the generation of toxic substances, improve 
their management, and reduce the environmental and health risks associated with them 
(UNCED, 1992; United Nations, 1972, 2002). To address these issues, a global 
regulatory system for chemicals and waste has emerged, developed around specific 
mechanisms to regulate the production, use, and trade of chemical substances worldwide. 
Most recently, the SDGs connected the issue of chemicals and waste to various goals in 
terms of human health, water management, and sustainable consumption and production 
(UN General Assembly, 2015). 
Scholarship in global environmental governance has addressed multiple 
dimensions of this regime complex. Factors such as its creation, effectiveness, and future 
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challenges have been studied and evaluated by scholars, experts, and policy-makers. 
Debates have also included the obstacles to managing the threats of hazardous waste and 
pollution. Issues such as the lack of information regarding the uses and effects of 
chemicals, the low degree of implementation of the conventions, and the lack of capacity 
of developing countries and economies in transition to design and implement cross-
cutting policies for chemicals and waste management (UNEP, 2012a), have raised 
questions about the role and relevance of the chemicals and waste regime. However, as it 
is also the case with the general literature about the implementation of global 
environmental conventions, most of these studies lack the empirical evidence and 
scientific rigor required to demonstrate an apparent failure of the regime to achieve 
global environmental goals.  
Using two of the multilateral agreements at the core of the chemicals and waste 
regime—the Basel Convention (UNEP, 1989), and the Stockholm Convention on POPs 
(United Nations, 2001), this chapter demonstrates that even when challenged by 
implementation, capacity, and institutional arrangements, the conventions perform an 
important role in protecting the environment and human health. In particular, this chapter 
discusses how factors such as countries’ level of development, technical capacities, 
access to technology, data collection, and monitoring mechanisms are needed to 
implement the obligations to these agreements. Even though some exceptions can be 
highlighted, and demonstrate that developing countries can in fact achieve the goals 
established by the conventions, there is a clear correlation between the level of 
development of countries and their progress in implementing their obligations with the 
chemicals and waste conventions, particularly the Stockholm Convention.  
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This chapter characterizes the chemicals and waste conventions, discussing first 
the nature of the problem of wastes and pollution, and then the context in which they 
were negotiated and drafted, their objectives, and institutional characteristics. Departing 
from these two points, the chapter assesses the level of implementation of the Basel and 
Stockholm conventions, analyzing the membership and level of national reporting to 
these to agreements, and presenting the results for implementation as measured by the 
ECI across type of countries and regions, the historical evolution of implementation since 
2001, and the top and bottom performers. Existing disparities in implementation call for 
targeted policy instruments in capacity building and technical assistance, particularly 
regarding information collection mechanisms. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the 
need for solid empirical indicators that support countries’ progress towards achieving the 
targets defined by the SDGs that are connected to the chemicals and waste regime. In 
particular, Target 4 in Goal 12 aims to "ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns" and achieve "the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all 
wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, 
and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their 
adverse impacts on human health and the environment" (UN General Assembly, 2015).  
  
The chemicals and waste regime: Origins, characteristics, goals, and challenges 
 Chemicals play an important role in agriculture, industry, energy and medicine. 
However, they pose, through the different stages of their life cycles, threats to both 
human health and the environment (Selin, 2010). Some chemicals become hazardous 
wastes, a condition that completely eliminates their economic benefits and development 
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advantages. A small minority of chemical substances—the Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs)—remain in the environment for long periods of time, bio-accumulating in 
different ecosystems and resulting in numerous harmful effects for people and the 
environment. These effects vary across geographies and social groups. As disposal places 
in industrialized countries are scarce, developing countries become extremely vulnerable 
to hazardous substances and lack proper disposal procedures (Critharis, 1990; Krueger, 
2001; Lucier & Gareau, 2014). All these dimensions of the problem of chemical pollution 
often lead to intentional violations of the regulations for the transportation of hazardous 
wastes. Such violations generate health and environmental consequences, incur important 
economic costs, and affect the existing international mechanisms designed to regulate 
these procedures (Krueger, 1999; Waugh, 1999). 
At the same time, the quantity of hazardous substances in the environment 
continues to increase. According to the Chemicals Abstract Service, more than 345,000 
chemical products are now inventoried or regulated (American Chemical Society, 2016). 
Consumption of chemical products in both developed and developing countries is 
growing fast, and could account for a third of global consumption by 2020 (UNEP, 
2012a). This leads to the production of all kinds of wastes that are often poorly managed 
through precarious practices affecting communities and ecosystems. In 2004, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 4.9 million deaths—8.3 percent of total 
deaths that year—were due to environmental exposures to selected chemicals (Prüss-
Ustün, Vickers, Haefliger, & Bertollini, 2011). This is the context in which the movement 
of hazardous waste and the control of pollutant substances became one of the most 
contentious issues in global environmental governance (Krueger, 1998). 
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Global cooperation is essential to address the wide range of issues related to 
hazardous chemicals, and efforts have been made to establish international obligations 
and standards (DeSombre, 2017; Kummer, 1992; Selin, 2010). In 1972, at the UNCHE, 
governments committed to preventing pollution and to collaborating with other states to 
address common challenges (United Nations, 1972 Principle 7). Twenty years later, at the 
Earth Summit, states agreed to “effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the 
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe 
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health” (United Nations, 
1992a Principle 14). Specifically, Agenda 21, the plan of action established at the Earth 
Summit, acknowledged two major problems regarding chemicals and wastes, particularly 
in developing countries: lack of sufficient scientific information to assess the risks 
entailed by the use of chemicals, and lack of resources to evaluate the chemicals for 
which data is available (UNCED, 1992). The 2002 Plan for Implementation of the WSSD 
followed up on previous decisions and established as one of its objectives the 
minimization, by 2020, of the adverse effects of chemicals (WSSD, 2002). These 
decisions resulted in two international treaties: the Basel Convention and the Stockholm 
Convention. The SDGs maintain this intent and define patterns for sustainable 
consumption and production that call for the reduction and elimination of wastes and the 
control of hazardous substances.  
Thus, for about four decades the international community has been actively 
working towards bridging the science-policy gap, promoting international cooperation, 
and increasing awareness about environmental issues related to hazardous chemicals and 
waste. In addition to the broader political efforts to include chemicals on the international 
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agenda, countries have also created specific policy instruments to address the challenges 
of hazardous substance management in an environmentally sound manner. Sands and 
Peel identify four approaches by which international agreements define hazardous 
substances and activities (Sands & Peel, 2012, p. 516): 
• by reference to their inherent characteristics, including their toxicity, 
flammability, explosiveness, and oxidization, 
• by reference to a listing system which identifies certain activities or projects on 
the basis that they are, per se, likely to have significant effects on the 
environment, 
• by reference to national laws, and 
• by regulating specific substances instead of establishing definitions.  
The next section describes four international treaties that regulate chemicals and 
waste (see Table 17).  Even though two of them are not part of this study, the four treaties 
regulate multiple aspects of the use, management, and disposal of hazardous substances 
through their life cycle. The Basel, Stockholm, and Rotterdam Conventions regulate 
hazardous wastes and POPs, and the Minamata Convention regulates mercury. Following 
a brief overview of each convention, I will discuss implementation and the role of the 
agreements in the policies established at the national level to protect human health and 
the environment.  
 
Chemicals and Hazardous Waste Regulation  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the number of sites available for disposal of hazardous 
substances in industrialized countries was inadequate for the storage and safe treatment of 
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the chemicals to be disposed. Sites in developing countries therefore became more 
appealing, as there were no domestic regulations in those countries to hinder acceptance 
of hazardous chemicals and no international regulations to prevent their transboundary 
movement. However, developing countries lacked proper disposal procedures and 
therefore became extremely vulnerable to the hazards of these substances (Critharis, 
1990; Krueger, 2001; Lucier & Gareau, 2014). Chemical pollution and other misuses of 
hazardous substances generated environmental harms, health consequences, and 
economic costs that called for the design of international mechanisms to regulate these 
procedures (Krueger, 1999; Waugh, 1999). The movement of hazardous waste and the 
control of pollutant substances became among the most contentious issues in global 
environmental governance (Krueger, 1998) and brought momentum for the negotiation of 
multiple multilateral agreements to address the challenge of managing, reducing, and 
eliminating chemicals and waste. 
Initially, UN Environment decided to tackle the issue with regulations to stabilize 
the transportation and disposal of toxic wastes, leading to the establishment in 1985 of 
the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of 
Hazardous Wastes (UNEP, 1987). A joint proposal by the governments of Switzerland 
and Hungary mandated the Executive Director to convene a working group for the 
elaboration of a global convention to control the transboundary movements of hazardous 
wastes (UNEP, 1987). The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Waste was signed in March 1989 with 53 original state parties, and entered 
into force in 1992 (UNEP, 1989). The Convention “discourages exports of hazardous and 
other wastes, which should only be allowed if the exporting state does not have the 
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capacity, facilities or suitable sites to dispose of them in an environmentally sound or 
efficient manner, or if the wastes are required as a raw material for recycling or recovery 
in the importing state, or in accordance with other criteria decided by the parties. 
Moreover, parties may not transfer to importing or transit states their obligation under the 
Convention to carry out environmentally sound management, and can impose additional 
requirements consistent with the Convention to better protect human health and the 
environment” (Sands, 2003, p. 693). It also provides specific rules for the international 
movement and transport of waste, including packaging and labeling guidelines. Once 
negotiated, the convention was perceived as the most comprehensive solution so far to 
the problem of hazardous wastes at different levels. It was also expected that the 
convention would shed light on UN Environment’s ability to implement multilateral 
environmental agreements, since it was the first agreement administered by this 
organization in which so many nations were likely to participate (Hackett, 1989).  
An additional key step in the regulation of the movement of hazardous wastes had 
to do with information and notification processes among exporters and recipients of these 
substances. The 1998 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (FAO/UNEP, 1998) 
regulates this matter. Specifically, it creates legally binding obligations to ensure that 
governments respect certain rules in the distribution of chemicals, particularly having all 
the information required to assess and take informed decisions on export and import 
transactions. The overall objective of the convention is to facilitate information exchange 
and to promote shared responsibility and cooperation among parties in the international 
trade of hazardous chemicals (Rotterdam Convention, 2010). 
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Responding to increasing international concern about pollution and hazardous 
substances, in 1995 UN Environment developed an international assessment of the effects 
of POPs. Based on the alarming results, in 1997 the organization received a mandate to 
negotiate a binding international agreement to identify, regulate, and control the effects of 
POPs (Hagen & Walls, 2005; Stockholm Convention, 2008; UNEP, 1997). In 2001, after 
five negotiation rounds, 92 countries signed the Stockholm Convention on POPs, which 
entered into force in 2004 (United Nations, 2001). The Stockholm Convention includes 
detailed provisions to eliminate releases of POPs and their associated risks. The 
convention also obliges countries to submit a national implementation plan, which is 
designed to establish a clear route for countries to advance implementation of their 
commitments under the convention (Lu, Giesy, & Holliday, 2007). Nonetheless, the 
agreement recognizes the need to work with developing countries to strengthen their 
capacities to achieve this objective.  
More recently, regulation of the anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury 
and mercury-containing compounds became another focus of the chemicals and waste 
regime. Since the 1950s, the environmental effects of and diseases caused by mercury 
poison called for voluntary commitments to decrease emissions. But only in 2009 did UN 
Environment adopt the decision “to initiate action to manage mercury in an efficient, 
effective and coherent manner” (UNEP, 2009). Through five intergovernmental 
negotiation committees, the chemicals branch of UN Environment’s Division of 
Technology, Industry and Economics led countries in negotiations. The resulting 
Minamata Convention on Mercury, finalized in 2013, also aims to protect human health 
and the environment. It draws global attention to a substance which is broadly used, and 
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which releases hazardous components in the atmosphere, soil, and water. The main 
objective of the convention is to control the anthropogenic releases of mercury 
throughout its life cycle. As of December 2016, the convention had 128 signatories, and 
35 countries had ratified it. It will enter into force after ratification from 50 countries 
(UNEP, 2013b). 
Since the chemicals and waste regime does not have a framework convention, 
each agreement addresses a specific dimension of this environmental cluster under the 
common goal of protecting human health and the environment, and each has specific 
legal, political, and practical implications (Krueger & Selin, 2002; Selin, 2010). Table 17 
summarizes the main objectives of each convention. As some of their objectives may 
differ, the four agreements also complement each other. Under that premise, the Basel, 
Rotterdam, and Stockholm conventions started a process to enhance cooperation and 
coordination among them. At the 2008/2009 COPs of each convention, parties adopted 
what have been called "synergies decisions" to coordinate organizational, administrative, 
technical, informational, and decision-making practices and improve efficiency and 
implementation through joint activities (Basel Convention, 2006; Rotterdam Convention, 
2008; Stockholm Convention, 2006). A fundamental consequence of this process was the 
establishment of a joint executive secretariat to oversee the three agreements. 
Most academics and policy analysts recognize the importance of the chemicals 
and waste regime and its contribution to environmental protection. However, there is an 
increasing concern about the level of implementation and the availability of data on how 
countries are translating global commitments into national policies (Stockholm 
Convention, 2016d). In the case of the Basel and Stockholm conventions, policy-makers  
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Table 17 Environmental agreements in the chemicals and waste regime 
 Year Parties13 Main objectives 
Basel 
Convention 1989 185 
• Protect human health and the environment against the adverse 
effects of hazardous waste 
• Control of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes as well 
as responsible trade in hazardous chemicals 
• Support for countries to strengthen their capacity for the sound 
management of chemicals and waste 
• Promote safe radioactive and nuclear waste management 
• Reduce the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes 
• Restrict those movements of hazardous wastes that are perceived in 
discordance with the principles of environmental sound 
management 
• Regulate the transboundary movements when they are permissible 
• Promote the environmentally sound management of hazardous 
wastes and adequate disposal activities  
Rotterdam 
Convention 1998 156 
• Promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties 
in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to 
protect human health and the environment from potential harm 
• Contribute to the environmentally sound use of those hazardous 
chemicals 
Stockholm 
Convention 2001 180 
• Regulate the sound management of chemicals throughout their life 
cycle, including POPs and heavy metals, as well as wastes 
Minamata 
Convention 2013 35 
• Protect human health and the environment from anthropogenic 
emissions and releases of mercury and mercury-containing 
compounds 
• Ban new mercury mines and phase out existing ones 
• Phase out and phase down mercury use in several products and 
processes 
• Develop control measures for emissions to air as well as releases to 
land and water 
• Regulate the informal sector of artisanal and small-scale mining 
• Ensure the environmentally sound interim storage of mercury, and 
of its disposal once it becomes waste 
Sources: (Basel Convention, 1987; Kummer, 1998; Porta & Zumeta, 2002; Rotterdam Convention, 2010; 
Stockholm Convention, 2008; UNEP, 2013b) 
 
                                                
13 The data presented in this study is updated to December 31, 2016. However, it is important to clarify the 
evolution in the membership up to April 30, 2017: 
- Angola joined the Basel Convention on February 6, 2017, and the agreement will enter into force 
in the country on May 7, 2017.  
- Malta joined the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions on January 17, 2017, and the agreements 
will enter into force in the country on April 17, 2017.  
- Five additional countries ratified the Minamata Convention: Costa Rica, Ghana, Honduras, 
Liechtenstein, and Togo. 
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and scholars argue that although progress has been achieved in the effective management 
and minimization of chemicals, “lack of data, information, and knowledge on waste 
scenarios, lack of comprehensive regulations and weak enforcement of existing 
legislation, weak technical and organizational capacities, poor public awareness and 
cooperation, and lack of funds” remain (Fiedler, 2008; Selin, 2010; UNCSD, 2011; 
UNEP, 2012a).  
Three specific propositions emerge from this assessment. First, global policy 
objectives in the area of chemicals and waste have not been achieved, which questions 
the implementation of the conventions and their role in protecting the environment 
(UNEP, 2012a). Second, developing countries and economies in transition need to 
strengthen their national capacities, including by establishing institutional frameworks for 
the “coherent implementation of the agreements” (Perrez, 2015; UNEP, 2012a) to achieve 
the objectives of the convention. This assumes a causal inference between countries’ level 
of development and the implementation of global environmental commitments. And 
third, there is not enough information regarding the uses, emissions, and effects of 
chemicals, which brings scientific uncertainty to monitoring and implementation 
(Krueger, 2001; Lallas, 2001; UNEP, 2012a). 
Scientific data is at the core of the chemicals regime. Science-based evaluations 
and management procedures are essential for identifying substances and for managing, 
reducing, and eliminating them. This directly reflects on the science-policy interface and 
the role of scientific information in the assessment and monitoring mechanisms that 
support the conventions' efforts for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous 
waste, particularly when designing technical assistance programs for developing 
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countries (Selin, 2010; WSSD, 2002 para. 23). Lack of data has persistently hindered the 
evaluation of chemicals and wastes globally and the effectiveness of the conventions. 
Also, the information submitted by state parties is often incomplete and unverified, 
specifically in regards to the assessment of inventories, stockpiles, and generation and 
movement of hazardous wastes and POPs (Basel Convention, 2011e; Stockholm 
Convention, 2011).  
 
Implementing the Basel and Stockholm conventions 
 As the global chemistry business keeps growing, particularly in developing 
countries, regulation and legislation need to keep pace in order to develop national and 
local standards. These standards are expected to reflect the reality of national chemical 
industries, and to establish monitoring, inspection, reporting, and enforcement 
mechanisms, and institutional and strategic arrangements to comply with international 
requirements (American Chemistry Council, 2014; UNEP, 2012a). Scholars argue that 
the challenges of the conventions are based on both ratification and implementation 
(Selin, 2009). Even though the number of ratifications is high, the chemicals and waste 
agreements have not “always transposed into national legislation in a comprehensive 
manner,” and countries still “face considerable difficulties establishing effective policies 
and administrative structures for managing hazardous chemicals" (Selin, 2010, p. 1; 
UNEP, 2012a). Factors affecting the implementation of the agreements include the level 
of development, the level of technical capacity, the debate between sovereignty and 
cooperation, and the fact that the policies seem not adaptable to the different national 
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characteristics of state parties (DeSombre, 2017; Krueger, 1998, 1999; Schneider, 1996; 
Selin, 2009; Walsh, 1992).  
The next two sections provide empirical evidence from the ECI to demonstrate 
how the implementation of the Basel and Stockholm conventions at the national level 
frequently differs from the premises of the traditional environmental governance 
literature. Three findings support this argument. First, the implementation of the 
conventions is progressing in both developed and developing countries, which evidences 
that in fact they are making progress regarding the definition of strategies, policies, and 
legislation for the management of hazardous wastes and POPs. Second, developing 
countries and economies in transition have strongly engaged in both conventions, not 
only in terms of membership but also in terms of national reporting and policy 
development, with some countries performing better than expected. However, factors 
such as national capacity, levels of development, and availability of scientific data are 
critical to fulfilling the obligations established by the Basel and Stockholm Conventions. 
As international cooperation is vital to the sound management of chemicals and waste, 
implementation of policy instruments such as the Basel and Stockholm conventions 
creates momentum and contributes to understanding and action. However, many 
countries still need more capacity and more solid implementation (Karlaganis, Marioni, 
Sieber, & Weber, 2001; Okaru, 1992). Bringing empirical evidence to the analysis of 
these agreements will certainly serve as a foundation to understand, explain, and improve 
countries’ performance in translating global commitments into national policies.  
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Membership 
 To understand implementation, it is important first to define the signatory parties 
for each convention. Membership is a point of departure in the evaluation of countries’ 
performance in achieving the obligations they acquired when signing and ratifying the 
convention. Legislation, strategies, institutional arrangements, and monitoring efforts 
differ among developed and developing countries. Furthermore, the nature of the problem 
of chemical production and pollution also varies across different countries and regions. 
According to the UN Environment flagship environmental assessment GEO-5, the 
production of chemicals has shifted in the last decade, moving from developed countries 
to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other developing countries, 
which are also increasing sales and generation of new chemicals (Ghosh et al., 2016; 
UNEP, 2012a). 
 
Figure 4 Historical evolution of the membership in the Basel and Stockholm 
conventions 
 
Sources: (Basel Convention, 2016b; Stockholm Convention, 2017)  
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Membership in the Basel Convention reached 185 countries in 2016 (see Figure 
4). Twenty-five percent of the members are developed countries and 75 percent are 
developing countries. In a similar pattern, 24 percent of the 180 parties to the Stockholm 
Convention are developed countries and 76 percent developing countries. The Stockholm 
Convention had approximately three times more original signatories than the Basel 
Convention, and twice as many as the Rotterdam Convention, illustrating the evolution of 
the regime from the 1990s when the Basel and Rotterdam conventions entered into force 
and increased the awareness of the international community about the importance of 
international cooperation to address chemical pollution and wastes. Expanding 
membership also confirms the success of the 2001 Johannesburg Plan of Action (WSSD, 
2002) in its objective to increase the ratification and implementation of the conventions. 
Since 2001, 38 countries have joined the Basel Convention, which represents 21 percent 
of its current membership. 95 percent of those new members are developing countries. 
Sierra Leone was the last country to join the convention in 2016 (Basel Convention, 
2016b). Membership in the Stockholm Convention has also increased. 156 countries 
ratified the convention after 2002, 79 percent of those countries (123) are developing 
while 21 percent (33) are developed. Iraq was the last country to join the convention in 
March 2016 (Stockholm Convention, 2017)14. 
All the conventions, however, have notable gaps in membership. Seven countries 
are not members in either convention: Grenada, Haiti, San Marino, South Sudan, Timor-
Leste, the United States, and the Vatican City. Other non-members include Angola for the 
                                                
14 Malta joined the Stockholm Convention in January 2017 and the agreement entered into force in April 
17th of that year.  
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Basel Convention15, and Israel, Italy, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan for the Stockholm 
Convention. The absence of some countries then leads to lower levels of implementation. 
Italy, for example, shows lower implementation of the Stockholm Convention when 
compared to other European countries (Miniero, De Felip, Magliuolo, Ferri, & Di 
Domenico, 2005), and ratifying the convention will be critical to improving national 
chemicals regulations. Other countries, such as Malaysia, have designed and executed 
policies consistent with the issues addressed by the conventions, but have not ratified the 
agreements yet, which leads to illegal use of some substances listed as POPs and their 
detection in the environment (IPEN, 2005). Israel—for the Basel Convention—and 
Angola—for the Stockholm Convention—have expressed their adherence to the 
conventions, and their preparations for ratification, but they have yet to go through the 
process (Angola Press, 2013; SCP/RAC, 2011). Yet others, such as the United States, 
possess advanced cradle-to-grave hazardous waste management systems and have signed 
both conventions but have not ratified, largely due to domestic political gridlock. 
Appendix D presents a summary of the membership for the conventions included in this 
study. 
The importance of the conventions’ membership trends is twofold. On the one 
hand, it evidences the increasing participation of developing countries in the system of 
global chemicals governance in particular, and global environmental governance in 
general. Given the transboundary nature of the threat of wastes and pollution, it is critical 
that all countries engage in their regulation to control harmful events for the environment 
                                                
15 Angola joined the Basel Convention on February 6, 2017 and the agreement will enter into force in the 
country in May 7, 2017.  
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and human health. Furthermore, the historical membership gap between the different 
conventions, which has been seen as a factor affecting the process of implementation 
(Krueger & Selin, 2002), has declined. Membership is now almost the same for the two 
agreements, and, as explained above, only 16 countries are members of only one of the 
conventions: 10 for Basel16 and 6 for Stockholm.  
 
National Reporting 
 As I explained in Chapter 3, the fundamental measure of implementation is 
reporting. Each convention secretariat requires parties to submit national reports on the 
fulfillment of their obligations under the agreement. Both the Basel and Stockholm 
conventions have specific reporting systems, requesting annual and periodic (every four 
years) reports, respectively, on detailed information about the measures established by 
each country to implement the conventions (see Table 18).  
 
Table 18 National reporting mechanisms for the Basel and Stockholm conventions 
 Basel Convention (Art. 13) Stockholm Convention (Art. 15) 
Reporting 
requirements 
• Information on focal points 
• Information on transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes and 
other wastes 
• Measures adopted to implement the 
convention 
• Statistics on the effect of hazardous 
waste generation, transportation and 
disposal  
• Information on accidents, disposal 
options and technologies for the 
management of hazardous wastes. 
• Information on other agreements for 
hazardous wastes management 
• Measures adopted to implement the 
convention, and their effectiveness 
• Statistical data on the production, 
import, and export of the chemicals 
included in the annexes to the 
convention. 
 
 
                                                
16 With Angola’s ratification, this number is now 9.  
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 Basel Convention (Art. 13) Stockholm Convention (Art. 15) 
Reporting 
cycles 
Reporting cycles are annual. An 
electronic reporting system was 
implemented in 2012. 
Reporting cycles are defined by the 
COP. So far it has established three. 
Reports 
available 2001-2015 
Three reporting cycles: 2002-2006, 
2006-2010 and 2010-2014 
Source: (Basel Convention, 2016a; Stockholm Convention, 2016a; UNEP, 1989 Art. 13; United Nations, 
2001 Art. 15) 
 
Even though reporting obligations have been part of the agreements since their 
beginning, reporting rates for the conventions are relatively low. A detailed diagnosis of 
the process of national reporting requires an analysis of three aspects: how the overall 
group of state parties complies with reporting obligations, how the process of national 
reporting has evolved over time, and how compliance with national reporting differs 
among different groups of countries or regions. For the chemicals and waste conventions, 
these factors reflect different trends that should be considered to understand countries’ 
implementation and the relevance of information exchange to achieve the conventions' 
objectives and improve their effectiveness. 
A key initial finding is that not all countries submit the national reports they are 
required to submit, and, of the ones that do, some delay submission, inhibiting the prompt 
availability of data to assess performance. Also, not all reports are available online, and 
only in recent reporting cycles—particularly in the case of the Basel Convention—data 
has been collected through electronic reporting systems. In the Basel Convention, 
countries have reported on average 52 percent of the time they were required to report 
since 2001, while for the Stockholm Convention they have only fulfilled this obligation 
44 percent of the time since 2002 (Basel Convention, 2016a; Stockholm Convention, 
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2016a)17. Only 19 countries have a 100-percent reporting rate for the Basel Convention. 
Most of them (15) are developed countries, but Bahrain, Madagascar, Malaysia, and 
Thailand are also part of this group. However, 20 countries—all of them developing—
have never submitted a report. For the Stockholm Convention, only 40 countries (22 
percent of the members) have submitted all the reports they were required to submit, 
including the Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Mali, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, while 59 
countries (33 percent of the parties) have never submitted a report. Figure 5 presents the 
compliance with national reporting obligations in the two agreements.18 
 
Figure 5 Compliance with national reporting obligations in the Basel and Stockholm 
conventions 
 
Source of data: (Basel Convention, 2016a; Stockholm Convention, 2016a) 
 
                                                
17 See Appendix E for detailed analysis on each country’s national reporting rates to each of the 
conventions included in this study. 
18 See Appendix F for detailed data on the reporting compliance rates – by each reporting cycle – for the 
conventions included in this study.  
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Historical analysis of reporting behavior illustrates a key challenge in the process 
of implementation, as the conventions follow different trends in terms of national 
reporting (see Figure 6). For the Basel Convention, the number of countries submitting a 
report each year has decreased from 74 percent in 2001 to 30 percent in 2015. The 
Stockholm Convention exhibits a more positive trend, with countries’ reporting 
increasing from 39 percent in 2002-2006 to 56 percent in 2006-2010 and 49 percent in 
2010-2014. However, there is still a significant group of countries for which data is not 
available, and it includes both developed and developing countries. 
 
Figure 6 Historical evolution of general compliance to national reporting obligations 
in the Basel and Stockholm conventions 
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of regions, Europe obtains the best results, submitting reports on average 80 percent of 
the times. Oceania, on the other hand, registers the lowest average national reporting rate 
(24%) (see Figure 7). Out of all the countries in that region that are state parties, only 
Australia and New Zealand have submitted their reports since 2007. The Cook Islands, 
Papua New Guinea, and Samoa have reported less than 10 percent of the time, and Tonga 
and Palau have never submitted the reports they were obliged to since they joined the 
convention in 2010 and 2011 respectively. For the Stockholm Convention, the average 
national reporting rate also differs between developed and developing countries. While 
for developed countries it is 73 percent, for developing countries it is only 35 percent (see 
Figure 7). Small islands in the Pacific and African countries fall short on this obligation. 
Out of 52 countries in Africa that are state parties to the Stockholm Convention, 22 have 
never submitted a report. Europe is the region with the best average national reporting 
rate—73 percent.19 
The historical evolution of the compliance with the reporting obligations is also 
different across different types of countries and regions. For the Basel Convention, the 
number of developed countries that submit reports has declined from 41 in 2001 to 22 in 
2015, while for developing countries it has decreased from 62 in 2001 to 32 in 2015 (see 
Figure 8). Factors such as the lack of capacity at the national level and the frequency of 
the reporting cycles may explain this situation. In the case of the Stockholm Convention, 
trends differ. Both developed and developing countries have managed to increase the 
submission of national reports (see Figure 9).20 However, there are still important gaps. In  
                                                
19 See Appendix E 
20 See Appendix F 
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Figure 7 Average national reporting rate by category of country and regions for the 
Basel and Stockholm conventions 
 
 
the last reporting cycle (2010-2014), 20 percent of developed countries and 60 
percent of developing countries parties to the convention have not submitted their reports 
as of December 31, 2016. Issues with the scientific information associated to the 
management of POPs and the technical capacity of some countries may cause non-
compliance with this obligation. Furthermore, the historical trend of late submission for 
the reports to this agreement indicates that there is still a possibility for more countries to 
submit their reports, even two years after its original deadline (December 31, 2014). 
Interestingly, for both Basel and Stockholm, the number of countries submitting the 
reports has not changed drastically since 2009 and 2010 respectively, both in total and in 
the distribution among types of countries. That explains why patterns for both regions 
and the average follow similar trends.  
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Figure 8 Evolution of national reporting compliance indicators for the Basel 
Convention 
 
 
Comparing individual countries’ reporting compliance for the two conventions 
also offers important observations. On average, there is a 25-percent difference between 
the national reporting rates of the Basel and the Stockholm Convention, with the latter 
being lower. Individual countries also differ in their reporting patterns across the 
conventions. While Hungary, for example, has submitted every report it was obliged to 
submit to the Basel Convention, the country has never reported to the Stockholm 
Convention. And, on the other hand, five countries that are fully compliant with the 
Stockholm Convention’s reporting obligations—Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Mali, Nepal, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—have only complied 
with the obligations to the Basel Convention one third of the times or less.21  
                                                
21 See Appendix E 
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Figure 9 Evolution of national reporting compliance indicators for the Stockholm 
Convention 
 
 
Reporting is a prerequisite to monitor and evaluate implementation. National 
reporting indicators as the ones presented above illustrate the characteristics of the 
reporting process, the challenges countries face in collecting the information and  
completing the reports, and the extent to which these impact the process of 
implementation. Analyzing and processing the information contained in national reports  
is essential to determine if countries have established the institutional, technical, and 
regulatory frameworks that will consequently contribute to the solution of environmental 
problems. If this information is not analyzed and processed, it will not be possible to 
determine the extent to which conventions are being translated into national policies. The 
next section addresses these issues.  
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Implementation 
In the case of the Basel Convention, 161 countries submitted at least one report in 
the period 2001-2015. They register an implementation score ranging from 0.87 (Burkina 
Faso) to 4.93 (Portugal and Spain). While this may initially reinforce the argument about 
developed countries obtaining better results in the implementation of their international 
environmental obligations, a detailed analysis of individual country results evidences that 
out of the 57 countries ranked in the top ten scores on the index (from 4.20 to 4.93), 27 
(47%) are developing countries, including Colombia, Madagascar, Algeria, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Rwanda and Nigeria (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 Environmental Conventions Index—Top performers for the Basel 
Convention 
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As explained in Chapter 3, index scores are based on the latest available report for 
each country, but even though for some cases—30 percent of the countries—scores date 
back to reports submitted in 2010 or before, the rest of the 161 state parties analyzed 
submitted at least one report after that year. Of the 57 countries ranked in the top ten 
performers, only five countries did not report after 2010—Burundi, Ecuador, Iceland, 
South Korea, and Zambia. Countries such as Colombia, Madagascar, and Rwanda 
register reporting rates higher than 80 percent, and submitted at least one report since 
2013.22  
At the bottom level, ten countries register low implementation index scores. 
Two—Monaco and the Republic of Macedonia—are classified as developed countries. 
Other bottom performers include Burkina Faso, Nauru, the Central African Republic, 
Turkmenistan, Equatorial Guinea, and Barbados (see Figure 11). The fact that most of the 
bottom-ranked countries are developing emphasizes the influence of state capacities and 
resources in the process of implementing global environmental conventions. 
Furthermore, it appears that this influence starts by the obligation to submit national 
reports. Of the countries that perform poorly, only two—Barbados and Monaco—have 
submitted their reports more than half of the times that they were obliged to. Poor 
implementation results in developing countries also raise questions about the nature of 
the movement of hazardous waste threat (Kummer, 1992) and the process of 
implementation, and about the extent to which storing these materials is a source of 
                                                
22 See Appendix G for detailed data on the ECI for the conventions included in this study. 
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income for some developing countries, which prevents them from fully implementing the 
obligations established by the Basel Convention.  
For the Stockholm Convention, the index has results for 120 countries in the 
period covered by the convention's three reporting cycles (2002-2014). Index scores for 
these countries range from 1.52 (Myanmar) to 4.67 (Switzerland), results that are more 
closely connected to development / capacity argument than in the case of the Basel 
 
Figure 11 Environmental Conventions Index—Bottom performers for the Basel 
Convention23 
 
 
Convention. This last finding is reinforced by the fact that all the countries with the top 
scores are considered developed (see Figure 12). On the contrary, all the bottom 
performers are developing countries, except for the Russian Federation, which ranks 
113th. Index scores for this group range from 1.52 for Myanmar to 2.00 for the United 
Arab Emirates. Almost all the countries with an index below 2.50 are classified as  
 
                                                
23 See Appendix H for a complete list of country codes 
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Figure 12 Environmental Conventions Index—Top performers for the Stockholm 
Convention 
 
Figure 13 Environmental Conventions Index—Bottom performers for the 
Stockholm Convention 
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required to identify, regulate and eliminate POPs (Selin, 2010), and as countries and 
international organizations have recognized, there is an important gap at that level that 
definitely undermines developing countries’ potential to fully implement their obligations 
under the Stockholm Convention (see Figure 13). 
Comparing national report and implementation patterns provides additional 
insights for both conventions on the linkages between the two processes. Interestingly, 
countries report not only when they are complying with all their technical obligations, but 
also when they are failing to do so. For instance, Barbados has submitted almost every 
report to the Basel Convention (for a total of 14) but indicates a very low level of 
implementation (ECI score of 1.80). This case is particularly relevant because of the 
impact of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste on small island developing 
states (SIDS) and the existence of specific national projects to advance in the 
implementation of the Basel Convention. Detailed analysis of the national reports 
evidences that Barbados provides information about its progress on obligations regarding 
legislation, information and regulations for transactions in hazardous wastes, but it does 
not submit information on the generation, export, and import of these substances, which 
reflects on the need for systematic and scientific monitoring mechanisms to support 
developing countries in fulfilling all the obligations under the convention.  
In the case of the Stockholm Convention, there are also similar cases of countries 
that have full compliance with the reporting obligations, but register low scores. 
Specifically, Indonesia and the Central African Republic rank 95th and 110th in the overall 
convention’s results with index scores of 2.55 and 2.02 respectively. Furthermore, none 
of the countries that ranked as bottom performers have fully complied with their 
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reporting obligations. Switzerland, on the other hand, illustrates the government’s full 
engagement in the chemicals and waste cluster conventions, and the fact that the country 
hosts the conventions' secretariats. Switzerland is the top performer (with a score of 4.67 
for 2014) among the countries that fully comply with their reporting obligations. 
 
Figure 14 Evolution of implementation index for Basel Convention 
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index score was 3.42. This apparent stagnation is caused by the lack of progress among 
developing countries, where the average index score has only improved from 3.09 to 3.10 
across the three reporting cycles (see Figure 15). Even some state parties in regions such 
as Africa, the Americas, and SIDS have registered declines in their level of 
implementation. As more countries submit their reports for the third reporting cycle, the 
real trends of these indicators would be confirmed. 
 
Figure 15 Evolution of implementation index for Stockholm Convention 
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chemicals and waste agreements are not being implemented, evidence from the ECI 
shows a wide spectrum of results that confirm the engagement of developing countries 
and economies in transition in the chemicals regime and reflect the importance of factors 
such as the availability of data, comprehensive regulations, national capacities, 
cooperation, and funding in the process of implementation (Fiedler, 2008; Selin, 2010; 
UNCSD, 2011; UNEP, 2012a). These results call for analysis to determine which 
factors—besides the level of development—act as the main obstacles to progress, so that 
both conventions and countries can address them. Data are also required to connect the 
definition of national policies with the effectiveness of the conventions. According to the 
Global Chemicals Outlook, for example, more than 70 percent of the countries that have 
submitted information on hazardous waste generation to the Basel Convention reported 
an increase of 12 percent in average in these substances (UNEP, 2013a). Furthermore, 
even though developing countries and economies in transition are decreasing the amount 
of hazardous waste they import, the amount exported has increased considerably. In the 
case of POPs, positive results have been achieved for some compounds, but some new 
substances still need to be phased out (Stockholm Convention, 2016d). However, since 
data are incomplete, additional information is necessary to evaluate the extent to which 
the conventions are effectively addressing the threat of chemical pollution and its effects 
on human health and the environment.  
Environmental conventions have defined “high priority substances” for countries 
to establish national policies and baselines (UNEP, 2013a). However, existing disparities 
in the implementation across types of countries and across regions call for “chemicals 
policy instruments and approaches that are appropriate to the economic conditions and 
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strategies” of specific countries (UNEP, 2013a). The use of the ECI allows for a clear 
assessment of the disparity in the process of implementation across types of countries and 
across regions, which should be a factor in the design and execution of capacity building 
and technical assistance programs coordinated by the conventions, other international 
organizations and donor countries. Additional research will help determine best practices 
that can be replicated and the type of information collection mechanisms and integrated 
approaches at the national level to implement the required chemicals policies.  
As the chemicals and waste conventions advance in the process to develop joint, 
synergistic operations at the global and national levels, it is important to determine the 
extent to which countries are following the guidance and objectives established by the 
conventions. Greater cooperation and coordination between the chemicals and waste 
conventions provide an opportunity for capacity building, knowledge transfer, enhanced 
awareness, and efficiency as well as for improved implementation. Furthermore, the 
chemicals and waste regime is being integrated with other global agendas. The SDGs—
specifically Goal 12 “Responsible Production and Consumption”—aim to achieve the 
environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life 
cycle, a goal that goes hand in hand with the framework of the conventions. Attaining this 
target will require the full implementation of the conventions, which now have both the 
opportunity and the responsibility to coordinate their efforts and integrate chemical 
management strategies in ways that contribute to the ultimate objective of sustainable 
development at the global, national, and local levels. 
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CHAPTER 5 
  
THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTIONS: HOW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES INFLUENCE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
Biological resources, and the services they provide, are essential for human well-being. 
They provide food security, human health, clean air and water, livelihoods, and economic 
development, factors all that are critical to poverty reduction and sustainability (CBD, 
2009; MEA, 2005). Despite their value and relevance, the interaction of population 
growth, socio-economic development, and scientific and technological progress increases 
the pressure on these resources, causing their decline (UNEP, 2012a). Specific threats to 
biodiversity resources include extinction, degradation, overexploitation, pollution, 
climate change, and the presence of alien invasive species (Secretariat of the Convention 
On Biological Diversity, 2014). The extinction risk of species, the loss of natural habitats, 
the presence of invasive alien species, the indiscriminate and unregulated access to 
genetic resources, and the degradation of protected areas are some of the indicators that 
raise concerns. In 2016, the IUCN published an updated assessment of its Red List. Of 
the more than 85,000 species evaluated, 24,300 (28 percent) are threatened with 
extinction (IUCN, 2016). Furthermore, relevant studies suggest high rates of decline for 
global wetland area, both in area and in quality (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of 
the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014).
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Biodiversity is defined as the “variability among living organisms from all 
sources, including the diversity of genes, people, species, communities and ecosystems” 
(United Nations, 1992b Art. 2). As natural resources bring different perspectives into 
their management and conservation, their diversity should be maintained and protected. 
Therefore, both the resources—organisms and ecosystems—and their contribution to life 
on Earth should be protected (Rayfuse, 2007). This contribution or value is categorized as 
instrumental, inherent, and intrinsic (Bowman & Redgwell, 1996). Instrumental value 
refers to the use of the resources, not only in terms of production and consumption, but in 
issues such as education and recreation. Inherent, refers to the non-use values based on 
aesthetic, spiritual, or religious considerations, and intrinsic refers to their value as 
entities, independently of economic or external considerations. Under these definitions, 
the protection of these resources is critical. 
Approaches to the management of biological resources has evolved over time, 
following changes in the balance between environmental considerations and economic 
activities. Starting from a very basic consideration of resources allocation among states, 
management of biological resources has evolved into approaches such as protection, 
preservation, conservation and sustainable use (Rayfuse, 2007). These concepts have 
been used in international regulations. The evolution of the system of global 
environmental governance offered various perspectives to address the different 
components of biodiversity (UNCED, 1992; United Nations, 1972, 2002). For the past 
five decades, the international system has adopted regulations to address the challenges 
of species extinction, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, wetlands 
conservation and sustainable use, among other issues, and to protect the benefits these 
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resources provide for people. Most recently, the SDGs specifically established two goals 
to protect Life below Water (SDG14) and Life on Land (SDG15) to protect marine, 
coastal, and terrestrial biodiversity. 
As part of the study of global environmental conventions, scholars have discussed 
the creation, evolution, and effectiveness of the different agreements that protect 
biodiversity. Debates have also addressed the relationship between nature and economics 
(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011; Nunes, Van Den Bergh, & Nijkamp, 2003; Perrings & 
Gadgil, 2003; WCED, 1987). Furthermore, issues such as the lack of resources 
mobilization, effective biodiversity strategies and plans at the national level, and 
knowledge and monitoring (UNEP, 2012a), have raised questions about the role and 
relevance of the biodiversity conventions, and about how the different dimensions of 
resources management they address may influence global progress in the protection of 
these resources. However, as in the case of the chemicals and waste regime, empirical 
evidence and systematic analysis are required to assess how the conventions are being 
implemented and contribute to the overall strategies for biodiversity protection, 
conservation, and sustainable use. 
This chapter demonstrates the degree to which the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES are being implemented and contribute to addressing the challenges of wetlands 
degradation and loss as well as illegal wildlife trade. It discusses how factors such as the 
nature of these problems, and the institutional arrangements established by the 
conventions determine the degree to which countries fulfill their different obligations. 
Specifically, it shows how developing countries are making substantive progress in 
wetlands conservation, and how the decisions and procedures established by the Ramsar 
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Convention’s executive bodies are a factor for successful implementation. On the other, it 
highlights how the complexity of environmental problems such as illegal wildlife trade 
may affect the process of implementation, and the importance of reporting and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
This chapter uses a similar structure than Chapter 4 to characterize the 
biodiversity conventions, discussing first the nature of the specific problems they address, 
the context in which they were negotiated and drafted, and their objectives and 
institutional characteristics. From there, it presents an assessment of the implementation 
of the Ramsar Convention and CITES, analyzing membership, level of national reporting, 
and results for the Environmental Conventions Index (ECI) across type of countries and 
regions, the historical evolution of implementation since 2001, and the top and bottom 
performers. Comparing the implementation results from these two strands of the global 
efforts for biodiversity conservation is fundamental to determining three things: first, the 
extent to which biodiversity conventions can work together, developing synergies that 
facilitate their operations and their contribution to sustainable development (UNEP, 
2016b); second, how the institutional arrangements and strategies that the conventions 
define influence the process of implementation; and third, which are the existing gaps in 
the implementation of the legal regime for biological resources. Only by understanding 
these three issues would it be possible to continue advancing the global agenda for the 
conservation, restoration, wise use and sustainability of biodiversity and its benefits for 
people and a healthy planet (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 
2014). 
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The legal regime for biodiversity: Species, ecosystems, their use and benefits 
 Biodiversity provides important benefits for the humans and the planet. Biological 
resources, their benefits, and diversity, represent “capital asset(s) with great potential for 
yielding sustainable benefits” (UNCED, 1992 para. 15.3). Each resource or ecosystem 
faces different challenges, but overall the pressure of human activities, development, and 
growth leads to their degradation and loss (Brooks et al., 2006). Nonetheless, the 
consequences of habitats and species loss are increasingly economic in nature. The 
increasing connection between biodiversity, poverty reduction, climate change, food 
security, and sustainable livelihoods puts biological resources at the core of the 
sustainable development agenda. Reducing the negative impacts on biodiversity is thus 
critical to advance towards sustainable development (Secretariat of the Convention On 
Biological Diversity, 2014). 
 As the Millennium Development Goals concluded in 2015, it was clear that by 
2010 the world had failed to achieve the target of reducing the rate of biodiversity loss 
(UNEP, 2012b; United Nations, 2015a). Multiple variables exemplify the seriousness of 
the threats and challenges in biodiversity conservation, and continued decline in 
populations, species, and habitats. Even though the net loss of forest slowed, 5.2 million 
hectares of forest were lost each year between 2000 and 2010 (UNEP, 2012a). This is 
particularly concerning, considering that 1.6 billion people still depend on forests for 
their livelihood (United Nations, 2015b). Threatened species have increased from 10,500 
in 1996/1998 to 24,300 in 2016 (see Figure 16) (IUCN, 2016). And fisheries captures 
more than quadrupled from the early 1950s to the 1990s, as fish provide 20 percent of 
animal protein to about 3 billion people (United Nations, 2012b). Furthermore, habitats’ 
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conditions have declined more than 20 percent since the 1980, wetlands and coasts being 
the most affected ecosystems (UNEP, 2012b). The Wetland Extent Index estimates a 40-
percent global decline in the extent of both marine/coastal and inland wetlands between 
1970 and 2008 (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of the Convention On Biological 
Diversity, 2014). 
 
Figure 16 Number of species included in the IUCN Red List 
 
 
Source of data: (IUCN, 2016) 
  
In the past five decades, cooperation to protect biodiversity has evolved. Different 
approaches to managing biological resources (Bowman & Redgwell, 1996) have been 
part of the discussions and decisions at the environmental governance summits. In 1972, 
at the Stockholm Conference, concerns about the “ecological balance of the biosphere” 
and the “destruction and depletion of replaceable resources” were some of the 
motivations for placing environment at the center of the international agenda (United 
Nations, 1972). Twenty years later, the concept of biodiversity was fundamental in the 
agenda of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and governments reaffirmed the need to balance 
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environment and development policies, guaranteeing the protection of national resources, 
and their sovereign exploitation within countries (United Nations, 1992a). Agenda 21 
focused its approach to biodiversity on its conservation and sustainable use, recognizing 
that it was not limited to species or resources, but include the variability of genes, 
species, populations and ecosystems (UNCED, 1992). Four fundamental threats to 
biodiversity were identified at the Earth Summit: habitat destruction, over-harvesting, 
pollution, and the inappropriate introduction of foreign plants and animals. In addition, 
Agenda 21 recognized the value and sustainable benefits that biodiversity would have for 
present and future generations. In the next twenty years, commitments to the protection 
of biodiversity were reaffirmed (United Nations, 2002). In 2012, the Rio+20 summit 
offered a comprehensive approach to biodiversity conservation, including specific 
references in its declaration to terrestrial and marine biodiversity, and connecting these 
resources to economic activities such as agriculture and tourism (United Nations, 2012a). 
In addition, the Rio+20 declaration reinforce the importance of area-based conservation 
measures (para. 177). 
 In a parallel but interconnected process, since the 1970s the international 
community also worked on the definition of international agreements for biodiversity. 
The 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of international importance, the 1973 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the 1979 Convention 
on Migratory Species (CMS), and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
were at the core of international cooperation and law for biodiversity conservation. These 
instruments established specific measures to regulate conservation, define sustainable 
use, reduce the threat of extinction, and guarantee the benefits that biodiversity provide 
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for humankind. The SDGs maintained this approach, and through the SDG14 and 
SDG15, incorporated specific targets to sustainable manage marine and coastal 
ecosystems; regulate harvesting and overfishing; conserve coastal and marine areas; 
ensure the conservation, restoration, and sustainable use of ecosystems; and take action to 
end poaching and the traffic of protected species, among many other targets (UN General 
Assembly, 2015).  
 The next section describes the main international law instruments for biodiversity 
conservation through a more detailed historical analysis of the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES, the two biodiversity agreements included in this study.  
 
Biodiversity Regulation 
 Towards the mid-twentieth century, discussions in the international community 
made clear that natural resources required protection and conservation efforts against 
over-exploitation. Back then, countries were mainly concerned with their distribution and 
their sovereign exploitation. However, around the discussions that led to the creation of 
UN Environment in 1972, new visions about the urgency and relevance of protecting 
biodiversity resulted in more structural approaches and institutional frameworks 
(Baakman, 2011). The Ramsar Convention and CITES were some outcomes from this 
period. 
 In 1962, different NGOs called attention to the importance of wetland 
ecosystems. The IUCN established the MAR project for the conservation and 
management of wetlands. This led to an international conference organized by the 
International Waterfowl & Wetlands Research Bureau, whose main outcome was an 
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agreement on the need for an international wetlands conservation treaty (Matthews, 
1993). After years of negotiations, a draft was presented for approval at the Ramsar 
Conference, organized by the government of Iran in the city that gives its name to the 
convention. The text of the convention was approved by representatives of 18 nations in 
1971 and entered into force in 1975 (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015b). The Ramsar 
Convention’s main mission is the conservation and wise use of all wetlands (Ramsar 
Convention, 2014; UNESCO, 1971). To achieve this goal, the convention established 
specific criteria for its list of wetlands for a list of Wetlands of International 
Importance—“the Ramsar List”—that are subject to specific conservation strategies. 
Currently, there are 2,264 Ramsar Sites that cover more than 2.1 million square 
kilometers (Ramsar Secretariat, 2017b).  
In the 1980s, the COP started discussions to create a permanent secretariat 
(Ramsar Convention, 1980). The Ramsar Convention first established the Ramsar 
Bureau, which duties were to be performed by IUCN. Functions of the bureau included 
the organization of the meetings of the COP, the maintenance of the Ramsar List, 
tracking—in coordination with the parties—the changes in the ecological character of the 
listed wetlands, and making recommendations on wetlands management (UNESCO, 
1971 Art. 8). After different discussions about the legal status of the secretariat and which 
organization should host it, IUCN was selected and in 2012, the COP meeting renewed 
the hosting arrangements with this organization (Ramsar Convention, 2012b). The 
Standing Committee meets once a year to oversee the convention matters and the 
activities of the secretariat (Ramsar Convention, 1987). Two other bodies—the Scientific 
and Technical Review Panel and the Communication, Education, Participation and 
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Awareness Oversight Panel—provide technical guidance and collaborating in the 
formulation of policies. The main activities of the convention are handled through a 
strategic plan defined every eight years to establish priorities, goals, and indicators 
(Ramsar Secretariat, 2015c). The convention also works closely with stakeholders, the 
private sector, and other conventions (see Box 4). 
 
Box 4 International Organization Partners in the Ramsar Convention  
In 1999, the Ramsar COP established an innovative measure of institutional cooperation, 
through the establishment of partnerships with “international organization partners” that 
provide support, technical advice, implementation assistance, and financial resources. 
IUCN, Birdlife International, Wetlands International, and the WWF have been partners to 
the convention since its beginnings. Later, the International Water Management Institute 
and the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust were granted this status. 
Source: (Ramsar Convention, 1999, 2005c; Ramsar Secretariat, 2015d) 
 
Not long after the adoption of the Ramsar Convention was adopted, a similar 
approach was taken for CITES. The origins of the convention go back to the 1960s, when 
the general assembly of IUCN started a campaign to develop an international instrument 
for species conservation (Epstein, 2006; Hill, 1990; Hutton & Dickson, 2000), 
recognizing that commercial development, illegal trade, hunting, and trapping were 
among the major threats that increase species vulnerability and risk of extinction (Hill, 
1990; UNEP, 2012a). This coincided with the U.S. passage of regulation to prevent the 
import of endangered species, and with the meeting of the Stockholm Conference and the 
creation of UN Environment. These factors resulted in the drafting and signature of 
CITES, also known as the Washington Convention, with nine original signatories: Chile, 
Cyprus, Ecuador, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the U.S. and Uruguay. Entering 
into force in 1975, CITES now has 183 state parties.  
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 CITES has two key objectives: to reduce the effects of trade on threatened species 
and to establish a system to ensure that trade in other species is sustainable (Hill, 1990; 
Patel, 1995). To achieve these goals, three basic principles serve as the foundation of the 
agreement: the recognition of biodiversity and its value, the role of people and states in the 
protection of biological resources, and the need for international cooperation to prevent the 
over-exploitation of nature through international trade (IUCN, 1973). The agreement’s 
legal text identifies its key components: 
• Regulations for signatory parties to achieve CITES’ objectives, including the 
system of permits and certificates and the procedures to manage the species lists 
(Art. III to VIII, X and XIII) 
• National institutional arrangements and the convention’s organizational bodies 
(Art. IX, XI and XII) 
• Legal matters of the convention as an international treaty, including ratification, 
entry into force, amendments and dispute resolution (Art. XIV to XXV) 
To support its regulations, the treaty established a detailed control system based 
on three appendixes that include species under different levels of risk (Hill, 1990; IUCN, 
1973). For each of the lists, CITES defines specific measures to guarantee that trade 
operations (exports, imports and re-exports) are conducted under conditions that do not 
generate or increase the risk of extinction.  Therefore, the focus of the convention is 
highly operational. Additional, the convention counts on an institutional structure to 
support its activities and establishes connections with other environmental organizations. 
The most important body is the COP, which according to Martin (2000) conducts 
probably the best organized meetings of the environmental conventions. Decisions at 
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COPs are based on specific rules of procedure that include different voting mechanisms 
for each issue. The COP meets every two or three years to consider amendments to the 
list of species protected by the convention, analyze reports, recommend measures to 
improve the effectiveness of the convention, and make the necessary institutional and 
financial provisions for the normal functioning of the secretariat (CITES, 2013c). 
Observers, including non-state parties, UN agencies, representatives from other 
conventions and NGOs can participate in the COP in addition to state parties. 
Three committees carry out the key functions in the inter-sessional periods 
between COPs (CITES, 2000a, 2013c). The standing committee provides policy guidance 
to the secretariat on the implementation of the convention. It also oversees the 
management of the secretariat’s budget and carries out other tasks assigned by the COP. 
Membership in the standing committee includes regional representation, the agreement’s 
depository government (Switzerland) and the host countries for the previous and next 
COP meetings. The standing committee usually means once a year. The animals and 
plants Committee establishes connections between the convention and the scientific 
specialized knowledge about species of animals or plants that are or might be part of 
CITES appendices. This committee also provides technical support for decision-making 
at COP meetings, and recommends action to the parties regarding the regulation of 
unsustainable trade. Finally, the CITES executive secretariat is administered by UN 
Environment. Its functions include coordination, advice, communications, monitoring, 
assistance, recommendations, and information provision (IUCN, 1973 Art. XII). The 
secretariat is also responsible of arranging meetings of COPs and permanent committees, 
and servicing those meetings.  
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Two other conventions complement the biodiversity legal regime. Following the 
recommendations of the UN Conference on the Human Environment regarding species 
inhabiting international waters or migrating from one country to the other (United 
Nations, 1972), Germany led the work to draft a convention to grant protection to 
migratory wildlife. The Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), also known as the 
Bonn Convention, was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1983. The CMS brings 
together states to develop internationally coordinated conservation measures throughout a 
species’ migratory range (Baakman, 2011; CMS, 1979). It establishes a series of general 
standards, and facilitates the conclusion of regional agreements to address threats to 
specific species based on their taxonomy or geographical location (Baldwin, 2011; 
Caddell, 2005). Currently the convention has 124 parties. 
In 1988, concerned about the increasing threats to ecosystems and species and 
about the recognition of the value of biological diversity, UN Environment convened an 
Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity to explore the need for an 
international convention on this topic. In 1991, an intergovernmental committee started 
the negotiation process that lead to the adoption in 1992 of the text of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). The agreement was opened for signature at that year’s Earth 
Summit, and entered into force in 1993, 90 days after the thirtieth country ratified it 
(McConnell, 1996; Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2004). The 
CBD is a comprehensive and holistic agreement that covers ecosystems, species, and 
genetic resources.  
To achieve its objectives, the CBD established various instruments (Le Prestre, 
2002). In addition to the 1992 convention, it has approved two protocols: the Cartagena 
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Protocol on Biosafety to regulate the handling, transport and use of living modified 
organisms, and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, approved in the tenth 
meeting of the COP (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2000, 2010). 
In that same session, parties adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and 
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. The plan was conceived as an overarching framework for 
the conservation and use of biodiversity to be used by the entire UN system and other 
partners engaged in biodiversity policy and management (CBD, 2010; Mace et al., 2010). 
In this context, the other biodiversity conventions are working to establish strategies and 
targets that converge with the Aichi targets and correspond to specific environmental 
issues. Furthermore, each country is required “to prepare a national biodiversity strategy 
(or equivalent instrument) and to ensure that this strategy is mainstreamed into the 
planning and activities of all those sectors whose activities can have an impact (positive 
and negative) on biodiversity” (United Nations, 1992b Art. 6).  
Even though the CBD can definitively be considered a framework convention, 
each of the agreements listed above addresses an important component of the protection 
of biodiversity under the common goal of conservation and sustainable use. Each 
agreement also has its own legal, political, and practical implications. Table 19 
summarizes the objectives of each of the main conventions in the regime. In 2012 the 
then governing council of UN Environment recognized the need to enhance cooperation 
and synergies nationally and regionally (UNEP, 2012c). Since then, UN Environment has 
carried out various activities to discuss and elaborate options for possible ways of 
“enhancing synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions” (UNEP, 
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2016a, 2016b). However, these arrangements have not led yet to any legal or 
administrative changes in the nature of the conventions and their executive bodies.  
 
Table 19 Environmental agreements for biodiversity conservation 
 Year Parties24 Main objectives 
Ramsar 
Convention 1971 169 
• The conservation and wise use of wetlands through actions at the 
international, national, and local levels, as a contribution to 
achieving sustainable development. The parties commit to: 
o Work towards the wise use of wetlands 
o Designate suitable wetlands for a list of Wetlands of 
International Importance (Ramsar sites) and ensure their 
effective management 
o Cooperate internationally on transboundary wetlands, shared 
wetlands systems, and shared species 
CITES 1973 183 
• Ensures that the international trade in specimens of wild animals 
and plants in risk of extinction does not threaten their survival. 
• Establishes certain controls for the export, import, and re-export of 
species that identified as threatened. Controls are based on three lists 
(appendices) with different trade regulations: 
o Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction, for 
which trade is permitted only in exceptional circumstances. 
o Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with 
extinction but in which trade must be controlled. 
o Appendix III contains species that are protected in at least one 
country, which has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in 
controlling trade.  
Convention 
on 
Migratory 
Species 
1979 124 
• Provides of a global platform for the conservation and sustainable 
use of migratory species and their habitats.  
• Brings together the states through which migratory animals pass and 
establishes international mechanisms for coordinated conservation 
measures throughout this range. Parties are expected to: 
o provide immediate protection to all endangered migratory 
species (Appendix I), and 
o work on the adoption of agreements for the conservation 
and management of migratory species which an 
unfavorable conservation status (Appendix II) 
• Promotes, cooperates in, and supports research relating to migratory 
species.  
Convention 
on 
Biological 
Diversity 
1992 196 
• Conservation of biological diversity. 
• Sustainable use of the components of biodiversity. 
• Fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources. 
Source: (CMS, 1979; IUCN, 1973; UNESCO, 1971; United Nations, 1992b) 
                                                
24 The data presented in this study are updated to December 31, 2016. 
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 As this comprehensive biodiversity regime evolved, concerns emerged about the 
effective and coherent implementation of the corresponding conventions. The 
environmental problems addressed by the Ramsar Convention and CITES persist 
(DeSombre, 2017). With Ramsar, the conversion of wetlands, and the lack of data 
collection are critical factors, affecting in particular the creation of wetlands inventories 
and the monitoring of their ecological characteristics (Ramsar Secretariat, 2010; UNEP, 
2012a). In the case of CITES, the management of wildlife trade and use requires the 
strengthening of border controls, training, public campaigns to raise awareness, and 
enforcement (UNEP, 2012a). Since the two conventions take different approaches to 
implementation, two specific factors require further analysis. While both conventions aim 
to protect natural resources, they are affected by different threats; for CITES the 
complexity of illegal wildlife trade creates continual new challenges. In addition, the 
institutional arrangements that countries set up for each convention, and the strategies 
and procedures they define—such as national reporting, capacity building, and technical 
assistance—influence their effective translation into national policies and the consequent 
success of the conventions themselves.  
 
Implementing the Ramsar Convention and CITES 
 Human activities, development, urbanization, and increasing economic expansion 
continue pressing biological resources towards degradation and depletion. Regulations 
need to be enforced to guarantee that the conventions that protect these resources are 
being implemented, and that their implementation contributes to sustainable 
development. In the case of the Ramsar Convention, data gathering and assessment, and 
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targeted strategies are critical factors to stopping and reversing the loss and degradation 
of wetlands and their services to people (Bowman, 2002; Bridgewater, 2008; Mauerhofer, 
Kim, & Stevens, 2015). In the case of CITES, data on the number of transactions of 
illegal trade of endangered species evidences that there is still much work to do. More 
legislation, policies, strategies, and enforcement mechanisms are required to control trade 
transactions under the convention (S. Young, 2003). In addition, CITES needs to engage 
with different actors in the fight against the criminal activities behind illegal wildlife 
trade (Curlier & Andresen, 2002).    
Based on the ECI, the next two sections provide empirical evidence of how 
implementation of the Ramsar Convention and CITES has differed over time. Three 
findings emerge from this analysis. First, that the procedures established by each 
convention for national reporting result in different outcomes in terms of compliance. 
Second, developing countries are strongly engaged in both the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES, their membership, national reporting, and policy development. In the case of 
Ramsar, especially, developing countries are achieving remarkable results, and they can 
use their experience and practices to participate more actively in global environmental 
governance. Third, the nature of the environmental issues addressed by these agreements 
influences the process of implementation. In some cases, the socio-economic and cultural 
value of wetlands and their ecosystem services increases the interest of governments and 
stakeholders to engage in their conservation. Similarly, the complexity of the criminal 
networks behind the traffic of endangered species has created a definite obstacle in the 
enforcement of CITES. For all these areas of concern, countries need additional 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms to advance implementation (Bowman, 
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2002; Dickson, 2009; Ferrajolo, 2011; Hepworth, 1998; Mauerhofer et al., 2015; 
McOmber, 2001). Bringing empirical evidence to the analysis of the Ramsar Convention 
and CITES explains countries’ progress to protection biological resources, and offers 
insights about how the conventions can work together in addressing the protection and 
sustainable use of these vital resources. 
 
Membership 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, membership analysis is the foundation for 
determining performance by parties to specific environmental conventions. Since 
developed and developing countries approach their obligations differently, a 
characterization of membership is necessary to understand how the distinction between 
developed and developing countries, and the differences in the availability of natural 
resources among them, influence how each group of countries implement their 
obligations.  
Membership to CITES reached 183 countries in 2016. The Ramsar Convention 
has 169 parties, fewer than the other conventions analyzed in this project, a distinction 
that can be explained by the specific nature and geographical location of wetlands 
ecosystems (see Figure 17). Out of total countries, 28 percent are developed countries 
and 72 percent are developing. CITES similarly has 26 percent—48 countries—being 
developed, and 74 percent—135 countries—being developing. Even though the two 
conventions were adopted close in time and have increased their memberships since then, 
more developing countries joined CITES sooner. By 1992, CITES had 115 parties, of 
which 87 (76 percent) were developing countries, while the Ramsar Convention had 74 
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parties, with 53 percent (39 countries) being developing. The 1992 Earth Summit 
definitively contributed to the ratification of the agreements, particularly for Ramsar, 
which more than half of the parties joined after 1993. In addition, nine countries joined 
the Ramsar Convention and eight joined CITES joined the conventions after 2010. These 
new parties for Ramsar came mostly from Africa, South East Asia, the Pacific and the 
Middle East, whereas new members for CITES represented other parts of the world, as 
well as the EU, which joined in 2015.25  
Both conventions, however, also have gaps in membership. Notable absences in 
CITES include mainly Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Nine of the fifteen 
countries that have not joined CITES are SIDS, including Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and Tuvalu. This can be partially explained by 
these nations’ limited resources and the critical importance of climate change on their 
environmental policies. In the case of Ramsar, the list of non-state parties is longer. 
Twenty-four UN member countries are not parties to Ramsar, including Angola, 
Ethiopia, Guyana, and Saudi Arabia. SIDS that are absent from the convention include 
Dominica, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Some of these absences—such as the cases of Afghanistan 
and Qatar—could be explained by geographic and biosphere characteristics such as the 
absence of wetland ecosystems, and by their political challenges. Other cases—such 
Ethiopia—are due to internal political dynamics. Only three African nations have not 
ratified Ramsar: Angola, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Contrarily to the case of the chemicals 
                                                
25 Andorra, Bhutan, Grenada, Kiribati, Kuwait, Oman, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are the 
countries that joined the Ramsar Convention, while Angola, Bahrain, the European Union, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Maldives, Tajikistan, and Tonga are the countries the latest parties to CITES. 
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conventions, the US is one of the original signatories of CITES and joined the Ramsar 
Convention in 1987. Appendix D presents a summary of the membership for the 
conventions included in this study. 
 
Figure 17 Historical evolution of the membership in the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES 
 
Sources of data: (CITES, 2016c; Ramsar Convention, 2015b) 
 
 Membership in the biodiversity conventions brings up two issues. First, 
developing countries engaged in both agreements from the start. Given the nature of 
wetlands and biodiversity, and the value they represent for societies and economies—in 
some countries the use of biological resources and ecosystems services are key to 
economic output—it is critical that nations protect and guarantee the sustainability of 
these resources. 
 Furthermore, the differences in membership between the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES, and with the CBD and the CMS, even when due to geographic considerations— 
such as absence of wetlands ecosystems or migratory species, may affect the 
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implementation and the synergies in the biodiversity cluster. Nineteen countries are 
members of CITES but not the Ramsar Convention, while five countries—Andorra, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, South Sudan, and Turkmenistan, are parties to Ramsar only. 
Ten countries are non-parties in both conventions.26 
 
National Reporting 
 The Ramsar Convention and CITES have different approaches to the process of 
national reporting (see Table 20). While Ramsar organizes its reporting obligations 
around the meetings of its COP, CITES has a dual system.  
 
Table 20 National reporting mechanisms for the Ramsar Convention and CITES 
 Ramsar Convention CITES (Art. VIII para. 7) 
Reporting 
requirements 
Defined by the standing committee for 
each COP. Reports should include: 
• Data and information on how the 
convention is being implemented, 
including indicators on strategic plans, 
the Scientific and Technical Review 
Panel, and on the Communication, 
Education, Participation, and 
Awareness Strategies 
• Lessons and experiences to help state 
parties develop future action. 
• Identification of emerging issues and 
challenges that require attention  
• National reports, which provide an 
opportunity for countries to draw 
attention to their achievements 
CITES requires parties to submit two 
reports to collect information on the 
implementation of the convention: 
• Annual trade report on the number and 
type of permits and certificates granted 
for trade operations in the species 
listed on the convention appendices 
• A biennial report on the measures 
taken for implementation27 
 
Reporting 
cycles 
Reporting cycles correspond to each 
meeting of the COP (every three years in 
average), and are submitted by the 
countries to the secretariat. The 
questionnaire was standardized to 
multiple choice questions in 2005 
Biennial 
                                                
26 This include Cook Islands, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Haiti, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palestine, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and the Vatican City. However, these, except for 
the Holy See, are parties to the CBD. 
27 For the implementation analysis included in this study only the biennial reports are considered.  
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 Ramsar Convention CITES (Art. VIII para. 7) 
Reports 
available 
2005 (COP9), 2008 (COP10), 2012 
(COP11), 2015 (COP12) 
Biennia 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-
2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, and 2013-
2014 
Source: (CITES, 2000b; IUCN, 1973; Ramsar Convention, 2013) 
  
According to Art. VIII para. 7 of the CITES convention countries shall prepare 
and transmit to the secretariat an annual report containing a summary of the permits and 
certificates granted for trade transactions, the states with which such trade has occurred, 
and the quantities and types of specimens; and a biennial report on the legislative, 
regulatory, and administrative measures taken to enforce the provisions of the convention 
(IUCN, 1973). Both reports are considered central to the monitoring of the 
implementation of the convention. Data from the annual reports goes into a database that 
provides the basis for comparative trade analysis to verify the overall compliance and 
effectiveness of the CITES. In addition, parties have agreed to specific measures to 
address non-compliance with the annual reports. If a party fails to submit the annual 
report for three consecutive years, the case should be presented to the standing 
committee, and this instance decides on recommendations to the parties to not authorize 
trade operations in CITES specimens with countries that are not fulfilling this obligation 
(CITES, 2000b). Currently, 31 countries are subject to trade suspensions, three of them—
Afghanistan, Grenada, and Lesotho—because of their failure to submit annual reports 
(CITES Secretariat, 2017). 
Reporting rates for the two conventions differ dramatically. The analysis based on 
the level of compliance with reporting obligations and the national reporting rates, shows 
the outcomes and challenges of the different reporting systems established by the 
biodiversity conventions. In the case of the Ramsar Convention, a key initial finding is 
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the high rate of compliance with reporting obligation and submission of national reports. 
An average of 137 reports are submitted to each meeting of the COP, which represents 88 
percent of the countries that are parties to the convention (Ramsar Convention, 2005a, 
2008, 2012a, 2015a). Sixty-eight percent of the countries have submitted all required 
reports, and all state parties with reporting obligations have submitted at least one report 
since 2005 (see Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18 Compliance with national reporting obligations in the Ramsar 
Convention and CITES 
 
 
Only six countries—Bahrain, Belize, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malta, and 
Nicaragua—have struggled with the process of national reporting, submitting only half or 
less of the reports.28 Compliance with reporting for CITES is considerably lower (CITES, 
2016a). Only 28 countries—18 of them developed states—have submitted all required 
                                                
28 See Appendix E  
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reports. Interestingly, countries such as Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and 
Thailand have fully complied with this obligation. Since these countries are some of 
those with a larger number of species at risk under the IUCN Red List, this raises 
questions about the influence that the nature of problem addressed by a convention has on 
fulfilling the reporting obligations (IUCN, 2016).In addition, the evolution of the 
reporting compliance rates also evidences important challenges for CITES. For Ramsar 
countries report an average of 88 percent of the time, for CITES the average is only 39 
percent, and it has systematically decreased from 52 percent for 2003-2004, to 32 percent 
for 2013-2014 (see Figure 19). Thirty-nine percent of the countries have not submitted a 
report since 2010, and 69 countries—equivalent to 38 percent of the parties—have never 
submitted any of these biennial reports. Sixty-six of the countries in this group are 
developing.  
 
Figure 19 Historical evolution of general compliance to national reporting 
obligations in the Ramsar Convention and CITES 
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Interestingly, the submission of annual trade reports for CITES shows different 
behavior. On average, 84 percent of the countries submit their annual reports every year, 
as recent efforts from the secretariat and the COP have stressed the importance of this 
fundamental obligation. Eighty-three countries have submitted reports for every year 
since records have been available (2008-2015), 60 percent of them (50 countries) 
developing nations. Sixteen countries, all of them developing and mostly from Africa and 
Asia, have not reported since 2013. Furthermore, there is often a significant delay in the 
submission of the reports. Annual reports for 2015 were due in October 2016, but only 
100 of the 180 countries had submitted their data by February 2017. Figure 20 presents a 
comparison between the compliance rate with each of the reports established for CITES. 
Data for annual reports before 2008 is not available for analysis. 
These differences in compliance with reporting requirements between the 
biodiversity conventions emphasize the importance of the institutional arrangements that 
the conventions prescribe for the process of data collection and reports submission. The 
Ramsar Convention exemplifies that specific strategies and approaches to the national 
reporting process result in better outcomes. Three factors make the national reporting 
process for Ramsar different: the preparatory process, the submission of the reports, and 
the use of the information in the reports (see Box 5). On the other hand, the format for the 
biennial reports to CITES has not been adjusted since 2003, and even though the 
secretariat follows up and urges parties to submit their reports at least one year before 
each meeting of the COP, the submission rate has not improved (CITES, 2000b). 
Analysis of the national reporting records of CITES also evidences critical delays in the 
submission of reports. On average, reports are submitted a year after they were due. 
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Morocco for example, only submitted its reports for 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 in 2014. 
Panama submitted all the reports in 2010 for the three biennia between 2003 and 2008. 
This delay seriously impacts the availability and use of the information, including 
preventing the secretariat from having enough and timely information for decision-
making processes.    
 
Figure 20 Comparative compliance rate with reporting obligations for CITES 
 
 
 
Box 5 National reporting process in the Ramsar Convention 
The Ramsar Convention’s standing committee defines specific procedures for the 
convention’s national reports.  
 
Preparatory process 
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report format (NRF) for the next COP. In the process of agreeing to these 
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• The NRF is also expected to permit continuity of the analyses of progress in 
implementation, by ensuring that indicator questions are maintained through the 
different reporting cycles. 
• The NRF is distributed to the parties about one year prior to the COP.  
• Once the parties are working on the completion of the reports, the secretariat closely 
follows up the process, through the different focal points, and organizes regional 
meetings. 
Submission of the reports 
• Reports are expected to be submitted at least nine months before each COP meeting. 
• The convention counts on its regional senior advisors to coordinate with the parties 
for the submission of the reports. 
Use of the reported information 
• National reports provide the basis for reporting by the secretariat to each meeting of 
the COP on global and regional implementation and on progress in meeting the 
conventions’ obligations. 
• Provision of information on specific implementation issues supports the decision-
making and recommendations at each COP. 
• Assessment of time-series progress on specific aspects of the implementation of the 
convention and its specific programs 
• Submission of reports on collaboration with other conventions, particularly the CBD 
Source: (Ramsar Convention, 2013) 
 
Classification of regions and types of countries also confirms the different 
reporting behaviors of the Ramsar Convention and CITES. For the former, both 
developed and developing countries have shown similar behaviors in terms of national 
reporting, with average reporting rates of 89 percent and 85 percent respectively (see 
Figure 21). The same can be said about the regions, since all of them have similar 
averages (above 80 percent), except for Oceania, where three of the eight countries that 
are parties to the convention—the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Papua New Guinea 
(Burundi, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sierra 
Leone)—have failed to submit all required reports. On a positive note, only 6 of the 50 
African countries that are parties to the Ramsar Convention have submitted half or less of 
the reports. For the rest, national reporting rates are 75 percent or higher, with 35 
countries having submitted all reports. 
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Figure 21 Average national reporting rate by category of countries and regions for 
the Ramsar Convention and CITES 
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The historical evolution of compliance with reporting obligations is also different 
across different types of countries and regions. For the Ramsar Convention, the number 
of developing countries that submit their reports has been significant since the 2005 
reporting cycle, when 80 percent of the developing state parties (77 countries) fulfilled 
this obligation. In 2015, this increased to 104 countries (86 percent). For developed 
countries, the number has slightly decreased, going from 42 to 40. However, changes in 
membership cause a more relevant decrease in the compliance rate, going from 93 
percent to 85 (see Figure 22). Factors such as the structure of the national reporting 
process and the importance of wetlands ecosystems at the socio-economic level may 
explain this situation. Also, the materiality of wetlands facilitates its monitoring and the 
assessment of the changes in their ecological character.  
 
Figure 22 Evolution of national reporting indicators for the Ramsar Convention 
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For CITES, the number of countries submitting reports between 2003 and 2014 
considerably decreased, from 86 to 57 (see Figure 23). However, developing countries 
performed much more poorly than this. Submission of biennial reports declined from 50 
countries for the 2003-2004 biennium, to 24 (18%) for 2013-2014.29 This is particularly 
concerning considering that membership only increased by 11 states in the same period. 
Factors such as challenges enacting legislation to protect endangered species, lack of 
capacity, and lack of institutional resources should be considered.  
 
Figure 23 Evolution of national reporting indicators for CITES 
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ranking. ECI scores range from 0.28 (Luxembourg) to 4.65 (Mali). This reflects the 
importance of wetlands for developing countries. A detailed analysis of individual 
country results shows that of the eleven countries ranked in the top ten for the ECI (from 
4.33 to 4.65), ten are developing (see Figure 24). Only France, with an ECI of 4.36, ranks 
at the top of the convention. Other developed countries follow closely—New Zealand, 
Australia, Austria, and the United Kingdom—rank in the top twenty performers for this 
agreement, but still most the countries with high implementation scores are developing. 
This is even more significant when considering that 87 percent of the countries’ scores 
correspond to recent assessments since they are based on reports submitted for COP12 in 
2015.30  
At the bottom level, eleven countries have low implementation ECI scores (see 
Figure 25). Two of them—the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Luxembourg—are classified as developed countries. Seven of the other nine bottom 
performers are in Africa, including Cote D’Ivoire, Chad, Swaziland, Sao Tome and 
Principe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Djibouti. African 
wetlands are considered some of the most productive and biologically diverse ecosystems 
in the world. However, the ways that countries in the region are prioritizing their 
development policies (land use, drainage, agriculture, and settlement) is increasing the 
risk of overexploitation of natural resources and inadequate planning (Gardner, Connolly, 
& Bamba, 2009). In this sense, the Ramsar secretariat has launched specific initiatives to 
support African countries in their wetland conservation efforts. An example of this is the  
 
                                                
30 See Appendix G  
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Figure 24 Environmental Conventions Index - Top performers for the Ramsar 
Convention31 
 
 
Figure 25 Environmental Conventions Index - Bottom performers for the Ramsar 
Convention 
 
 
                                                
31 See Appendix H  
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Global Wetland Africa initiative, developed in partnership with non-governmental 
organizations and the European Space Agency. The project provides technology and tools 
to assess the condition of wetlands and better monitor their trends over time (Ramsar 
Secretariat, 2015a). 
For CITES, the ECI developed results for 110 countries over the six reporting 
cycles analyzed (2003-2014). ECI scores for these countries range from 1.05 (Antigua 
and Barbuda) to 4.61 (Philippines) (see Figure 26). A more detailed analysis of the ECI 
scores reflects first that developing countries are obtaining positive results. Of the twelve 
countries with the top ten scores for CITES, 75 percent (9 countries) are developing, 
including Mozambique, Peru, and Nepal. Interestingly, seven of those countries are in 
Asia, and five—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam—are in the 
southeast region of that continent. This deserves special attention, considering that 
multiple studies have established that Southeast Asia is a wildlife trade hotspot, a region 
that faces disproportional challenges in terms of wildlife trade management (Nijman, 
2010; Rosen & Smith, 2010; Wilcove, Giam, Edwards, Fisher, & Koh, 2013). Despite 
national and regional efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to 
control this threat, pressures from economic growth, urbanization, expansion of 
infrastructure, free trade promotion, and development, make this part of the world a 
“supplier, consumer, and general import-export emporium” for wildlife (TRAFFIC, 
2004). 
On the other hand, bottom performers include countries from different regions 
around the world. The bottom scores range from 2.07 (Serbia) to 1.05 (Antigua and 
Barbuda) (see Figure 27). Countries are evenly distributed among developed and  
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Figure 26 Environmental Conventions Index - Top performers for CITES 
 
 
Figure 27 Environmental Conventions Index - Bottom performers for CITES 
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reflect these countries’ low degree of implementation. In the same way, three of the 
developing countries are Caribbean states—Guyana, Barbados, and Antigua and 
Barbuda—where illegal wildlife trade obeys regional traditional practices of harvesting 
wild species for foot, pet trade, and ornamental and medicinal purposes (CARICOM, 
2016). This also demonstrates the lack of an apparent connection between the level of 
development and progress in implementation of CITES obligations.  
A comprehensive analysis of the national reporting rates and the implementation 
patterns also result in important findings. In the case of Ramsar, the high rates of 
reporting include countries whose implementation has not been very positive. Five 
countries with ECI scores of 2.00 or below—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Turkmenistan—have submitted 100 percent of the 
reports that they were obliged to, although their achievements in terms of implementation 
were not very significant. The first two cases—the DRC and Djibouti—deserve special 
attention, since they were obliged to report in all the cycles included in this study, and 
their ECI scores of 1.07 and 0.95 respectively are some of the lowest. Of the top 20 ECI 
scores, only three countries—Bahamas, Turkey, and Uruguay—failed to submit any 
reports to the convention.  
The situation differs for CITES, given low compliance with the reporting 
obligations. Out of the 28 countries that have fully complied with their reporting 
obligations, only three register ECI scores below 2.50: Barbados, Georgia, and Qatar. 
Barbados is the only country among the bottom performers that has 100 percent reporting 
rates. Five of the countries ranking at the bottom ten—Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, and the Russian Federation—have only reported one 
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third or fewer of the times they were expected to. At the top of the ranking, ten of the 
twelve countries with positive results have reported more than half of the times. 
Interestingly, the country at the top of the board—the Philippines—systematically failed 
to submit its reports until 2014, and it is this data on the 2013-2014 biennial report grants 
the country the spot at the top of the ranking.  
To finalize, analyzing historical trends of the implementation process also reveals 
important patters. For the Ramsar Convention, the average ECI has increased 26 percent 
in the period included in this study, going from 2.62 to 3.31, with the most significant 
changes taking place between 2005 and 2008. This trend is more significant among 
developing countries, since they have improved at a higher rate closing the 
implementation gap with developed countries (see Figure 28). For the past two reporting 
cycles, the ECI scores for developed countries have remained stable. Regionally, all 
regions except Europe have significantly progressed in the implementation of Ramsar, 
with ECI scores improving an average of 12 percent each reporting cycle for Africa, the 
Americas, and Asia, and 20 percent for the case of Oceania.  
In the case of CITES, ECI scores have increased from 2.83 in the first biennium 
(2003-2004) to 3.18 in the last reporting cycle (2013-2014), which reflects a total change 
of 12 percent and an average of 2-percent improvement each biennium. Differences 
among developed and developed countries are not significant, as they have shown similar 
behavior (see Figure 29). Regional comparisons, however, result in more relevant 
findings. All regions except Oceania have managed to improve their degree of 
implementation. Africa and the Americas improved the most, increasing their average 
ECI scores by 29 and 16 percent respectively. Africa, however, registered an important  
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Figure 28 Evolution of implementation index for Ramsar Convention 
 
 
Figure 29 Evolution of implementation index for CITES 
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four of the African countries that had traditionally submitted information—Benin, Eritrea, 
Liberia, and Swaziland—stopped sending their reports. In the Americas, improvement 
has been steady, but still the number of countries reporting significantly decreased; e.g., 
Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela did not submit reports after 2010. 
Implementing global environmental commitments around the protection of 
wetlands and the regulation of illegal wildlife trade reflects the diverse realities of 
countries and conventions in their national policies, global strategies, and managerial 
approaches. Evidently, CITES requires additional effort in terms of national reporting. 
Strategies to update the national reports format and to improve compliance with 
implementation would definitively contribute to better information for decision-making 
on global efforts against illegal wildlife trade. Some of these measures have already been 
established by the CITES COP and executive secretariat. The reporting cycle and 
national report format have been adjusted, and the next reports are to be submitted in 
2018 for the 2015-2017 period (CITES Secretariat, 2016). This will reflect the three-year 
cycle between meetings of the COP. Reports are expected to measure progress on the 
CITES Strategic Vision 2008-2020 and the contributions of the convention to the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. On the other hand, the results of the Ramsar Convention exemplify 
the importance of institutional arrangements for national reporting to obtain optimal 
outcomes from the process. 
 Evidence from the ECI shows a wide spectrum of results across and within 
conventions. Even when the ECI scores for CITES show a larger distance to target, the 
progress achieved by developing countries deserves special attention. Developing 
countries demonstrate how the nature of the biodiversity issues influences the process of 
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implementation. States that are either better equipped or more concerned to address the 
challenges of wetland degradation and illegal wildlife trade seem to reflect specific 
implementation patterns. These two problems also register different levels of complexity 
that may affect the process of implementation. The corporality of wetlands, and the 
complexity of the criminal activities behind the non-compliance to CITES, are some of 
the variables that could be analyzed when explaining why countries achieve different 
results in implementation of the biodiversity conventions. Data is also required to connect 
the definition of national policies with the effectiveness of the conventions. As habitat 
losses persist, focused efforts to reduce biodiversity degradation and reduce the extinction 
risk of threatened species is critical (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of the 
Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014; UNEP, 2012a). Further research will include 
this type of analysis. Using specific indicators that measure the changes in the ecological 
character of wetlands, and in the unregulated trade transactions in endangered species, 
data can be compared with the ECI to determine the extent to which countries that are 
making progress in the implementation of the convention, are experiencing improvement 
in the environmental issues that the Ramsar Convention and CITES address. This can 
also raise awareness and identify the specific strategies that are improving results, and the 
issues on which progress is still required, to guarantee that all the state parties obtain the 
same outcomes.  
As the fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO-4) explained, biodiversity 
policies are motivated by multiple factors that are increasingly economic in nature, as 
these resources are essential for livelihoods, ecosystem services, habitats, and food 
security (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014). International 
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goals and targets for the protection of biodiversity range from the conventions, to the 
SDGs and the Aichi targets. However, adherence to regimes, low implementation, and 
the lack of compliance mechanisms prevent countries from effectively conserving 
biodiversity (Rayfuse, 2007). Data from the ECI provides the elements for a clear 
assessment across countries and conventions, which inform decisions to improve the 
impact and outcomes of the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the other agreements in the 
biodiversity regime. Data on best practices and challenges can support how countries 
assist each other, and establish integrated approaches to biodiversity conservation. 
Every day, additional pressures are placed on the life and Earth systems. Decisive 
work of the parties to the conventions and their executive bodies will be needed to 
overcome these. As the conventions explore the possibilities for collaboration, it is 
necessary to determine the degree to which countries are fulfilling the objectives of each 
agreement. This information will also provide opportunities for capacity building, and 
technical assistance, to improve compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. Stronger 
results and collaboration are central to bringing ecosystems back from degradations and 
overexploitation, and to guarantee that the conventions contribute to the sustainable 
development agenda. To achieve these results, biodiversity conservation approaches need 
to be integrated into economic, social, and development policies. Only in this way it 
would be possible to advance in the value, conservation, and sustainable use of 
biodiversity in ways that prevent its loss and guarantee benefits for all sectors and all 
people.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONNECTING IMPLEMENTATION TO NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
Multiple drivers affect the implementation of global environmental conventions at 
the national level (Fearon, 1998). As Chapter 2 illustrated, traditional approaches to the 
implementation of environmental law assume that states comply with all their 
international agreements. The evidence from the ECI, however, demonstrates that 
countries make different amounts of progress on their international environmental 
obligations, and that progress varies on a convention-by-convention basis. In addition to 
factors such as the functional benefits of international cooperation on the environment 
(Simmons, 1998; Underdal, 1998), states’ reputation (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Fearon, 
1998), or effectiveness in problem-solving (Checkel, 2001; Downs & Jones, 2002; 
Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Oran R. Young, 1994), the implementation of global 
environmental conventions depends on specific factors such as the nature of the 
environmental problems, the characteristics of each country, the momentum of the 
international system, and the initiatives developed by the agreements to promote and 
enforce compliance (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; O'Neill, 2009, 2017) (see Table 
21). Ultimately, results depend on the specific measures that countries develop to 
domesticate their international environmental commitments, and on the challenges—
internal and external—that they face in the execution of those measures. 
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Table 21 Determinants for the implementation of environmental conventions 
System Issues Strategies Actors 
• Structure of the 
international system 
• Governance and 
leadership 
• Existence of the 
necessary 
conditions for 
implementation 
• Nature of the 
issues from which 
international 
agreements emerge 
• Complexity 
• Availability of 
information 
• Definition of the 
objectives, targets, 
obligations, and 
mechanisms of 
enforcement 
 
• Capabilities of the 
actors involved 
• Existence of the 
necessary 
conditions for 
implementation 
 
	 To understand the process of implementation, it is necessary to connect the results 
of the ECI with qualitative analysis at the national level that evaluate national legislation, 
institutions, and other relevant measures. The national implementation profiles allow us 
to assess with greater empirical evidence how countries define and implement policies to 
fulfill the various obligations they acquire when joining the conventions. This chapter 
presents such an analysis for ten countries—Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, South Korea, and Thailand (see 
Figure 30)—to exemplify how specific best practices or challenges affect implementation 
of their obligations. Countries were selected by the Center for Governance and 
Sustainability at UMass Boston, as part of a research project developed in partnership 
with the Law Division of UN Environment using three core criteria: 
• Membership: Only state parties to all the conventions included in this study were 
considered. 
• Reporting: Only countries that submitted at least one report from 2010 to 2014 in 
accordance with each agreement’s reporting cycles are included. An exception 
was made for CITES, considering the convention’s low rates of compliance with 
reporting. 
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• Representativeness: To ensure that all UN regions are represented in the study, 
and that both developed and developing countries are included.  
Table 22 shows how the selected countries represent different socioeconomic, 
developmental, and environmental circumstances. Furthermore, the fact that these ten 
countries register different national implementation results across and within clusters, 
confirms that the process of implementation is not static and determined by a set of 
constant variables, but is rather the dynamic result of the interaction of multiple factors.  
 
Figure 30 Ten country profiled for national implementation  
 
 Selected countries for national implementation profiles 
 
Table 22 Select countries for national implementation profiles 
 Algeria (DZA) Argentina (ARG) 
Population 
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.) 
HDI (2016) 
Forest areas (% of total) 
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015) 
40.3 million 
$15,000  
0.745 (83rd) 
0.8% 
-1.6% 
43.0 million 
$20,170 
0.827 (45th) 
9.9% 
1.0% 
 Australia (AUS) Canada (CAN) 
Population 
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.) 
HDI (2016) 
Forest areas (% of total) 
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015) 
23.0 million 
$48,800 
0.939 (2nd) 
16.2% 
0/2% 
35.4 million 
$46,200 
0.920 (10th) 
38.2% 
0.0% 
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 Colombia (COL) Czech Republic (CZE) 
Population 
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.) 
HDI (2016) 
Forest areas (% of total) 
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015) 
47.2 million 
$14,200 
0.727 (95th) 
52.7% 
0.4% 
10.6 million 
$33,200 
0.878 (28th) 
34.5% 
-0.1% 
 Germany (DEU) Mozambique (MOZ) 
Population 
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.) 
HDI (2016) 
Forest areas (% of total) 
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015) 
80.7 million 
$48,200 
0.926 (4th) 
38.2% 
0.0% 
25.9 million 
$1,228 
0.418 (181st) 
48.2% 
0.5% 
 South Korea (KOR) Thailand (THA) 
Population 
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.) 
HDI (2016) 
Forest areas (% of total) 
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015) 
50.9 million 
$37.900 
0.901 (18th) 
63.4% 
0.1% 
68.2 million 
$16,800 
0.740 (87th) 
32.1% 
0.2% 
Sources: (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017; International Monetary Fund, 2016; UNDP, 2016; 
World Bank, 2016) 
 
 The qualitative analysis of the implementation profiles seeks to explain countries’ 
results in the ECI. To that end, together with the research team at the Center for 
Governance and Sustainability, we analyzed primary and secondary sources such as 
legislative and institutional documents, implementation plans, and NGOs reports to 
identify the legislative and institutional arrangements for implementation, technical 
capacity, data management, levels of public awareness, and cooperation. Rigorous 
research on national measures led to the identification of best practices that facilitate 
implementation and challenges that hinder it. These factors are then classified according 
to the specific categories of obligations that are part of the ECI (see Chapter 3). This 
analysis reflects on the specific interactions that governments develop with conventions, 
with stakeholders, and between the different national agencies, to work together on 
specific environmental obligations. These interactions also require capacity, openness, 
and engagement. The analysis resulted in a typology of eight factors that operate as either 
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best practices, challenges, or both (see Table 23). The examples characterized under each 
type of obligation demonstrate how the assessment of implementation connects to the 
policies, strategies, and measures developed at the national level.  
 
Table 23 Best practices and challenges in implementing global environmental 
conventions 
Type of obligation Factor 
Regulation 1. Legislation 
Management 2. Institutional arrangements, strategies, and policies 3. Cooperation and engagement 
Informational 4. Information, science, and monitoring 5. Public awareness 
Technical 6. Technical measures 7. Exogenous factors 
Financial 8. Availability of financial resources 
 
Explanatory factors also provide insights for policy-makers at the national and 
global levels that would enable improvement of performance and the creation of the 
necessary conditions for the achievement of global environmental goals. Best practices 
provide a source of information to improve the effectiveness of environmental 
conventions, and to connect state parties through assistance and capacity-building 
mechanisms. Furthermore, information on how specific challenges hinder the process of 
implementation can serve as a foundation for the development of targeted strategies that 
solve countries’ challenges and improve their performance. In this way, academic 
analysis and policy mechanisms can help improve the process of implementation and the 
effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements. If these challenges are not 
addressed, environmental treaties will be perceived as failed mechanisms, since they will 
not be fulfilling their problem-solving and cooperation mission.  
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Implementation Comparison across ten countries 
 National reports are the main source of information for analyzing the 
implementation of global environmental conventions. All ten countries included in this 
study register high rates of national reporting (see). However, there are exceptions. South 
Korea has not submitted a report to the Basel Convention since 2008, and has, together 
with Algeria and Mozambique, submitted only one of the three required reports for the 
Stockholm Convention. Colombia has very low reporting rates for CITES, having 
submitted only one of the six required reports. Algeria has never reported to CITES. 
Interestingly, all countries have submitted all their reports to the Ramsar Convention, 
except for the Czech Republic, which did not submit the latest report due in 2015. 
 
Figure 31 National Reporting Rate by convention and country 
 
 
The implementation of the conventions varies across and within countries (see 
Figure 32). While some countries perform similarly across all the conventions, others 
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register different degrees of implementation among or within clusters. Germany, for 
example, has very consistent performance. Even when the country has low scores in 
some cases—as in CITES—it outperforms most other countries. Other countries, like the 
Czech Republic, register important differences in performance for each of the clusters, 
with outstanding results in the chemicals cluster for both the Basel and Stockholm 
Conventions, and low scores in the biodiversity cluster for both Ramsar and CITES. 
Mozambique, on the other hand, has better results in the biodiversity cluster. Its overall 
results evidence mid-level performance globally, but this country has some important 
challenges in the case of the chemicals conventions, particularly in technical management 
of hazardous wastes and regulations for control of POPs. Mozambique shows important 
positive results in the protection in endangered species and has considerably improved its 
implementation for the Ramsar Convention, making it a model both regionally and 
globally. Australia exemplifies a different trend, with relatively important differences in 
the implementation within the clusters. Its scores for the ECI evidence important progress 
in the Stockholm and Ramsar conventions because of the efforts to enable legislation that 
translates commitments into national policies. However, the results also show the need 
for additional efforts in the CITES and Basel Conventions, particularly regarding 
technical obligations. Figure 33 and Figure 34 summarize the results of the ECI for the 
countries in each of the clusters. The global and regional rankings of the ECI scores 
contextualize the performance of the countries (see Table 24 – The number in 
parentheses under each ranking corresponds to the number of countries for which there is 
data at either the global or the regional level). 
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Figure 32 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, by convention 
 
 
Figure 33 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, chemicals and 
waste cluster 
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Figure 34 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, biodiversity 
cluster 
 
Table 24 Environmental Conventions Index ranking for selected countries, by 
convention 
 DZA ARG AUS CAN COL CZE DEU MOZ KOR THA 
Basel Convention 
Global 16 3 76 16 3 11 11 112 34 46 
 (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) (161) 
Regional 3 1 2 4 1 6 6 24 5 8 
 (41) (31) (9) (31) (31) (42) (42) (41) (38) (38) 
Stockholm Convention 
Global 97 50 5 8 35 3 20 60 13 87 
 (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) (120) 
Regional 19 12 1 1 6 2 14 9 2 19 
 (30) (25) (2) (25) (25) (35) (35) (30) (28) (28) 
Ramsar Convention 
Global 12 110 8 68 22 114 38 65 30 7 
 (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) (166) 
Regional 4 22 1 14 4 28 7 19 10 3 
 (50) (30) (8) (30) (30) (41) (41) (50) (37) (37) 
CITES 
Global N.A. 13 30 48 25 33 14 6 34 4 
  (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) 
Regional N.A. 3 1 14 8 12 3 1 9 3 
  (24) (3) (24) (24) (39) (39) (17) (27) (27) 
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Regulation: Legislation enactment and enforcement 
 Enactment of national legislation for addressing the concerns subject to 
international environmental agreements is the foundational element for successful 
implementation of international environmental law. All ten countries have delivered in 
this regard. This is true particularly for the Basel Convention and CITES, as the adoption 
of domestic laws is critical to defining categories of hazardous wastes and their sound 
management, and procedures for trade in endangered species must be defined at the 
national level.  
 Countries approach regulatory frameworks in different ways. Some establish laws 
for the respective components of each convention, while others define comprehensive 
legislative frameworks to protect the environment. Algeria, for example, established a 
specific law (Law No. 01-19 of 12/12/2001) to regulate the management, control, and 
disposal of waste, and it also set up the National Special Waste Management Plan (Plan 
national de gestion des déchets spéciaux or PNAGDES) (Basel Convention, 2008a; 
REVADE, 2016). In addition, the government of Algeria enacted specific legislation to 
establish transportation requirements and nomenclature for dangerous special wastes 
(Basel Convention, 2008a; Ministry of Energie (Ministère de l'Energie), 2004, 2006). 
Argentina took a similar approach. National Law 24.051 (approved in 1992) regulates the 
generation, handling, transport, treatment, and final disposal of hazardous wastes. For the 
Stockholm Convention, however, the legislative framework includes multiple laws that 
address various types of pesticides. Argentina’s regulations cover nine of the sixteen 
pesticides listed in the convention and  possesses several draft laws to regulate some of 
the rest of the substances (Government of Argentina, 2007). Germany has also enacted 
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several pieces of legislation relating to hazardous waste management. Some of the 
country’s federal states have also issued waste management plans, and ten of the sixteen 
states have implemented an obligation for delivery of certain types of wastes to public 
facilities (Basel Convention, 2011b). 
In the chemicals and waste cluster, some countries treat the Basel and Stockholm 
Conventions as a unified block when establishing regulations, while others create 
separate regulations for each agreement. In the case of South Korea, for example, the 
Basel Convention is regulated by the 1994 Act on the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. This act limits or bans the export 
and import of specific wastes harmful to human health or the environment (Basel 
Convention, 2008b). Korea also enacted additional regulations for the management of 
waste, including the Waste Management Act in 1986 and the Act on the Promotion of 
Saving and Recycling of Resources in 2008. For the Stockholm Convention, Korea’s 
regulatory framework includes the 1990 Chemical Substance Control Act, which controls 
the import, export, and usage of chemicals including POPs, and the POPs Control Act of 
2007 (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009).  
By contrast, Colombia’s regulation for the conventions came down from the 
country’s national constitution (O'Brien, 1995). The 1991 constitution set forth new laws 
and principles for a balance between the environment and national development. This 
serve as the foundation for several policies, including the Environmental Policy for the 
Integrated Management of Hazardous Waste, Resolution 1045 of 2003 and Resolution 
1390 of 2005 on the reformed disposal of waste, the 1997 Policy for Cleaner Production, 
and the Policy for the Use and Handling of Pesticides. These policies were complemented 
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by national health policies for the management of hazardous wastes and POPs, including 
epidemiological surveillance, an agricultural policy, and monitoring of environmental 
conditions by poisoning, accidents, or emergencies (Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y 
Desarrollo Territorial, 2010). 
Specific components of legislation are also important to achieving the objectives 
of some of the conventions. In 2008, South Korea introduced specific legislation for 
electrical and electronic equipment and automobiles. Thailand has also included explicit 
regulations for special wastes such as packaging waste and electrical and electronic 
equipment waste (the Integrated Strategy of the Management of Waste from Electrical 
and Electronic Equipment or WEEE) (Basel Convention, 2008b, 2011d). Both countries 
also have innovative measures for Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems, and 
Thailand has included the “polluter pays” principle in its legislation. Furthermore, the 
Thai cabinet adopted the National Master Plan on Waste Management (2016-2021) 
aimed to encourage the 3Rs concept—reduce, reuse, recycle—and to establish proper 
disposal methods.  
In the biodiversity cluster, legislation treats the Ramsar Convention and CITES 
separately, because of the differences in the nature of each agreement. In the case of 
CITES, strong and comprehensive legislation is necessary to regulate the exports, 
imports, and trade transactions in endangered species. That is why one of the 
convention’s key facilitation mechanisms is the National Legislation Project (NLP), 
created in 1992 to analyze parties’ enabling and implementing legislation. Under the 
regulations of the convention, the project reviews each country’s legislation and classifies 
it in one of three categories: Category 1 (requirements fully met), Category 2 
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(requirements partly met), or Category 3 (requirements generally not met) (CITES, 
1992). Eight out of the ten countries analyzed are classified under Category 1, which 
means that the country’s legislation meets the requirements of CITES implementation 
(see Table 25). The two African countries—Algeria and Mozambique—have yet to meet 
the legislation requirements of CITES. 
 
Table 25 2016 classification of selected countries under CITES National Legislation 
Project 
DZA ARG AUS CAN COL CZE DEU MOZ KOR THA 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Source: (CITES, 2016b) 
 
In this context, countries have specific regulations for CITES. In the Czech 
Republic, for example, the Act on Trade in Endangered Species No. 100/2004 is the main 
piece of legislation to protect endangered species. Germany also has the Federal 
Ordinance on the Conservation of Species, established in 2005. The two countries 
however, are also subject to the EU Wildlife Protection Regulations. Additional national 
regulations principally cover species that require protection based on specific directives. 
In other countries, regulation of trade in endangered species is part of broader 
biodiversity conservation laws. In Australia, the 1999 Environment Protection and 
Conservation Act is the main legislative instrument to regulate compliance with CITES 
requirements (Farrier & Tucker, 2000). It was amended in 2006 to specify that permits 
for trade are required not only for CITES-listed species but also for species that appear in 
the declared specimens list defined by the Ministry of Environment (Alacs & Georges, 
2008). Thailand has comprehensive regulation for trade in endangered species. In 1992, 
the country adopted the Wild Animal Preservation and Protection Act (B.E. 2535), and 
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new measures for derivatives were defined in 2003 (B.E. 2546), and in the 2015 
constitution (B.E. 2557) (Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1992). In addition to 
limiting hunting and controlling the trade of wildlife, the act also made provisions for the 
institutional arrangements for CITES implementation within the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (Oswell, 2010). South Korea’s regulations for CITES are 
also part of a broader piece of legislation, the 1992 Natural Environment Preservation 
Act, that contains, after being amended in 1994, basic provisions on the international 
trade in CITES-listed species and their derivatives.  
Legislation for the Ramsar Convention also tends to be part of general 
environmental measures. In the case of Colombia, Law 357 (1997) was the main 
instrument for the protection of wetlands. Furthermore, Law 99 of 1993—which 
established general environmental policies for Colombia—explicitly listed paramo 
ecosystems (in the Andean mountains) as needing special protection. In 2001, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the constitutionality of these regulations and 
recognized paramo ecosystems as areas of special ecological importance (Murillo 
Chavarro, 2011). Other subsequent resolutions also connected wetlands to the Code of 
Renewable Natural Resources providing measures for the protection of Ramsar sites and 
other paramo ecosystems.  
National regulation for the biodiversity conventions also includes innovative 
measures to connect these global agreements to other policy areas. South Korea, for 
example, recently amended its Pharmaceutical Affairs Act to include regulation of the 
import and export of drugs made from processed goods of animals and plants as 
prescribed by CITES (Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, 2016). In a similar approach, 
 180 
the Czech Republic has connected the protection of wetlands to its water management 
policies. The government has undertaken significant water policy reform (including the 
Water Act of 2008) to promote the wise use of water resources and return water to key 
environmental assets (including Ramsar wetlands) (Ramsar, 2012). Equally important, 
the mining code defined by the government of Colombia extended protection of natural 
areas from mining activities to wetlands (Law 1382 of 2010) (Murillo Chavarro, 2011).  
Enacting legislation also poses important challenges. Mozambique, for example, 
has struggled with the need to continuously update or add elements to existing legislation 
in order to regulate the Basel and Stockholm Conventions. Different pieces of legislation 
regulate Mozambique’s production of waste (Article 9 Decree 13 of July 13, 2006), the 
management of solid municipal waste (Decree no. 94/2014), the management of 
hazardous waste, the management of POPs (Environmental Management Act, enacted in 
2002), and the liability of those who damage the environment (Basel Convention, 2011c; 
Cambule & Gouveia Pereira, 2015). This fragmentation affects the process of 
implementation. Coordination among government agencies for planning, execution, 
monitoring, and reporting on the multiple pieces of legislation requires additional time 
and resources. In addition, adjusting the multiple laws to reflect decisions made at the 
conventions’ COPs is also a complex process. These issues delay progress in 
implementation. Furthermore, Mozambique has submitted its legislation to be evaluated 
by the CITES National Legislation Project (NLP). While the existing regulation is 
comprehensive, and the country has participated in workshops developed by the 
secretariat to improve compliance with legislation, the legislation has not been published 
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and no agreement exists with the secretariat for revised legislative analysis, including 
possible Category 1 status (CITES, 2016b). 
Algeria faces similar challenges. In the case of the chemicals conventions, there 
are important legislation gaps. Algeria has not enacted legislation or regulations to 
identify unregulated transboundary movement of waste, or to specify the responsibility 
for illegal traffic, and therefore cannot ensure proper waste disposal in these cases 
(Government of Algeria, 2015). In addition, the National Implementation Plan for the 
Stockholm Convention acknowledges that “Algerian legislation in the case of polluted 
sites has not taken into account and has not provided the necessary steps to rehabilitate 
soils to be in line with the principle of polluter pays” (Ministère de l’Aménagement du 
Territoire et de l’Environnement, 2006). For CITES, Algeria’s legislation is also 
classified under Category 2. The country has submitted a draft of its legislation for the 
secretariat’s review and has participated in the different workshops. However, the 
finalization and submission of implementing legislation to Parliament for enactment 
remains to be done (CITES, 2016b).  
Other countries also face legislative challenges regarding aspects of some of the 
agreements. A 2015 report commissioned by Australia’s Department of the Environment, 
for example, recommended updating the 1989 Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports 
and Imports) Act (O'Farrell & Marsden, 2015). In Canada, despite the existence of some 
controls regarding shipments for hazardous wastes outside the OECD region, the country 
needs additional technical definitions about trade in non-hazardous recyclables in order to 
ratify the Ban Amendment (Basel Convention, 1995). Colombia needs to reconcile 
mining codes with existing regulation for biodiversity conservation and wetlands 
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protection. Inconsistent compliance with Ramsar obligations due to anthropogenic 
activities has evidenced the fragmentation and weaknesses in the regulations of the Code 
of Renewable Natural Resources for ecosystems protection. “The main problem in 
Colombia regarding protecting areas of ecological importance, such as the paramo, is not 
a deficient legal regime but the absence of compliance and enforcement measures to 
ensure that it is properly implemented” (Murillo Chavarro, 2011). 
 
Management: Institutions, strategies and engagement 
 Management obligations are at the core of national processes to domesticate 
global environmental obligations. Implementing them involves various activities, 
including the appointment of institutions to serve as focal points and authorities—the 
institutions that work on the implementation—for each of the agreements, the design of 
strategies and policies, and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms (see Table 23). 
These arrangements create the policy spaces for countries engage with all actors involved 
in the creation of the necessary conditions to achieve the obligations of each of the 
agreements and solve the corresponding environmental problems. 
 The designation of focal points is a basic obligation and requirement in the 
process of implementation. In addition, countries sometimes must establish institutions to 
support the implementation of other obligations, or introduce policy spaces so that 
different actors can come together around specific obligations. Algeria, for example, 
established the National Observatory for Environment and Sustainable Development, the 
National Centre for Environmental Training, and the National Waste Agency (Ministry of 
Land Planning and the Environment, 2010) to work on the implementation of the 
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chemicals conventions. Australia has also established different institutions; the 
Stockholm Intergovernmental Forum facilitates consultations between the Australian 
government, state, and territory agencies that work on POPs (Department of the 
Environment and Heritage, 2006), and the National Measurement Institute was the first 
and remains the largest facility in the country dedicated to the analysis of hazardous 
substances (Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2006).  
While these examples show that institutions are specifically designed for each 
environmental convention, Germany has taken a different approach, connecting its 
institutional arrangements for the chemical conventions to other policy areas related to 
health and safety. The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und 
Reaktorsicherheit) is the lead agency responsible for implementing the Stockholm 
Convention. But it works closely with the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin), which is the authority for 
the export and import of POPs, in charge of permanently monitoring these substances in 
blood samples (Federal Republic of Germany, 2006). The country also connects the 
implementation of the different conventions to the issue of sustainable development, 
through the Council for Sustainable Development, and to education and research through 
the Federal Ministry for these topics (Bundeministerium für Bildung und Forschung).  
 Partnerships with institutions for data collection and analysis are also an 
important best practice. In South Korea, the National Institute of Environmental Research 
(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon), the Korea Environment Institute (Bulgwangdong, 
Eunpyong-gu, Seoul), the Korea Environmental Management Corporation 
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(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon), and the Korea Environment Resources Corporation 
(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon) work together on the management and regulation of 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste (Basel Convention, 2008b). Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy operates the Center for Development of 
Resources Recycling Technology (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2004). In 
Thailand, different departments provide technical assistance and training for 
implementation of the Basel Convention, including the Department of Industrial Works, 
the Pollution Control Department, the Environmental Research and Training Center, the 
Department of Environment Quality Promotion, and the Environmental Research 
Institute of Chulalongkorn University (Basel Convention, 2011d). Some of these 
institutional arrangements have also been relevant to the Stockholm Convention. The 
Pollution Control Department is the focal point for the Stockholm Convention and the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is responsible for implementing the 
National Implementation Plan (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 
2007). As countries deal with multiple levels of governance and institutions working on 
the process of implementation, coordination among them becomes a critical factor for the 
achievement of the policy goals established by each convention. A good example of this 
comes from Colombia, where the national government has developed a successful degree 
of coordination between several ministries involved in the management of POPs, 
including regional autonomous corporations (Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y 
Desarrollo Territorial, 2010).  
In the definition of policies and strategies, countries have also taken different 
paths. Successful approaches have been developed by defining broad strategies and 
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policies to focus national efforts around specific environmental conventions. A noticeable 
process is being executed by the Czech Republic, whose State Environmental Policy 
2012—2020, underlines the importance to implement provisions of multilateral 
environmental agreements aimed at protecting health and the environment from harmful 
effects of chemical substances, including the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, among 
others (Ministry of the Environment (Ministerstvo životního prostředí), 2013). Algeria, 
also reflects important connections between policy areas. The management of chemicals, 
wastes and POPs is based on its National Environmental Strategy (NES) and the National 
Environmental Action Plan and Sustainable Development (NEAPSD) (Ministry of Land 
Planning and the Environment, 2010). The country has also established several action 
plan goals related to the elimination of PCBs, limit the sources of emissions, and reduce 
unintentional releases (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement, 
2006). 
 In terms of cooperation, countries collaborate at various levels from convention 
secretariats to other countries and non-state actors at global and national levels. When 
working with the conventions’ executive bodies, some countries, such as Canada, directly 
engage with conventions’ functioning and overall operation. In the case of the Stockholm 
Convention, for example, Canada’s international engagement in the process of 
implementation includes institutional support and financial assistance for UN 
Environment, the convention’s secretariat, and other national governments for activities 
around specific obligations, providing funding and hosting different activities such as 
workshops and summits to discuss implementation (UNEP, 2000). The country has also 
promoted and funded the establishment of the convention’s regional centers (Basel 
 186 
Convention, 1999). Canada has also been active in the negotiation and diplomatic 
processes around the Stockholm Convention. The country also was highly influential on 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, being the first signatory to provide 
financial assistance. In 2000, Canada established the five-year $20 million Canada POPs 
Fund, administered by the World Bank, to assist developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition in building their capacities to deal with POPs and in 
implementing their obligations under the convention (Government of Canada, 2006). In 
2016, Canada also chaired the Effectiveness Evaluation Committee under the Stockholm 
Convention (Stockholm Convention, 2016b). In 2001, Klaus Töpfer, then Executive 
Director of UN Environment, recognized Canada as a “pioneer in working with other 
parts of the world to achieve environmental agreements” (UNEP, 2001).  
Algeria, Argentina, and the Czech Republic provide more targeted support by 
hosting some of the Regional Centers established by the Basel and Stockholm 
conventions. In 2002, Argentina established the Basel Convention Regional Center for 
Capacity Building and Transfer of Technology for South America, and has since then 
provided funding for its operation (Basel Convention, 2011a; Basel Convention Regional 
Center, 2015). The government of the Czech Republic established the National Centre for 
POPs, to provide expert support, coordinate, and implement goals and targets featured in 
action plans for the implementation of the Stockholm Convention. The activities of the 
National Centre are coordinated and overseen by a multi-ministerial Council (the 
National Centre Council) composed of representatives of nine different ministries 
(RECETOX, 2017b). Similarly, Algeria hosts the North Africa Regional Centre for the 
Stockholm Convention, known in the region by its French acronym CNTPP (Le Centre 
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National des Technologies de Production plus Propre) (Ministère de l’Aménagement du 
Territoire et de l’Environnement, 2006). The center serves seven countries: Algeria, 
Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia. 
Collaboration and engagement are also important to countries, as cooperation 
both with neighboring states and regionally can contribute to successful implementation. 
In Canada, the implementation of the Basel and Stockholm conventions is closely 
connected to the 1986 Canada-US agreement on the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes. In 2014 “more than 99% of imports and 98% of exports [of 
transboundary waste] occurred between Canada and the United States” (Environment and 
Climate Change Canada, 2013). Also, under the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, both countries have created specific North American 
Regional Action Plans related to management of POPs. Germany also takes part in 
different multilateral and bilateral agreements on waste transportation. The most notable 
are the 1994 Germany-Afghanistan agreement and the 2000 Germany-Kosovo 
agreement, both designed to export the waste generated in these two places to Germany 
for the purpose of environmentally sound management (Reinhardt, 2000). A similar 
approach is used in the implementation of the Ramsar Convention, as Germany 
cooperates with the Netherlands in practicing cross-boundary nature conservation of the 
Gelderse Poort, an area where the Rhine leaves Germany and flows into the lowlands of 
the Netherlands (de Jong & van Tatenhove, 1998).  The country has also engaged in 
bilateral collaboration in Ramsar site designation. In 2008 Germany and France jointly 
designated two new Wetlands of International Importance, the Oberrhein / Rhin supérieur 
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in Germany and the Rhin supérieur / Oberrhein in France (Secretariat of the Ramsar 
Convention, 2008). 
At the regional level, cooperation has led some countries to assume a position of 
leadership, helping and supporting the implementation of the agreements in other 
countries. South Korea, for example, has promoted a database of POPs monitoring results 
from each country in East Asia, as well as data sharing and data exchange with 
international organizations (Ministry of Environment, 2013). Eleven East Asian countries 
participate in this initiative (South Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam), and they have 
been holding annual workshops since 2005. In a like manner, in 2003 Thailand ratified 
the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, adopted by the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 
2007).  
This type of regional organization is also the scenario for cooperation around the 
implementation of global environmental obligations. In December 2005 at a Special 
Meeting of ASEAN, the Ministers responsible for CITES implementation established a 
regional action plan to create a regional intergovernmental law-enforcement network for 
illegal wildlife trade, as well as a mechanism to share information and collaboration 
between countries and government agencies (Oswell, 2010). As a  result, ASEAN 
members, which include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand, launched the ASEAN Wildlife 
Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN, 2017). Thailand, a leader of the network, has 
worked closely on the promotion of networking among relevant law enforcement 
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authorities in ASEAN countries to curb illegal trade in wild fauna and flora (ASEAN-
WEN, 2017). This scheme for regional collaboration has favored important seizures in 
the Thai/Cambodia border in 2006, when over 200 Siamese crocodiles Crocodylus 
siamensis (CITES I) were recovered, and in the Thai/Laos border when 260 Malayan 
Pangolins Manis javanica (CITES II) were found (TRAFFIC, 2016). In Africa, 
Mozambique and twenty-four other countries are parties to the regional multilateral 
Bamako Convention (Agreement on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes) within the continent. 
The Bamako Convention, which came into force in 1996, prohibits the import of all 
hazardous wastes, including radioactive waste, into African countries. The agreement 
imposes stricter regulation than the Basel Convention, since it prohibits all imports of 
hazardous wastes and provides no exemption for radioactive wastes. 
Cooperation with stakeholders is also important. Countries engage with non-state 
actors to develop specific projects and activities that support implementation at the local 
level. Community organizations, industry conglomerates, and NGOs support and create 
plans and projects to advance environmental goals. Examples of such cooperation include 
the provincial  Environmental Directions and the regional Environmental Inspections in 
Algeria (Ministry of Land Planning and the Environment, 2010), and the work by 
Argentinean state, municipal, and local governments on the adoption of specific waste 
management goals and plans (International POPs Elimination Network, 2010). NGOs in 
Argentina are also actively engaged in the implementation of the POPs convention. One 
of the most prominent is the Citizen’s Anti-Incineration Coalition, a network of NGOs 
 190 
and citizens opposed to incineration and committed to the promotion of awareness about 
the effects of POPs on human health and the environment (Bianco & Campra, 2005).  
NGOs also serve purposes of agenda-setting, public awareness raising, and 
institutional arrangements. Since 2008, the Arnika Association, a national NGO in the 
Czech Republic, has served as a coordination center for Central and Eastern Europe on 
the right to healthy environment. As part of its efforts, it hosts the secretariat of the 
International POPs Elimination Project (IPEP) (Arnika Association, 2005, 2006b; 
Holoubek, 2006). In Argentina, the NGO Taller Ecologista has worked on the promotion 
of zero waste ordinances in main cities (International POPs Elimination Network, 2010). 
Since 2005 Thailand has worked to promote the participation of NGOs and civil society 
organizations in the implementation of the conventions. The National Master Plan on 
Waste Management (2016-2021) supports all relevant sectors for participation in the 
management of solid and hazardous waste. Thailand has hosted workshops that bring 
together different organizations to foster communication and collaboration in fulfilling 
the goals around environmentally sound management of POPs (Pesticide Action Network 
– Philippines and Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives, 2005). Groups from 
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have taken part in its 
activities. Industry participation in POP management is another important best practice in 
implementation. In July 2005, the Ministry of Environment of South Korea signed an 
agreement with companies that had high emissions of POPs such as dioxins and furans 
(Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009), which has contributed to a dramatic 
decline in the level of emissions.  
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All these institutional arrangements are critical to fulfilling related management 
obligations. Capacity building and training mechanisms are essential to achieving the 
goals of environmental conventions. Algeria, for example, has trained high-level 
technicians to analyze POPs (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de 
l’Environnement, 2006) and has designed strategies to promote stakeholder engagement. 
The Ministry of Environment signed an environmental performance contract with its 
industries to follow their environmental actions and encourage them to use best available 
techniques (Ministry of Land Planning and the Environment, 2010). In Argentina, the 
Basel Regional Centre includes among its objectives the goal of promoting Argentina’s 
capacity-building role, facilitating synergy among the chemicals conventions (Basel 
Convention Regional Center, 2015). Similar management strategies are used by Canada 
in the implementation of CITES (Cooper & Chalifour, 2004). Environment Canada 
provides interagency training in different regions, promoting regional collaboration and 
the adoption of policies that clarify the roles of the different authorities—scientific, 
management, and enforcement—that the convention requires.  
 
Information: Data collection, scientific assessment, and reporting 
 In implementing global environmental conventions, the availability of 
information is fundamental, for two reasons. First, data collection is essential to 
monitoring the state of the environment, to establish baselines for future reference, to 
assess progress in fulfilling obligations, and to produce the reports that constitute the 
most important evidence of how countries are advancing in implementing the 
conventions. Second, availability of information supports public awareness and engages 
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communities and stakeholders in developing policies to achieve the objectives of each 
agreement. Ultimately, information, science, and monitoring constitute fundamental 
inputs to the policy-making process as countries move forward with their commitments.  
 Best practices in data collection and monitoring take multiple forms. In the case 
of the Ramsar Convention, monitoring are critical factors since it determines and maps 
the wetland sites to be protected. Countries take different initiatives in this aspect. 
Algeria developed a partnership between the General Directorate of Forests and the 
Mediterranean Wetlands Observatory to produce thematic maps on land use and flooding 
dynamics of the country’s Ramsar sites (Guelmami, 2016). In Canada, one of the 
country’s main assets in the implementation of the Ramsar Convention are the data and 
information management systems. After the country ratified the convention in 1991, it 
has consistently worked on the design and establishment of a national wetland inventory 
that has reliable accuracy and provides information on ecosystems and natural resources 
value (Fournier, Grenier, Lavoie, & Hélie, 2007; Molnar & Kubiszewski, 2012). 
Although Canada has still not developed a systematic ecosystem valuation analysis, the 
Canadian Wetland Inventory is a useful tool and provides baseline data for monitoring 
programs (Fournier et al., 2007; Molnar & Kubiszewski, 2012). In South Korea, surveys 
were critical once the country joined the Ramsar Convention in 1997 as well. Between 
1999 and 2004, the country conducted its first survey of coastal wetlands of international 
importance. Later, between 2008 and 2012, Korea conducted a second survey for the 
establishment of a wetland information system under the operations of the Ministry of 
Oceans and Fisheries (Kim, 2010). Both surveys supported the designation of Ramsar 
sites.  
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 Data is not only important for designating Ramsar sites but also for maintaining 
them and evaluating whether they are fulfilling the various requirements established by 
the convention. Argentina, for example, despite its low levels of implementation has 
consistently worked to improve information on Ramsar sites and has made important 
progress in implementing the information-related obligations established by the 
convention. In the Czech Republic, research is used to improve knowledge among 
government and civil leaders about the management and multipurpose use of wetland 
reservoirs. Studies are employed for both the monitoring of wetlands ecological change, 
the promotion of community involvement in their management, and the inclusion of local 
organizations and government authorities in the management of these ecosystems (Petřík 
et al., 2007). The most recent study on the conservation, research and sustainable use of 
wetlands in the Czech Republic (2014-2017), provided assessment of the ecological state 
of Ramsar sites, including biodiversity.  
 Managing POPs also requires information and monitoring. Countries need to 
collect data on the substances present in humans and the environment. One country that 
has made good progress on this is the Czech Republic. The country established a national 
database for records on hazardous substances, and an information system for 
contaminated sites and old environmental burdens (Arnika Association, 2006a). The 
Czech government, through its State Health Institute, has also worked on the creation of a 
database to record and monitor the results of dietary exposure to POPs since 1994. Levels 
of POPs are also made available through GENASIS, an environmental data repository 
that provides comprehensive information on chemical contamination of the environment 
and human matrices (Klánová et al., 2009; RECETOX, 2017a). Another country, 
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Thailand, focused research on the creation of a POPs inventory to evaluate the existence 
of stockpiles of some pollutants, particularly pesticides. In 2001, with the support from 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Thai government, the Thai 
department of agriculture conducted an inventory of obsolete POP pesticide (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 2007). In 2004, these organizations 
formed a pesticide task team engaging national expert consultants on POPs pesticides and 
staff from the Pollution Control Department in conducting a new inventory (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 2007). Further inventories have showed a 
decrease in obsolete POPs pesticide stockpiles and have addressed specific substances, 
including DDT. 
South Korea uses data collection, scientific assessment, and monitoring in a 
combined effort to strengthen implementation of the Stockholm Convention. Since 1999, 
the Ministry of Environment has conducted studies to evaluate the effects of industrial 
POPs and their presence in the air (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009; Ministry 
of Environment, 2013; Shin et al., 2011). Additionally, each of the ministries engaged in 
the reduction and eradication of POPs has a subsidiary research institute that studies the 
presence of these substances in fish, food products, human breastmilk, and human blood 
(Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009). Korean efforts to make information 
available for the implementation of the chemicals conventions has also expanded to East 
Asia. Korea has hosted the POPs Information Warehouse Project to evaluate the 
implementation of the Stockholm Convention in East Asia (Ministry of Environment, 
2013); as part of the project, it promoted the creation of a database of POPs monitoring 
results from each country in East Asia as well as data sharing and data exchange with 
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international organizations (Ministry of Environment, 2013). The Ministry of 
Environment also works with stakeholders in conducting different research studies on 
POPs in the country. A PCBs Policy Council and a PCBs Safety Evaluation Group 
involving the utilities corporations and civic groups has conducted different studies and 
established a “Roadmap for PCBs Elimination” (Government of the Republic of Korea, 
2009).  
 Public awareness, education, and communication strategies are also necessary to 
fulfill the information obligations under the environmental conventions. In the case of the 
Ramsar Convention, countries carry out different activities related to information 
dissemination. Algeria facilitates public awareness by distributing materials for events 
including World Wetlands Day, World Tree Day, and Environment Day (Gardner et al., 
2009). In 2017, as part of the country’s celebrations for World Wetlands Day, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Education held a 
competition for primary school students’ artwork on wetlands (Ramsar Secretariat, 2017a). 
Colombia has also developed informative campaigns and education  projects alongside 
local communities to teach children—and ultimately communities—about the 
preservation of local wetlands (Ramsar Secretariat & Ruiz-Carvajal, 2006). The Thailand 
Biodiversity Division, under the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
and Planning, along with WWF Thailand, have promoted public awareness of wetlands 
since 2002, especially regarding the national parks system (Office of Natural Resources 
and Environmental Policy and Planning & Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment, 2009). This program includes the establishment of a network of schools 
and a curriculum based on wetlands and their conservation. A similar educational 
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approach has been developed in Australia, where the government has established 
Wetland Environment Centres in various regions to provide public education about 
specific Ramsar sites and about wetlands protection in general, and to promote 
cooperation with NGOs involved in wetlands management (Brisbane City Council, 2016; 
Department of the Environment, 2016). All these activities are coordinated with the 
Ramsar Secretariat, as part of the convention’s Communication, Education, Participation, 
and Awareness Programme (CEPA), started in 1999. 
Chemicals management and waste disposal also require public awareness. 
Countries such as Argentina have developed a series of activities including workshops, 
conferences on POPs, and media campaigns to involve communities in the 
implementation of the Stockholm Convention (Bianco & Campra, 2005; Government of 
Argentina, 2007). One of the main goals of these strategies is to produce a publicly 
available, valid inventory of the sources of polluting substances, and an inventory of 
contaminated sites. Australia has also established a consultation with non-government 
organizations dealing with POPs denominated the Stockholm Reference Group (SRG). 
Other governmental agencies also work in the development of a National Awareness 
Plan, to ensure that government officers and stakeholders are aware of the obligations 
under the convention (Government of Australia & Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, 2006). Other campaigns are specifically oriented to consumers. Germany has 
developed eco-labeling programs, such as the German environment label The Blue Angel 
(Der Blau Engel), established in 1978. The program comprises more than a hundred 
product categories (e.g. tires, copiers, paper), around 1,500 companies, and over 12,000 
labeled products (The Blue Angel, 2017). The label guarantees that products meet 
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standards for environment, health, and performance characteristics  (Basel Convention, 
2011b). Germany’s Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) also provides 
information on POPs to the public through print media, press releases, and the internet 
(Federal Republic of Germany, 2006).  
Germany also make efforts to promote public awareness and data and information 
availability regarding endangered species, both nationally and as part of global 
biodiversity conservation initiatives. The Federal Agency for Nature Conservancy 
(Bundesamt für Naturschutz, BfN) is the German management authority for CITES, for 
which it produces brochures and leaflets. However, its core project has to do with the 
determination of age and geographical origin of ivory of African elephant (CITES, 
2013b), which demonstrates the importance and value of data in tackling environmental 
problems. The project led to the creation of a database—the IvoryID—that was handed 
over to CITES Secretariat during COP17 in 2016. The database also embodies the 
importance of modern forensic techniques in the fight against illegal wildlife trade 
(CITES, 2016e). In a similar approach, South Korea has initiated public awareness on 
biodiversity by launching a Natural History Research Information Center, to combine 
biodiversity databases from other national sources such as natural history museums as 
well as molecular and genomic databases that support biodiversity conservation efforts 
(Korea Natural History Research Information Center, 2017).  
 
Technical: Capacities and measures for problem-solving 
 Implementing environmental conventions also requires the setting up of technical 
measures to control the environmental problems addressed by each agreement. Aspects 
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such as the reduction and/or elimination of the generation of hazardous waste, permits for 
endangered species trade, measures to physically protect wetlands, and control of the 
stockpiles of pollutant substances are some of the technical obligations that countries 
should fulfill to achieve their international environmental goals. In addition, countries 
need to address technical challenges generated by the effects of other policies they put 
into place, and that negatively impact the control hazardous substances and the protection 
of biodiversity. In most cases, these exogenous factors result from the consequences of 
other human activities. 
 Some countries have developed multiple best practices for putting in place 
technical measures. Algeria for example, has defined specific policies to address the 
negative impact of land-use activities on different ecosystems. As acknowledged by 
Algeria’s forest department, that serves as the country’s Ramsar administrative authority, 
“Algeria’s key environment issues include the depletion of water resources, land 
degradation and desertification, overuse of forest resources and decrease in species 
populations” (Gardner et al., 2009; Ramsar Secretariat, 2017a). To minimize the negative 
effects of these factors on wetlands, the country had to design policies to technically 
address those issues. Canada faces similar challenges regarding land-use. It set up reverse 
auctions to incentivize wetlands conservation and restoration on agricultural lands. The 
program is contingent upon payments and/or benefits from conservation funding 
mechanisms. Expert analysis has pointed out that farmers are more interested in 
agricultural benefits than wildlife protection in contrast to other countries, which calls for 
decisive measures such as rotation programs and crops control (Molnar & Kubiszewski, 
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2012). Canada has also established several water pollution trading schemes as another 
mechanism to protect wetlands. 
In the Czech Republic, technical measures to protect wetlands include specific 
recognition of ecological changes in some Ramsar sites. Consequently, four sites were 
listed in the Montreux Record, a register of wetland sites where changes in ecological 
character have occurred, are occurring, or are likely to occur as a result of human 
activities (Ministry of the Environment (Ministerstvo životního prostředí), 2005). 
Specifically, sites are threatened by the need to develop adequate plans for the technical 
and sound management of the fishponds, balancing current levels of protection with 
anthropogenic interference (Harmáčková & Vačkář, 2015).  
Other innovative initiatives are also relevant best practices in the process of 
implementation. South Korea, for example, has worked on the development of a 
“Wetland City Concept.” The objective of this collaboration is for the country to 
designate pilot sites for wetland cities, and to contribute to application of same process in 
other countries, by hosting a workshop for the guidelines on wetland city accreditation 
(Ramsar Convention, 2012c; Ramsar Secretariat, 2013). Korea has also designed 
technical measures to solve multiple environmental problems at once. Wetland 
management programs, for example, also aim to improve the protection of migratory bird 
species (Korea National Park Services, 2009). A similar approach has been developed in 
Argentina, where wetland conservation policies define long-term plans that include the 
conservation of endangered bird species protected, in some cases, by CITES. Examples  
include the protection of the Andean flamingo at Laguna Melincué  (Derlindati, 2011; 
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Romano, Luppi, & Pagano, 2015). In Colombia, the designation of some national parks 
aims to conserve both wetlands and endangered species (IUCN, 2013 ). 
 Management of POPs also requires technical procedures, ranging from certificates 
that confirm the sound management of waste from cradle to grave, as they were designed 
in Argentina (Basel Convention, 2011a),  to the creation of policies to avoid adding new 
sources of POPs (Bianco & Campra, 2005). Germany has also worked on measures and 
technologies for the proper disposal of waste and to prohibit the production, placing on 
the market, and use of DDT (Federal Republic of Germany, 2006). Policies are also 
focused on the management of raw materials efficiency projects along the entire 
production value chain (Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium 
für Bildung und Forschung), 2017; German Council for Sustainable Development (RNE), 
2017).  
 In some cases, technical measures are developed through specialized 
organizations. Canada, for example, created the Habitat Stewardship Program for Species 
at Risk, one of three pillars in Canada’s national strategy to protect species at risk. 
Canada strengthened the program in 2014 by allocating funding to protect non-
endangered species as well (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017). However, 
external factors continue impacting the technical components of environmental 
conventions. In South Korea, technical measures have not been enough to control the 
trade and farming of moon bears (Ursus thibetanus), a species declared protected by 
CITES. Despite strict oversight on international trade, domestic activities in Korea still 
contradict the fundamentals of the convention and its global goals (IAKA, 2014). 
Because of beliefs about the medicinal properties of bear bile, its price—estimated at 
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more than US$20,000 per specimen—makes it an attractive source of income, and more 
than one third of traditional medicine shops in South Korea still sell it, thereby creating 
demand for bear farms. Since 2010, the National Assembly has been considering a law 
that will prohibit the further breeding and sale of bears. As part of these efforts, a 
research project was conducted in 2011 on the logistics of ending bear farming (IAKA, 
2014). In a similar way, measures to control turtle hunting in Colombia have not been 
effective because of their religious value. Despite strategies to arrest smugglers of 
Matamata turtles (Chelus fimbriatus), red-eared slider turtles (Trachemys scripta), and 
poison frogs (Dendrobates histrionicus), seizures still take place and the species remain 
listed under CITES Appendix II (TRAFFIC, 2016).  
 
Financial 
 As expected, countries only list the availability of financial resources as a 
challenge, not a best practice. However, only two countries do so. Argentina has 
historically struggled with its contributions to the Stockholm Convention, which are the 
core financial obligations that countries are expected to comply with as part of the 
agreement. As of January 31, 2016, Argentina had $29,129 in unpaid pledges for 2015 
and years prior, and $28,410 for 2016 and future years, for a total of $57,539 in unpaid 
dues. This ranked it as the twentieth country with most unpaid dues out of 180 parties 
that were analyzed. This was partially explained by the fact that the country, in the 
aftermath of its financial crisis, had reallocated resources originally dedicated to 
environmental protection to other programs and initiatives. However, since then  
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Argentina has met these obligations and, as of the end of 2016, had no pending payments 
(Stockholm Convention, 2016c).  
Other countries also struggle to implement specific projects because of the lack of 
financial resources. Mozambique, for example, has faced challenges in implementing the 
National Ivory and Rhino Action Plan, which was requested by the CITES Standing 
Committee because of Mozambique’s lack of regulatory progress to include significant 
penalties for illegal killing of elephants and rhinos and for the possession of ivory and 
rhino horn (CITES, 2016d; TRAFFIC, 2013). However, a new report  presented to the 
67th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee in 2016 reported “substantial 
achievements” in most of the actions (Ministry of Land & National Administration for 
Conservation Areas (ANAC), 2016). To implement the not-yet-executed activities, the 
World Bank gave a grant to the Mozambique’s Conservation Areas for Biodiversity and 
Development Project (CITES, 2016d).  
 
Overall lessons for cooperation and implementation 
 The analysis of the ten qualitative national implementation profiles presented in 
this chapter confirms that the process of implementation is intrinsically connected with 
the measures countries establish to fulfill the obligations they acquire when joining 
conventions. This connection confirms the complexity of the process of implementation, 
and the relevance of evaluating and explaining it. 
 All countries identified best practices for the conventions. Germany and the 
Czech Republic listed more factors as best practices, which could reflect their experience 
in implementing the conventions, the positive results that they have achieved, their 
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engagement with the conventions, and the availability of information. Analyzing the data 
by convention confirms the experience of both countries, since they have listed more best 
practices for the conventions in which they perform relatively better than the rest of the 
countries in the study: Stockholm for the Czech Republic and CITES for Germany. 
Algeria, on the contrary, is the country with the least factors, which is the result of the 
lack of data about the process of implementation in the country, especially for CITES, in 
which the country failed to submit even the national reports it was obliged to.  
 
Figure 35 Percentage of countries listing best practices, by convention 
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the factor is critical for 6 and 5 countries for CITES and the Stockholm Convention 
respectively.  
 
Table 26 Most relevant best practices in implementation, by country 
 Legislation 
Institutions, 
strategies 
& policies 
Cooperation 
Information, 
science & 
monitoring 
Public 
awareness 
Technical 
measures 
DZA  X  X  X 
ARG  X     
AUS  X     
CAN  X X X  X 
COL X      
CZE  X X X  X 
DEU   X X   
MOZ   X    
KOR X      
THA   X    
 
Figure 36 Percentage of countries listing challenges, by convention 
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Countries also identified challenges for all conventions, except the Basel 
Convention in Korea, and CITES in the Czech Republic and Germany. For the Basel 
Convention, this could be partially explained by the fact that there is no clear information 
about its implementation in Korea after 2008. The most challenges were identified for 
Algeria and Mozambique. Algeria appears to have more issues with the Stockholm 
Convention. Mozambique has challenges with both conventions, which is particularly 
interesting since the country is at the top of the results for implementation. However, this 
apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that the distance to the target of 
“complete” implementation remains high. Three factors appear to be critical to successful 
implementation: technical capacity, exogenous factors, and information, science and 
monitoring (see Figure 36 and Table 27). Technical capacity was shown to be critical for 
at least two of the conventions in Australia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Mozambique, 
South Korea, and Canada, while exogenous factors affected all countries except 
Argentina in at least one convention. 
  
Table 27 Most relevant challenges in implementation, by country 
 Legislation 
Institutions, 
strategies & 
policies 
Cooperation 
Information, 
science & 
monitoring 
Technical 
measures 
Exogenous 
factors Finances 
DZA    X    
ARG    X   X 
AUS     X X  
CAN  X      
COL    X    
CZE     X   
DEU  X      
MOZ  X  X    
KOR     X X  
THA     X X  
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Best practices and challenges are then the departure point for understanding the 
lessons that conventions and governments need to learn from the process of 
implementation. By evaluating the extent to which countries are implementing the 
environmental conventions and how they are achieving those results, it will be possible to 
design technical assistance and capacity-building mechanisms that are targeted to specific 
needs and characteristics, in order to guarantee that any investment in improving 
implementation obtains the most and best-possible outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT, LEARNING, AND POLICY SPACE 
 
 
 
Problems such as pollution, the presence of harmful chemicals, biodiversity loss, 
and illegal wildlife trade have come to exemplify the importance of international 
environmental cooperation. Environmental conventions are policy responses that regulate 
behaviors and raise awareness about the specific issues they address. In the system of 
global governance, traditional scholarly analyses argue that such conventions are 
effective instruments of governance, since most of the countries fulfill the obligations 
they acquire. However, international environmental conventions have not stopped most 
problems they were designed to address. Meanwhile, new mechanisms of cooperation are 
emerging to protect the environment and promote sustainable development. The recent 
adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the 2030 UN Agenda on 
Sustainable Development reinforces the need for more compelling and effective policies 
that translate international commitments into national strategies. In particular, the fact 
that the SDGs integrate many existing environmental goals—not only as specific goals 
(see Table 29) but also in ways that cut across multiple SDGs—shows the importance of 
monitoring environmental goals to guarantee their effectiveness and implementation.  
This study has argued that implementation requires the expansion of existing 
analytical frameworks. By focusing on four global environmental conventions—the Basel 
and Stockholm conventions in the chemicals and waste cluster, and the Ramsar
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Convention and CITES in the biodiversity cluster—this analysis uses the Environmental 
Conventions Index to measure implementation and creates a baseline. This research, 
therefore, offers new understanding about how countries translate international 
environmental conventions into domestic policies.  In addition, this methodological 
construction also can be applied to other international legal instruments. Furthermore, 
this is the first step of a comprehensive method to improve the implementation and 
effectiveness of international environmental conventions. This concluding chapter 
summarizes the analytical foundations that underlie the study and outlines the main 
theoretical and empirical contributions of this work. It also describes the next steps for a 
suggested research agenda, and maps possible paths to use the main findings as inputs for 
the policy world, creating a science-policy interface that leads to a more effective system 
of global environmental governance.   
 
Implementing global environmental conventions: What is missing? 
 Scholars of global environmental governance and international environmental 
conventions have explained that these agreements bring together governments and 
stakeholders around the establishment of common obligations and mechanisms to 
improve the state of the environment. Since the creation of UN Environment in 1972, the 
number of environmental agreements has increased greatly. Global environmental 
conventions—classified as such because of their global scope and universal 
membership—ensure that governments take coordinated and effective actions to protect 
and improve the environment. Evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of these 
conventions, therefore, is particularly important. Countries need to assess how well they 
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are succeeding at adopting domestic regulations, designing strategies, appointing 
institutions, establishing technical measures, and allocating financial resources to fulfill 
their international environmental obligations. It would then be possible to evaluate how 
the agreements contribute overall to resolving global environmental problems.  
However, evaluating implementation is a complex task. Each convention’s 
definition of implementation differs, and in most cases, it does not consider adoption of 
specific measures to comply with obligations, but focuses exclusively on the solution of 
the environmental problems. Furthermore, the literature argues that implementation 
results depend directly on the capacities and resources available in each country. It also 
fails to offer specific evidence that offers the possibility for comparisons, and for the 
analysis of historical trends. Therefore—as explained in Chapter 1—the puzzle behind 
the implementation of global environmental conventions is based on three specific gaps: 
First, analyses are focused purely on effectiveness, without understanding first how the 
conventions are implemented. Second, no empirical metrics assess the extent to which 
individual countries are fulfilling their global environmental obligations. And third, the 
scope of existing implementation studies is limited to specific group of countries, which 
halts comparisons across countries and conventions. Only by using a standard empirical 
methodology would it be possible to determine the degree of implementation and the 
reasons for variations in countries’ performance. This study addressed these three gaps, 
offering rigorous data and analysis that could inform policy-making processes. 
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Measuring and explaining the implementation of environmental conventions  
 Chapters 4 and 5 presented a detailed analysis of the degree of implementation of 
four global environmental conventions. In addition to this baseline for national 
performance, other findings also deserve attention. First, compliance with national 
reporting obligations is critical. By using national reports as sources material, this study 
reflected on the nature of these information mechanisms. National reports are the most 
basic method used by the agreements for ensuring compliance. However, it is concerning 
that the number of countries submitting reports has been decreasing over the past fifteen 
years, as the cases of the Basel Convention and CITES illustrate starkly (see Figure 37). 
The fact that there are important gaps both in national reporting rates and in the rate of 
compliance with reporting obligations also raises important questions about the structure 
of national report questionnaires, the data collection process to answer them, the timing 
of reporting cycles, and the kinds of instruments that the conventions need to put in place 
to prepare and coordinate with state parties for the submission of information.  
Evidence from the four conventions covered by this research demonstrates that 
close collaborations among the secretariats and countries, together with a clear structure 
of the reports and a specific purpose for the information they collect, could improve the 
results for this important obligation, generating consistent and coherent data about 
implementation. Governments and the conventions’ executive bodies could determine the 
obstacles to the submission of national reports and best practices around structure and 
frequency of those reports, to guarantee that all state parties submit the required 
information to assess progress towards the environmental commitments defined by each 
agreement.  
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Evidence from the four conventions covered by this research demonstrates that 
close collaborations between the secretariats and the countries, together with a clear 
structure of the reports, and a specific purpose for the information they collect, could 
improve the results for this important obligation, generating consistent and coherent data 
about implementation. Governments and the conventions’ executive bodies could 
determine the obstacles to the submission of national reports and the best practices in 
terms of the structure and frequency of national reports, to guarantee that all state parties 
submit the required information to assess their progress towards the environmental 
commitments defined by each agreement.  
 
Figure 37 National reporting rates over time 
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The measurement of implementation for each of the conventions included in this 
study also resulted in important findings. On average, there is still progress to be made in 
all the conventions. There are also marked differences across clusters. Differences in 
index scores between developed and developing countries are more pronounced in the 
chemicals and waste conventions while, on average, scores are equal for the biodiversity 
conventions. This reflects the importance of technical capacities, science, and financial 
resources to achieve the obligations of the Basel and Stockholm Conventions (see Figure 
38). For the Stockholm Convention, the gap between developed and developing countries 
has not narrowed, which calls for additional support for developing countries to 
environmentally sound manage POPs.  
 
Figure 38 Environmental Conventions Index, by convention and type of country 
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In the biodiversity cluster, the positive results of some developing countries in the 
implementation of the Ramsar Convention, can certainly be used to identify best 
practices for CITES and other agreements. For CITES, results show a lower degree of 
implementation than the other agreements, calling for new strategies that integrate the 
measures that parties are expected to establish in terms of institutions and legislation, 
with the mechanisms of international cooperation, and the specific factors that increase 
the complexity of illegal wildlife trade. 
Individual country results also confirm the degree of variation in the process of 
implementation. No country has positive similar scores across all the conventions 
included in this study. As Chapter 6 pointed out, even developed countries face 
challenges, especially at the institutional level, and in balancing the outcomes of their 
economic and environmental policies. Also, the individual countries’ results for the ECI 
show some exceptional cases that require additional analysis. The fact that several 
developing countries rank among the top performers in the Basel and Ramsar 
conventions as well as CITES, indicates that even when dealing with the challenges of 
development, some countries have created successful policies and measures that 
contribute to achieving global environmental goals. Interestingly, these are not the same 
countries for all four conventions. The performance of Argentina, Colombia, Rwanda, 
and Nigeria for the Basel Convention; Malaysia, Peru, Mozambique, and Thailand for 
CITES; and Mali, Uganda, Viet Nam, Kenya, Indonesia, and Bahamas for Ramsar 
illustrates this diversity. 
The results of the ECI illustrate the need for a more detailed analysis that 
examines each of the indicators and explains the reasons for the decline that some 
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countries are experiencing in the degree of implementation. ECI analysis also offers 
important insights about the factors that explain implementation, going beyond traditional 
approaches that focus solely on countries’ performance and indicate that developed 
countries with strong institutional backgrounds perform better. The best practices and 
challenges identified in Chapter 6 illustrate these assumptions and demonstrate the need 
for targeted implementation mechanisms across conventions (see Table 28). The fact that 
the countries recognize cooperation as a best practice most of the times demonstrates the 
increasing role of stakeholders and IGOs in the system of governance. Countries need to 
work with international organizations, with the conventions’ executive bodies, and with 
stakeholders to achieve their commitments. Challenges in terms of technical measures, 
exogenous factors and information, scientific assessment, and data availability also 
require urgent action. 
 
Table 28 Best practices and challenges ranked by importance 
Best practices Challenges 
1. Cooperation 
2. Institutions, strategies, and policies 
3. Legislation 
4. Information, science, and monitoring 
5. Public awareness 
6. Technical measures 
1. Technical measures 
2. Exogenous factors 
3. Information, science, and 
monitoring 
4. Institutions, strategies, and policies 
5. Legislation 
6. Finances 
7. Cooperation 
 
Rethinking the process of implementation  
 This research brings a new dimension to the understanding of the process of 
implementation of global environmental conventions. First, this study recognized that 
implementation is a decisive step towards effectiveness that needs to be measured and 
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understood separately. Secondly, this research introduced empirical data that allows for 
comparisons across countries and conventions; and third, it designed a systematic 
methodology for the assessment of implementation. The national implementation profiles 
presented in Chapter 6 complement existing models of the variables and issues that 
influence countries’ engagement to global environmental commitments. They also 
connect national policies with specific global environmental obligations, to improve 
countries’ outcomes in terms of implementation. Countries and conventions now have 
information available both to strengthen their systems of environmental governance, and 
to support the creation of better and more effective approaches to environmental 
protection and sustainable development.  
Questions also emerge regarding the connection between the degree of 
implementation and the role of the conventions in solving environmental problems. For 
example, the different ECI results between the chemicals and waste and the biodiversity 
clusters inform discussions about how the nature of environmental problems influences 
the implementation of agreements. Establishing the relationship between the ECI and 
variables that measure the state of the environment—in the issues addressed by the 
conventions—will serve to determine if implementation and effectiveness are correlated. 
Variables such as the presence of POPs in the environment, changes in wetlands’ surface, 
or variations in trade in endangered species can be used to assess the status of the 
environmental issues addressed by each of the conventions, and will offer new insights 
about the actual contributions of the conventions to improvement or decline of the 
environmental conditions they address   
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 The analysis of the institutional arrangements behind each environmental 
convention also offers a new vision about how the interaction between governments and 
executive bodies influences the implementation of international environmental law. 
Traditionally, conventions act as agents of the mandate given to them by state parties. 
The evidence from the conventions presented in this dissertation explains the interactions 
between secretariats and states, and the extent to which the executive bodies perform the 
mandate given to them by the state parties. Results from the ECI and this study’s analysis 
of the conventions explain that the extent to which the secretariats are fulfilling their 
functions—and in some cases additional functions oriented to coordination, visibility, and 
engagement—and contributing to the successful implementation of conventions.  
  
Connecting academia and the policy world 
 By expanding our understanding about the effective implementation of global 
environmental conventions, academia can provide input for policy processes that address 
planetary challenges and proscribe human activities harmful to the environment. 
Measuring and explaining implementation support effective and better governance, 
through the definition of a series of policy recommendations that inform governments 
and international organizations. The best practices identified in this dissertation can be 
used to design strategies in specific policy areas, and new research projects that can be 
developed to expand the work to other global conventions as well as other international 
agreements in policy areas related to environment, development, and sustainability.  
The Environmental Conventions Index also can be used as a public information 
resource. The Center for Governance and Sustainability plans to make to make the ECI 
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available to the public in 2018, in a user-friendly online format. Furthermore, since the 
index is composed of specific indicators on issues such as legislation institutions, 
information, technical environmental operations, and finances, it offers a wealth of data 
on areas of implementation that require more progress, contributing to the definition of 
targeted capacity-building mechanisms that can improve national performance and 
consequently how successfully conventions themselves address environmental 
problems. The Environmental Conventions Project will comprise six analytical outreach 
strands: 
• Data analysis, through the development of a systematic protocol and 
methodology to evaluate the level of implementation of the four conventions 
included in this study, applicable not only to environmental conventions but also 
to other international law instruments. Making all the data on implementation 
available will constitute a central body of information for governments, 
conventions, and other stakeholders, providing insights on variables relevant to 
policy processes beyond implementation. 
• Policy recommendations, opening space for using the outcomes of the proposed 
research in additional projects directed not only to governments and the 
secretariats of global environmental conventions but also to stakeholders and civil 
society representatives, and fostering dialogue about the need to enhance the 
capacity of countries and conventions to improve their policies and strategic 
approaches towards the achievement of global environmental goals. This is 
particularly relevant in the current context, when the international community is 
embarking on a new development agenda oriented towards sustainable 
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development and with a significant emphasis on several environmental challenges 
included in the conventions.  
• Creation of a policy space, to bring together and stimulate collaboration among 
officials from the convention secretariats and national governments as well as 
scientific and policy experts. Developing this research within the Center for 
Governance and Sustainability will provide information significant to the 
analysis, since the center will convene, consult with, and engage officials from 
environmental conventions in developing the data analysis framework, evaluation 
of policy processes, and articulation of future strategies. 
• Communication, since the ECI is a powerful tool for users to communicate which 
countries are leaders and laggards in meeting global environmental goals. In turn, 
this will engage and inform the public and empower citizens to demand improved 
performance.  
• Leadership development, as the Center for Governance and Sustainability, using 
the key findings in this project, will create training programs to provide guidance 
to governments and environmental conventions officials in substantive 
environmental policy issues as well as in negotiation and conflict resolution 
processes.  
• Solution of global environmental problems, supporting countries and 
environmental conventions with information needed to take actions to improve 
environmental performance. Offering a scientific perspective on the process of 
implementation and its connections to solving environmental problems will 
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improve the policy-making processes and the conventions’ effectiveness in 
addressing environmental challenges.  
The ECI, its national implementation profiles and explanatory analysis, together 
with the results of additional projects in terms of policy recommendations and potential 
training modules for capacity building, constitute a robust portfolio of resources for 
giving governments, international organizations and stakeholders fresh ideas to enhance 
international cooperation and bridge the gap between policy and solutions. Furthermore, 
with its emphasis on transparency and accountability, this Environmental Conventions 
Project will challenge assumptions about reporting and performance on the treaties it 
analyzes, and can offer strategies for improvement on a case-by-case basis.  
 
What is next? 
 While multiple studies have previously tried to evaluate implementation, the 
systematic approach created by this research project provides a new repository of data 
that can be the departure point for academic analysis and policy recommendations. In 
terms of future research, the application of the methodology to other environmental 
conventions is an obvious and necessary next step. Additional in-depth analyses that 
focus on the results that individual countries are achieving could also be developed. 
Countries could then increase the salience of environmental issues in foreign policy, 
which has traditionally been dominated by issues of security, conflict, and development. 
Furthermore, the role and relevance of environmental conventions in achieving the SDGs 
under the umbrella of the new Sustainable Development Agenda is critical. The 
conventions and the indicators that comprise the ECI can provide data and information to 
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measure progress on some of the goals. The SDGs, targets, and indicators include direct 
and indirect references to environmental conventions (see Table 29). Some references are 
specific to environmental problems, while others are linked to the system of governance 
as means of implementation. For example, all conventions can contribute to the 
implementation of SDG16 (Peaceful and Inclusive Societies), and SDG17 (Partnerships 
for the Goals). The SDGs, therefore, connect with the international environmental 
conventions, and governments can learn from the agreements about the challenges of 
governance instruments, implementation, and responsibilities such as national reporting, 
monitoring, and follow-up. 
  
Table 29 Reference to environmental conventions in the SDGs 
 
SDG  Target Conventions 
SDG2  
Zero Hunger 
 
2.4. Ensure sustainable food production systems and 
implement resilient agricultural practices 
Basel 
Stockholm 
Ramsar 
SDG3  
Good Health and 
Well-being 
3.9 Reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from 
hazardous chemicals, pollution, and contamination 
Basel 
Stockholm 
3.d Strengthen countries’ capacity for risk reduction and 
management of global and national health risks 
Basel  
Stockholm 
SDG6  
Clean Water and 
Sanitation 
6.3 Improve water quality by reducing pollution and 
eliminating release of hazardous chemicals 
Basel 
Stockholm 
6.6 Protect and restore water-related ecosystems, 
including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, 
aquifers and lakes 
Ramsar 
SDG11 
Sustainable Cities 
and Communities 
11.6 Reduce the adverse environment per capita impact of 
cities by paying attention to waste management 
Basel 
Stockholm 
SDG12  
Sustainable 
consumption and 
production 
12.2 Achieve the sustainable management and efficient 
use of natural resources 
Ramsar 
CITES 
12.4 Achieve the environmentally sound management of 
chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle 
Basel 
Stockholm 
12.5 Achieve the environmentally sound management of 
chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle 
Basel 
Stockholm 
SDG13  
Climate Action 
13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for 
effective climate change-related planning and 
management in least developed countries and small 
island developing states  
Ramsar 
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SDG  Target Conventions 
SDG14  
Life Below Water 
14.1 Prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of 
all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, 
including marine debris and nutrient pollution  
Basel 
Stockholm 
14.2 Sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal 
ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts,  
CITES 
14.4 Effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and 
destructive fishing practices, and implement science-
based management plans, in order to restore fish 
stocks  
CITES 
SDG15 
Life on Land 
15.1 Ensure the conservation, restoration, and sustainable 
use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems 
and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, 
mountains and drylands, in line with obligations 
under international agreements  
Ramsar  
15.7 Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking 
of protected species of flora and fauna and address 
both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products  
CITES 
15.b Mobilize significant resources from all sources and 
at all levels to finance sustainable forest 
management and provide adequate incentives to 
developing countries to advance such management, 
including for conservation and reforestation  
CITES 
Sources of data: (UN General Assembly, 2015; UNEP, 2016b) 
 
Better understanding of implementation also offers the space for policy action and 
cooperation to create a new generation of leadership—at the national level, in global 
institutions, and in the higher education system—motivating organizations to produce 
this type of analysis and to support policy-making processes with rigor and engagement.  
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